Europe: the continent of immigrants
Trends, structures and policy implications

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Introduction

Marek Okolski

This volume constitutes a final and major outcome of a research project titled *Mediterranean and Eastern Central European countries as new immigration destinations in the European Union* (acronym: IDEA), which was carried out in 2007-2009 by a consortium of 11 European academic institutions. The consortium comprised (in alphabetical order):

- Central European Forum for Migration and Population Research, CEFMR (International Organisation\(^1\) for Migration), Poland;
- Centre for International Migration and Refugee Studies (Institute of Ethnic and National Minority Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, MTA), Hungary;
- Centre of Migration Research, CMR (University of Warsaw); Poland (the coordinating institution);
- Centre of Research in Economic Sociology and Organisation, SOCIUS, Portugal;
- Department of Social Geography and Regional Development (Charles University, UKP), the Czech Republic;
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, ELIAMEP, Greece;
- Institute for Urban and Regional Studies, ISR (Austrian Academy of Sciences, OEAW), Austria;
- Institute for Research on Population and Social Policies, IRPPS (National Research Council, CNR), Italy;
- Institute of Political Science, ISP (Paris University X Nanterre, UPX), France;
- Mediterranean Laboratory of Sociology, LAMES; National Centre of Scientific Research, CNRS), France;
- Ortega y Gasset University Institute for Research, IUIOG, Spain.

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\(^1\)The project was financially supported by the European Commission within the Sixth Framework Programme.
Change is inseparable of modern life. One of its fundamental manifestations taking place before our eyes is the change in migration patterns. Bearing this in mind, IDEA focused on a systematic inflow of foreign nationals and the change of migration status: from net emigration to net immigration as an all-European phenomenon. The nature of that phenomenon was analysed in two perspectives: historical and geographical. Intuitively, countries located in Northern and Western parts of the continent seemed to be the pioneers in the transition of migration status, and at the time of project conceptualisation those countries might have “accumulated” relatively larger experience than other European countries with respect to the inflow of foreign nationals. Whereas Southern countries underwent that principal change in migration pattern in a considerably later time, countries of Eastern Europe are lagging behind even more, and in fact at present “immigration experience” of the latter countries still seems rather poor. This is why within the IDEA project different groups of European countries were distinguished with respect to “maturity” of their immigration.

The specificity of immigration in those groups of countries including the underlying factors and contexts became major research concern of IDEA. More specifically, the project aimed at identifying the similarities and differences in immigration within and between the groups, and ultimately at testing the concept of regional or all-European patterns of immigration. Additional objective of the project was the comparison and assessment of institutional, administrative and political background of immigration in the countries of destination, and an examination of the relevance and effectiveness of migration policies. Furthermore, in view of potential similarities in immigration patterns and, particularly, a tendency towards a more effective management of immigration in Europe, IDEA attempted at a forecasting exercise that concerned future inflows of third country nationals to Europe.

All in all, the strategic goal of the IDEA project was providing support for the European and national immigration policies. In order to attain that the researchers undertook to reach and communicate its principal results the five
target audience groups: (1) policy makers at both EU and national levels; (2) representatives of administration at both EU, national and local; (3) NGOs; (4) researchers and (5) general public.

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Migration as a phenomenon that exists on the circumferences of many different fields of science needs approaches that are interdisciplinary and capable of exploiting various data sources and methods of analysis. In coping with that challenge IDEA brought together several researchers representing various disciplines of the social sciences, and vast and diversified experience in migration studies. All these helped to reach an adequate synergy and complementarities while conducting this comprehensive and multi-level project.

A pre-requisite for bringing the IDEA objectives into reality, was incremental research process based on sequential studying of immigration in the groups of countries according to their maturity or advancement in migration processes (immigration cycle). This became possible mainly thanks to the reconstruction of past immigration trends, dynamics, patterns and types, and the analysis of migration policies and their effectiveness in the investigated countries. All that was to serve testing two key hypotheses:

- first, claiming that the patterns of immigration in the new destination countries of Europe recall historical patterns found in the old immigration countries, and
- second, assuming that in the transition from net emigration to net immigration status and passing through the stages of immigration cycle, European countries do not behave homogeneously, in a uniform way, but rather that each individual country (even within a given group of countries) displays a number of distinctive features with respect, among other things, to: geographical location, migration tradition, historical time of the transition and global context (at the onset of transition).
The value added of this peculiar research process was a mutual learning, or to put it otherwise, learning one from another group of countries and testing the other’s findings, acting more as navigators in exploring new immigration grounds, which was especially so in case of relatively “immature” immigration countries. Thus, the project has created a unique opportunity to learn lessons derived from experiences of the countries being at different stages of the immigration cycle. This also included comparing or even benchmarking the mechanisms, practices and solutions within the three groups of countries – from those most developed in terms of immigration (old immigration countries), through the fairly developed (new immigration countries), to the least developed (future immigration countries).

The principal research stages included:

- firstly, a design of project methodology and conceptual framework;
- secondly, an analysis of the evolution of migration process in each individual country included in the project;
- thirdly, a synthesis of the regional group of countries’ findings and (where possible) comparative future-oriented considerations,
- fourthly, a design and an examination of the forecasting tools for predicting future immigration, with the use of internationally comparable time-series of demographic, statistical and economic as well as relevant political information and
- fifthly, building up of the policy recommendations, both addressed locally and to European decision makers.

Therefore, this has created an opportunity to improve tools for EU “open method of coordination” in the area of migration policy and (within that) to focus on labour migration\(^2\), by evaluation of data sources and their comparability and by creating specific analytical tools. The Europe-wide scope of research (with comparative and case study approach, where applicable) and generalisations (where possible) that the project had offered,

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2 The method rests on soft mechanisms such as guidelines and indicators, benchmarking and sharing best practice. The method relies more on a form of peer pressure and naming and shaming, as no member state wants to be seen as the worst in a given policy area.
has ensured that the results and conclusions are considerably universal and applicable to many European countries. For this reason all Member States of the European Union, not only countries approached in the project, are welcome to draw from the experiences and tools of the project and if necessary develop them further, according to their specific situation and needs.

Co-operation with respect to imparting the in-depth understanding of local (national) and regional (in terms of regions of Europe) migration conditionings and migration processes to the identified target audience was based on several research actions taken at various stages of the project, which were coherent in terms of research directions related to: immigration histories, immigration policies and their effectiveness, current trends of legal and illegal immigration and the impacts of immigration. The activities within that streamline of the project included: meeting with migration policy stakeholders and communicating project results to various target audience groups by means of seminars, leaflets, policy briefs and diverse academic publications³.

All these point to that the IDEA project exhibits great complexity and uniqueness, in terms of such aspects as:

- gradualism of the research process;
- interdisciplinary and multi-technique approaches;
- diversity of data sources;
- a wide geographical coverage, and
- a strong applied-social-science-orientation and a strong policy nexus.

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This volume presents a highly synthetic view of IDEA researchers. Its contents extends from considerations on a general historical trend common to the countries of Europe of passing from the state of massive emigration to the state of massive immigration, to an overview of commonalities and

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³ The published IDEA outcomes include: nine national, three regional and one forecasting report (all within the IDEA Working Papers series), nine country-specific or one synthetic policy oriented executive summary (all within the IDEA Policy Briefs series) and two region-oriented volumes of comparative character (under preparation). In addition, the IDEA findings have been systematically reported and summarised in IDEA Newsletter (11 issues). All that material is available by entering IDEA website: http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl.
diversities in immigration cycle observed across groups of European countries, to an in-depth analysis of immigration patterns in various parts of the continent, to a reflection on the feasibility and validity of predicting the future European immigration, and to an assessment of immigration policies in Europe and policy recommendations.

In its first chapter Marek Okolski deals with the transition of migration status among European countries. The author argues that the transition was (or – in case of some “late coming” countries – will be) unavoidable process stemming (although in various times) from a mix of demographic, socio-economic and political changes specific to modern Europe.

The theme of chapter two is various European immigration patterns and regimes. Its author, Joaquin Arango introduces major underlying IDEA hypotheses and research propositions, and he examines various immigration patterns and regimes found by the project against such conceptual framework.

Three following subsequent chapters give an overview of immigration in various parts of Europe. Chapter three, authored by Heinz Fassmann and Ursula Reger, is devoted to the “old” immigration countries, and it contains description of the complete migration cycle in the mature countries of Western and Northern Europe. In chapter four Joao Peixoto and a team of co-authors depict what could be called the southern immigration model. They attempt at identifying distinct and common features of immigration to “new” European destination countries, i.e. four Mediterranean member-countries of the EU (including Portugal), and, especially, at pointing to the features that distinguish the immigration experience of those countries from that of countries of Western and Northern Europe. In turn, chapter five, written by Dusan Drbohlav in collaboration with several other researchers, undertakes a little blurred issue of the inflow of foreign nationals to countries of Eastern Europe who recently accessed to the EU. The picture presented in that chapter is far from being clear and unequivocal; it is probably too early to determine whether a new distinct pattern of immigration (at the same time,
consistent with the European immigration cycle) will have emerged in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and to find its major characteristics.

In chapter six Arkadiusz Wisniowski and the co-authors consider the main methodological premises of migration forecasting that would properly account for uncertainty of immigration and respective forecasting error. By applying the Bayesian approach, they develop an innovative technique of immigration forecasting and test it empirically in case of a number of European receiving countries.

Finally, Magdalena Lesinska, the author of chapter seven synthesises the experience of immigration policy in the three groups of countries considered, pointing to its complexity and limitations but also to common (all-European) mainstreams. The chapter includes major policy recommendations at national and EU levels that have been suggested within IDEA.

Overall, although the book is far from being conclusive in its search for European model of immigration, it seems to have made an important step forward in that direction, by increasing comprehensiveness and widening scope of the analysis and shedding light on new or emerging migration-related phenomena.
Chapter 1

Transition from emigration to immigration: is it a destiny of modern European countries?

Marek Okolski

1. Purpose of the chapter

The present book makes an extensive use of two basic concepts: migration transition and migration (or/and immigration) cycle. It has been argued within the framework of the IDEA project, which emanated those concepts, that over time, under specific circumstances, individual European countries transform their migration status from emigration to immigration. Such change of migration status has been termed the “migration transition”. The “migration cycle” involves three consecutive stages: the first when a country is overwhelmed by the outflow of its inhabitants and the proportion of foreign nationals in the total population continues to be marginal, the second when the migration transition takes place, and the third when immigration systematically predominates over emigration and foreigners constitute a considerable proportion of the population. The migration transition also involves stages, which can be distinguished according to the degree of maturity of a given country in terms of its immigration pattern or regime. A sequence of those stages – from an incipient (a preliminary) stage to a mature (an advanced) stage – has been called the “immigration cycle”.

The main hypothesis underlying IDEA was that each European country finds itself in a specific stage of the migration cycle and/or (a majority of them) of the immigration cycle. Consequently, countries embraced by the project were divided in three groups: the most advanced (“old”), the moderately advanced (“new”) and the least advanced (“future”). As it will be shown in part 3 of this chapter, of all nine countries analysed in depth within IDEA, Austria and France belong the first group (“new”), Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain to the second group (“new”) and the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to
the third group (“future”). In turn, Ruby Gropas and Anna Triandafyllidou (2007) speak of five types of present European countries with regard to migration patterns: old host countries, recent host countries, countries in transition, small island countries and non-immigrant countries. Leaving aside “small islands” (according to Gropas and Triandafyllidou, Cyprus and Malta; I would add Iceland here), this typology, apart from the three groups distinguished by IDEA, accounts for non-immigration, the status which has been attributed to the Baltic States, Slovakia and Slovenia. In this chapter I address specifically the process of becoming a country of immigration.

To begin with, we should be more specific when using the notion of “immigration country” (or “receiving area”). Does any inflow of people (foreigners alone or also return migrants?, settlers alone or also circular migrants?) matter, irrespective of its volume, durability or form, or should there be some additional requirements? It seems that immigration to be studied as such (especially in the context of an immigration country) needs to attain certain (high) critical mass and to be a relatively sustained phenomenon. Moreover it seems conceivable that high and sustained immigration goes hand in hand with net emigration. In turn, assuming that no country becomes immigration country out of blue but rather reaches that status in the course of transformation from net emigration to net immigration, it seems useful – at least insofar as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are concerned – to extend the concept of immigration cycle by adding to the cycle an early stage (prenatal or embryonic, to use obstetrics terminology), in which emigration declines and nucleuses of immigrant settlements are being set up. For Central and Eastern European countries (.probably as much as for some other countries, e.g. Finland, Iceland and Ireland) the real analytical issue where respective hypotheses could be empirically tested is if (and if so, how) those countries are changing their status from net emigration to net immigration. Such approach, however, requires taking a longer view back into the history.
2. Factors of European migration in a historical perspective

In 19th century all societies of Europe experienced a massive territorial mobility, including massive emigration. Compared to the migrations observed in earlier periods of European history, the 19th century mobility displayed two important distinct characteristics. First of all, it was by and large intentionally and actually of settlement type. In addition, it was principally individualistic and economically-oriented, as it was undertaken by entrepreneurs (including farmers) and workers in search of gainful employment.

It all started with capitalism and modernisation as a sustained quasi-unidirectional process of complex social change. Industrial revolution in England, an early component and factor of modernisation, gave rise to an unprecedented and long-lasting decline in mortality and accelerated population growth. The population explosion became all-European phenomenon. According to Walter F. Willcox (quoted by Chesnais 1986), between 1800 and 1930 the population whose mother tongue was Russian increased by factor six, while in case of English the growth was five fold, Italian and Polish – three and a half fold, Spanish – three fold, German – two and a half fold and French – a bit more than two fold.

Increasing population nourished industrial growth, both by enhancing demand for goods and by supplying labour market with ever larger labour. Modernisation and demographic transition became interwoven and mutually interdependent (Dyson 2001).

Initially, surpluses of population and labour occurred mainly in backward areas, which hardly were influenced or penetrated by modern social change and the related institutions or social relationships. Thus the flow of people in response to unsatisfied labour demand claimed by modernising areas took a quite clear direction – from peripheries adhering (at least partly) to subsistence (pre-capitalist) economy to centres relying on full-fledged markets and highly monetised (capitalist) economy. This in turn, inter alia,
contributed to the expansion of demand for goods, and stimulated the growth of production.

Population growth in Europe in 19th century turned out such high that the flows of people from the periphery to the core, typically from rural to urban areas, both within particular countries and in trans-European space, did not substantially reduce the population surplus and emerging demographic-economic imbalance. Hence a large overseas emigration occurred. Overall it took an unprecedented scale. While around 1800 the population of all continents but Europe probably consisted of less than five million European settlers or their ancestors, nowadays the respective number is as high as between 550 and 650 million (Grabowska-Lusinska & Okolski 2009).

With modernisation and colonisation by Europeans of the overseas, the world has gradually been divided into a group of core (or centre) countries where modern changes were either complete or strongly advanced and a group of peripheral countries where these changes were immature. A long-term tendency that pertains to that division is moving of individual countries from the former group towards the latter.

Depending on the course of both modernisation and demographic transition, occasionally the demand for labour in the centre exceeded the supply of migrant labour (originating in a predominant part from the periphery) or the opposite happened. The former case favoured immigration whereas the latter case emigration. A general tendency, however, was that of net emigration in early stages of the economic and demographic change and net immigration in late stages. France, for instance, where demographic transition was relatively ‘low’ and social change was rather deep, experienced very little emigration and it rather quickly became a net immigration country.

The fact that the status of net immigration is typical of an advanced modernity, which coexists with demographic transition coming close to its end, results from the very nature of the latter. The end of demographic transition means, among other things, a very low fertility, close to zero
population growth and fast population ageing. Under the circumstances of fast economic growth this unmistakably leads to shortages of labour and its suction from outside (third countries).

A shift from a relative abundance of labour to its deficit could be seriously affected (amplified or retarded) by some other factors. One of those catalysts is the date of initiation of modern changes or strictly speaking a relative position with respect to modernity of a given society vis-à-vis other societies at the moment of the take-off. The later a society enters modernisation, the more can it borrow or copy from the pioneers or predecessors, and the less consistent seem to be social changes in that society. The case of modernisation of Mediterranean and Central and Eastern European societies may serve as an illustration here. Nevertheless it might be so that the latecomers encounter more acute and prolonged imbalance between the unsatisfied demand for labour generated by the centre and the excessive supply of labour generated by the periphery.

Other crucial factor that contributes to diversity among various societies in the course of migration status change are cultural differences between those societies. The societies that are culturally close to each other are more likely to undergo a similar course of the transformation from net emigration to net immigration status than those more distant.

Both the modern social changes and demographic transition are not uniform processes, and, among other things, they heavily depend upon the point of start and cultural specificity. For instance, the latecomers usually experience very fast decline in mortality and strong upsurge in natural increase relative to the pioneers while the extent of tradition and subsistence economy among the latecomers at the start is comparatively larger, which makes modern change more arduous and slow. Under such circumstances, even if emigration takes a large size, surplus of population is being continuously reproduced if not increased, which hampers or undermines the social change.
In order to attune the two processes, i.e. the demographic and social change, a bit of luck is necessary. In case of Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal) the luck came with a coincidence of a decline in fertility in those countries and a rise in the outflow of population in response to an insatiate demand for foreign labour in the pioneer countries of Western and Northern Europe. This happened in the 1950s and 1960s when the former countries had already been fairly advanced in modernisation of their institutions and socio-economic structures. The outflow of redundant population has then produced crowding-out effect and made room for the completion of modern changes.

3. Diversity of migration trends across Europe

Let me now take a bit shorter view, and focus on European migration in the post-Second World War period. Looking at basic migration trends in that period from the perspective of the transformation of migration status – from net emigration to net immigration, it might be observed that whereas major characteristics of that change were preserved, it was by and large influenced by a new post-war political reality. In order to clarify this point, I will refer to the following division of the post-war period into five stages:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage/sub-period</th>
<th>Epitome characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 1945-1947</td>
<td>Post-war reconstruction; new partition of Europe; adjustment migration. Political bi-polarity: “cold war” and “arm race”; blooming western market economies vis-à-vis state-controlled and non-efficient economies of Southern and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE); western economic integration (EEC); strong labour flow from the South to the West and suppressed labour mobility in the East.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 1948-1973</td>
<td>Political “détente”; major cracks on political system in CEE (1980, Poland); globalisation challenges: economic restructuring and deeper integration (inclusion of the South); search for available low-cost labour: inflow of irregular migrants from CEE (including many “ethnic Germans” leaving their CEE countries of origin and entering Germany as tourists) and non-European countries; failure of “socialist modernisation”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 1974-1988</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. 1989-2004

Breakdown of the communist block: end of bi-polarity; sudden increase in population displacements: regional conflicts and wars, new political entities; a complete project of European integration (incl. common immigration policy and management); economic transition in CEE.

Restoration of European unity; strong competition on the part of non-European economies; human capital deficits: continuous demand for immigrants vis-à-vis intensified difficulties in migrant integration.

5. after 2004/2007

Having distinguished those stages or sub-periods, I will point to basic differences in migration trends between three groups of countries: Western and Northern Europe (WNE), Southern (Mediterranean) Europe and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). What is essential for this geographical breakdown, is, among other things, a distance in historical time of the initiation of modern social change - WNE countries took precedence of Mediterranean countries, and the latter took precedence of CEE countries.

To facilitate my task, subsequent sub-periods have been identified by a predominant and specific to a given sub-period flow of people, and called, respectively: “post-war adjustment migration”, “migration related to labour recruitment”, “migration related to ‘new globalisation’”, “post-communist migration” and “post-enlargement migration”, and then succinctly described, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage/sub-period</th>
<th>Western and Northern (WNE)</th>
<th>Southern (Mediterranean)</th>
<th>Central and Eastern (CEE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Post-war adjustment migration (1945 - 1947)</td>
<td>post-war return migration, politically- and ethnicity-motivated displacements (Germany)</td>
<td>(low skilled) labour outflow (Greece)</td>
<td>ban on international movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Migration related to labour recruitment/ bilateral agreements (1948 - 1973)</td>
<td>labour shortages</td>
<td>freeing labour markets of redundant labour</td>
<td>under urbanisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>foreign recruitment</td>
<td>high net emigration</td>
<td>GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (political exceptions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>towards net immigration</td>
<td>networks and ethnic niches in WNE</td>
<td>Yugoslavia (economic exception)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>fears of brain drain in some WNE countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage/ sub-period</td>
<td>Western and Northern (WNE)</td>
<td>Southern (Mediterranean)</td>
<td>Central and Eastern (CEE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Migration of the onset of “new globalisation” (1974 -1988)</td>
<td>• cessation of recruitment • labour market segmentation • inflow for family reunion • inflow of asylum-seekers • irregular employment of foreigners</td>
<td>• rapid decline in outflow • labour deficit → admission of foreigners (large scale of irregular work) • towards net immigration</td>
<td>• movements contained within CEE region • resumption of ethnicity-motivated outflow • onset of incomplete migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Post-communist migration – related to disruption of communism and orientation towards “Fortress Europe” (1989 - 2004)</td>
<td>• advanced segmentation of labour market (secondary jobs for foreigners) • massive inflow of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers • migrant smugglers and traffickers • selective admission for the highly skilled</td>
<td></td>
<td>• incomplete migration • post-communist adjustment migration • economic polarisation within CEE → intra-regional movements • towards net immigration (Czech Republic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Post-enlargement migration – integrated European migration space (after 2004/2007)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

prospective trends in the 10-15-year time span

• inflows due to population stagnation and ageing (main underlying factors)
• further segmentation of labour markets
• intra-EU competition for the highly skilled
• low level of intra-EU mobility (some but shallow potential in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states → completion of labour market draining of redundant labour

Right after the period of post-war adjustment migration, WNE, facing serious labour deficits and a challenge of deep economic restructuring, became ready for a massive intake of foreign workers. Soon a continuous flow of immigrants was triggered off, and after some time WNE countries, one by one, turned net immigration area.
Many of those workers originated from Mediterranean countries. According to various accounts, between 1950 and 1970 from 7 to 10 million persons emigrated from Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal (circa 8-10 per cent of the mid-period population), of which a half to WNE (Layard et al. 1992). Such huge outflow was possible due to a considerable under-employment or disguised unemployment in those countries. In more underdeveloped areas of those countries the outflow represented up to 85-90 per cent of the potential increase of the labour force (Danieli 1972). Parallel to this, from the late 1960s all four Mediterranean countries encountered a rapid and consistent decline in fertility – from a maximum TFR between 2.4 and 3.1 to 1.4-1.7 around 1985 (United Nations 2007). Therefore the current labour potential was significantly reduced due to emigration, and a continuation of diminishing labour potential into the future was secured by turning to below-replacement fertility.

Those were the demographic underpinnings for a major social change and sustained modern economic development. The social change in Italy has been accelerated in the 1950s, in Spain in the 1960s, while in Greece and Portugal only in the 1980s. In each case, however, a breakthrough came along with opening up of the economy and integration with more developed European countries.

As a consequence, after 1973, in the sub-period of migration related to “new globalisation”, Mediterranean countries, first Italy and later the three other, became affected by shortages of labour. The outflow was drastically reduced and soon the labour markets were opened to the inflow of foreigners. By the end of 1980s the four countries changed their migration status and came to be the net immigration areas.

Contrary to WNE and Mediterranean Europe, the population movements in CEE over the period up to the late 1980s were strongly subordinated of to a political factor. In fact, after an abrupt interruption of massive post-war resettlements in 1948, both the outflows and the inflows were reduced to virtually exceptional cases. Not only international migration came to a halt;
any cross-border mobility was effectively stopped. Under the circumstances of a high natural increase and a sluggish economic development, a large backlog of unsatisfied migration appeared in many CEE countries, notably in Poland and Romania.

However, in the course of time, and hand in hand with softening grip on human freedoms, a variety of forms of the out-movement were observed, which became an alternative to “regular” emigration. Those movements, heavily controlled by the authorities, reflected a specific pattern which was concomitant with an internal political cycle. In particular, compared to a “norm”, many more people were allowed to leave the country at times of political turmoil and a shift in political leadership. Step by step, more and more residents of CEE travelling abroad became the residents of foreign countries – as immigrants or temporary workers, or refugees, or co-ethnics, or undocumented migrants (e.g. “overstaying tourists”).

What fundamentally differed CEE countries from other source countries important for European migration with respect to the population movements were, until at least 1989, their concealed motives and forms. While a great majority of migrants from CEE sought employment in foreign countries and that was undoubtedly the main motive of their migration, they were compelled to declare other purposes both to the administration of their country of origin and host countries simply in order to be allowed to leave or enter and stay, respectively. This forced them to an unstable and disadvantageous if not precarious situation in labour market and social life in general. Even after 1989, when the exit from CEE countries became unlimited and the residents could easily enter many countries of their “traditional” destination, the migrants as a rule could legally be only tourists in those countries, which rarely was their actual motive of a foreign journey.

Because of their more or less irregular status, most migrants originating from CEE suffered from discriminatory practices by employers and in particular were underpaid. As a means of coping with that situation, migrants developed a peculiar pattern of mobility that enabled them to boost the “real
value” of their foreign earnings. It was incomplete migration, a circulation of individual household members, often repeated, characterised by a short-term employment abroad and a very high rate of earnings remitted or repatriated to migrant's home country where the cost of living was substantially lower. By spending most of “foreign money” in the country of origin, migrant’s real wage became relatively high and enabled migrant households a survival if not a decent life. Simultaneously, by the same token, migrant households remained anchored and indeed petrified in the peripheries of CEE, despite mobility of some of their members.

Hence for a long time, also over the entire sub-period of post-communist migration, the flows of people from CEE could hardly contribute to freeing respective countries of redundant people. Despite growing out-migration, the surpluses of labour were constantly reproduced. In the period of post-communist migration, however, there occurred at least one radical change, which was in line with what happened earlier in WNE and Mediterranean Europe – fertility decreased to much below the replacement level. While in 1985 TFR was still as high as 2.3 in Poland, Romania and Slovakia (then a part of Czechoslovakia) and 2.1 in the present Baltic States, in 2000 it everywhere in the region reached the level around 1.3 (United Nations 2007). This heralded a rapidly shrinking demographic potential of labour in the years to come.

Now it is time to ask a question whether the accession of CEE countries to the European Union resulted in any significant change in migration of their populations.

It will be possible to attempt at reliable estimates of the post-enlargement outflow only when the results of the forthcoming population censuses in various countries are known. At present we may at best speak of “guesstimates”. This is because no record adequately measures various types of flows and stocks of migrants. Typically stocks differ across countries with regard to the definition of an immigrant resident, and do not distinguish those who migrated before the date of the accession and those who did that
after, especially those for whom the act of accession provided an opportunity for changing their status – from clandestine and undocumented to regular and documented. In turn, flows are not broken down according to the length of migrant’s stay in the destination country, which may result in a multiple count and other deficiencies.

Those reservations notwithstanding, it could be responsibly claimed that May 1st, 2004, the date of the first eastward EU enlargement marked the beginning of a “new quality” in the outflow of people from CEE. It is quite clear, after two and a half year, that the change in differentia specifica of migration embraced many of its aspects – the volume of flows, which increased substantially, and their composition – regional, social, economic and demographic. Also forms of flows and motives of migrants became more diversified.

A cautious estimate of the World Bank (2006) referring to the outflow from the EU8 accession countries to the three EU15 countries who on May 1st, 2004 did not introduce transitory precautions protecting their labour markets, implied a very large scale of mobility. It claimed that over initial 20 months, until December 31st, 2004, Lithuania lost more than 3.3 per cent of its working age population, Latvia 2.4 per cent, Slovakia 1.3 per cent, Poland 1.2 per cent and Estonia 1.1 per cent. To many analysts that came as a surprise, as in the pre-accession period little was known about migration potential of such countries as Latvia or Slovakia, and population of those countries was not regarded as highly prone to emigration.

We may assume that since May 1st, 2004 at least one million persons, of whom 80-90 per cent job seekers, have emigrated from Poland. This corresponds to slightly above 4 per cent of the total working age mid-period population (2.6 per cent of the entire population). Bearing in mind estimates of the outflow in the 1980s (over one million long-term emigrants), and between 1991 and 2003 (approximately 750 thousand), it might be argued that over the last quarter of a century around 2.5 million Poles emigrated, which would mean over 67 per cent of natural increase in that period and
over 6.5 per cent of the total population (Grabowska-Lusinska & Okolski 2009). Comparing the rate and volume of that outflow to the outflow recorded in Mediterranean Europe at the stage of migration related to labour recruitment, we may conclude that Poland might not be far from the completion of the crowding out process.

Polish LFS data leave no doubts that the accession date constituted a breakthrough in the outflow trend. Until the beginnings of 2004 the stock of migrants was fairly stable, at the level of around 200 thousand. This was especially so with respect to the number of long-term migrants; the stock of short term migrants was slowly decreasing over the 1990s and slowly increasing in 2000-2003. Shortly, in the middle of 2005, the stock of migrants passed the level of 300 thousand; by the mid-2006 it was elevated to 450, and at the end of that year half a million of Poles were recorded as temporary migrants.

A similar conclusion can be drawn on the basis of host countries sources. For instance, an accelerated inflow to Britain is reflected in the National Insurance Number statistics, where Poles, along with Slovaks and Lithuanians, became leading nationalities amongst those allotted a new number. One year before the date of accession they hardly counted in those statistics, with an overall share of around 4 per cent in all foreigners, whereas one year later Poland has become a clear leader in the statistics, and in the year 2006/2007 of the top six nationalities three represented CEE countries with an overall share of 39 per cent. Also IPS data confirm that the movements of citizens of the accession countries, in particular Poles, into the United Kingdom increased rapidly after May 1st, 2004. Same trend was observed in Sweden where not only the inflow from CEE accelerated but apart from migrant workers it involved proportionally more and more family members. A striking illustration of this phenomenon presents the case of inflow to Ireland. Until the middle of 2004 that country hosted few immigrants from CEE but in 2006 people from those countries became a clearly predominant group among the newly arrived (Grabowska-Lusinska & Okolski 2007).
Not only the three countries that did not limit access to their labour markets have experienced elevated inflow from CEE. With one distinct exception of Germany, a strong rise was also observed in other WNE countries.

A vehement outflow of people from CEE countries in the post-enlargement sub-period concomitant a rapid decline in fertility and forthcoming reduction of demographic potential of labour force provided for a historical opportunity to ultimately free labour markets in those countries of superfluous people and as a consequence to make those markets efficient and fitting other spheres of social activity undergoing the transition.

Since this went hand in hand with the modern economic change, which in turn was founded on a firm basis of economic integration within the EU, the accession countries of CEE might soon experience a breakthrough in the transformation of their migration status from net emigration to net immigration. As in case of the historical precedent, the case of the four Mediterranean countries, a bit of luck in fulfilment of that major change proved helpful if not indispensable. This time the luck came from Britain and materialised in a visionary and strong will of the British polity and a huge labour-absorptive capacity of the booming British economy.

Therefore the meaning of the outflow of people from CEE in the post-accession period could hardly be overestimated and confused. The crowding out of those countries labour markets has been a major structurally determined social phenomenon and a foundation for further modern social changes and ultimately a convergence with the core of EU.

4. Why immigration occurs? Transformation of migration status: an outline of the model

Taking a long view, migration can be perceived as a response to disequilibrium between the population size and growth and the stock and change of resources that population uses or needs to support itself. As
pointed out in part 2 of this chapter, modernisation brings about two processes that are of vital importance for migration:

- shrinking of subsistence sector of the economy, which since that time symbolises backwardness to the benefit of expanding and highly monetised market sector;
- a specific population change (called the demographic transition) among whose major traits are systematic and accelerated increase in the number of people and on the one hand, clustering of those people in the enclaves of backwardness or the peripheries of modernity, and, on the other hand, growing their shortages in emerging economic growth poles (centres).

That kind of social change entails a mass migration from the periphery to the centre whose direct cause is embedded in a relatively uneven distribution of the population. This is a multistage phenomenon ranging from strictly local through global stage.

It could be argued that the population surpluses hamper or occasionally preclude the modernisation of peripheries. Therefore the outflow of redundant people constitute one of major premises that determine the completion of modernisation project although, on the other hand, it is not capable of either initiating nor substituting of modern reforms.

An early modernity, due to an increasing (and usually relatively high) natural increase, is conducive to emigration – from overpopulated rural areas (including tiny towns located in the middle of those centres) to developing urban areas or colonised lands. A mature modernisation in turn coincides with a declining (and usually relatively low, sometimes negative) natural increase. Additionally, population ageing is being set in motion. What ensues is a structural deficit of population, expressed above all in a steady shortage of labour. Needless to say, this favours immigration.

An additional factor of the flow of people from peripheries to centres bound up with modernisation, which is specific to international perspective, is
historical time of the take-off to modern changes in particular countries (a “generation” factor?). As a rule, the pioneer countries in their early stage of modernisation, apart from sending population surpluses generated by their peripheries to the modernity poles (centres), export some of those surpluses to other countries, typically to the colonial overseas. The latecomers, however, are usually devoid of such opportunities. What succours the latter is quite paradoxically a difference in the historical time of take-off between the pioneers and latecomers, and for that matter a transformation of migration status among the pioneers – from net emigration to net immigration. For the erosion of traditional social and economic structure and institutions among the latecomers goes hand in hand with a mature modernity and frequently also with labour shortages among the pioneers.

Subsistence (natural) sector in a modernising society can be conceived as an enclave or an incompatible remnant, or a relic in the body of economy. No convergence mechanism exists that would make it compatible with the market (capitalist) sector. It may only perish or parasitize on the latter. People functioning in such sector have little chance of changing their social and economic roles and positions unless they abandon the sector. In a predominant majority of cases though the abandoning means out-migration.

One can speak of a structural incompatibility between the subsistence and market economy. The virtue of the former is a “closeness” or semi-isolation and a struggle for survival and continuity whereas of the latter – an openness and expansion. Mentality, work culture and skills of people in one sector are useless in another sector, and vice versa. The characteristics of cultural and human capital continuously reproduced in the subsistence sector do not fit the market sector. In this sense one may speak of a superfluity of population resources in the subsistence sector.

In the modern society with nation state as its distinct attribute, the natural sector gives rise to extra social costs, the bigger the larger extend and coverage of welfare state. Those costs are particularly acute under the
circumstances of generally low mobility of the population or when that mobility (outflow) is impeded by existing institutions. This is so because for obvious reasons the natural increase of people living on the subsistence sector is relatively high, which puts a pressure on social benefits and leads to increasing related costs. By this token, the preservation of subsistence sector under the modern conditions impedes the development. The scale of modernising reforms (e.g. investment in modern infrastructure and R&D) is severely limited by a “competition” from necessary financing of extra social costs that result from the very existence of subsistence sector.

From the standpoint of entering by a country a modern and self-sustained development it is particularly beneficial if three conditions are met at about the same time:

- deep reforms leading to the expansion of market sector;
- reduction of fertility bringing about a low natural increase;
- high mobility (especially spatial mobility) of the population facilitating internal transfers of the demographic surpluses of subsistence sector and outflow of the remaining redundant population to third countries.

Then there quickly comes shrinking of the subsistence sector and drying out of the sources of superfluous population. Modern open economy becomes strengthened and consolidated when, among other things, a strong international competition is in force and no population pressure is exerted (close to zero natural increase) on it. The attempts of economic actors (firms) at lowering of labour costs (or at least at stemming their increase) is accompanied by and in a way confronted with decreasing supply of local workforce and weakening propensity of local workers to accept low paid jobs. That tendency to a large degree results from and is reinforced by the very nature of the institutions of welfare state. The ensuing evolution of labour market takes it to a specific structural form called dual labour market with a characteristic segmentation pattern. Under such situation the expansion of a segment of the labour market characterised by a low level of regulatory practices and wage rigidities becomes a source of comparative advantages of firms linked to that segment. However, in view of insufficient supply of local
labour, the inflow of migrant workers from peripheral economies makes a basic premise of such expansion.

Specific institutions and mechanisms are being devised that facilitate the inflow of workers responding to the volume and structure of demand for labour of a mature modern economy. Systematic immigration contributes to the emergence and growth of “foreigner’s sector” of the labour market. Migrants workers become over-represented in that sector relative to their share in the total labour force or in some cases outnumber the local workers. To sum up, an indispensable condition for any country to transform its migration status is the ultimate outflow of redundant population (the crowding out) and at the same time embarking on the path of sustained modern development. Under such circumstances emigration declines rapidly. In turn, a close of the demographic transition (natural increase around zero level and fast ageing of the population, including the workforce) and economic competition-led segmentation of the labour market bring about the inflow of foreign workers, which over shorter or longer time becomes larger than the outflow of local workers. Former emigration country turns immigration country.

References
Early-starters and latecomers. Comparing countries of immigration and immigration regimes in Europe

Joaquin Arango

“Seek simplicity and distrust it” (J. Davis)

1. Introduction

In recent decades Europe has become one of the major immigration receiving regions in the world. In our days, no other receives more immigrants in absolute terms, although not in relation to population size. Seen in historical perspective, this represents an epochal change, as until fifty years ago Europeans tended to predominate in international migration flows. Taken as a whole, it can be said that Europe’s migration transition – understanding by that the transformation from a primarily sending region to a primarily receiving one - took place in the two decades that followed the end of World War II, albeit a handful of countries had experienced it well before. This notwithstanding, the present configuration of Europe as an immigration receiving region can be better seen as the outcome of a gradual accumulation of national migration transitions, some of which are still in process. Further national transitions can be expected in coming years.

In the specialized literature, Europe is often referred to as an international migration system. Ever since the 1990s, the notion of migration systems has become fashionable. The idea of applying system analysis to the study of migration is no doubt an appealing proposal, one that emphasizes the bidirectionality that exists between groups of countries that exchange migration flows in the context of other exchanges. It was promisingly applied by the geographer Akin Mabogunje in its seminal study of international migration flows in Western Africa (Mabogunje 1970) and later promoted by Kritz, Lim and Zlotnik at the beginning of the 1990s (Kritz, Lim & Zlotnik, 1992). Yet, in our
days it is richer in undelivered promises than in tangible results. It suffers from considerable ambiguity, as it is used with a diversity of meanings that are seldom made clear. In its most usual meaning, it is applied to groups of more or less adjacent receiving countries that have important elements in common, leaving aside the countries where the bulk of its immigrants originate, as the initial and more orthodox version of the notion would require (Zlotnik 1992). In this way, it does not go beyond what geographers used to term migration regions.

In this limited meaning, Europe is one of the major four systems in the contemporary world, together with North America, the Persian Gulf and the Asia Pacific region (Massey et al. 1998). Seen in global perspective, and compared with the remaining three, Europe can appear as a relatively homogeneous entity, markedly different from its counterparts. Yet, taken in itself, and looking inwards instead of outwards, there can be little doubt that if anything characterizes Europe is a high degree of diversity, not surprising given the large number of countries that make it up. Europe is synonymous of heterogeneity, and this applies to migration realities as well as to many other dimensions.

The richness and potential of the comparative perspective has been sufficiently attested in the social sciences, and does not require to be pondered here. It is the central viewpoint of the IDEA project in which this paper takes place. In an early, preparatory document, it was stated that IDEA is essentially a comparative project, an exercise in comparison among European immigration receiving countries from which to draw suggestions to improve the knowledge of national immigration experiences, and to gain a better understanding of the latter’s implications for policy. This is where the raison d’être of the project is to be found. The full development of the IDEA project required a series of national reports, three synthetic regional reports, and a comparison among the regional groups. This paper belongs in the third segment. It is an offspring of an analytical framework that was proposed earlier in the project. In a most tentative and sketchy form, and constantly incurring the risk of overgeneralization – hard to avoid given the nature of the subject matter -, it
examines factors that may explain differences among groups of countries. It is
admittedly an initial and speculative incursion that calls for additional
development, refining and substantiation. Existing theories are of little or no use
in this exercise. Therefore, the analytical framework has to be developed
inductively, going back and forth to reality and taking relevant notions from it.

2. Analytical considerations

Few would dispute that comparative analysis of the countries that form the
European migration system can contribute to a better understanding of national
realities and their determinants, and offer interesting policy insights. Yet, the
large number of receiving countries involved – close to thirty – makes the
comparison difficult, albeit not impossible. Comparing countries that are located
at very different points in the maturity/recentness scale compounds the
difficulties. Identifying meaningful groups among them may be a way to reduce
such complexity and to seek significant patterns. It can be posited that the
comparative exercise will be analytically richer if it is carried not only among
a large number of individual countries but also among a much smaller number
of meaningful groups of countries. It is clear that every country is peculiar, and
different from all the other, also in matters of migration, but it is no less clear
that significant similarities among them can be found as well. This, the idea that
there are groups of countries that share relevant similarities, was implicit in the
IDEA Project since its inception. In turn, it can be surmised that these groups
could be seen as representatives of different types of immigration receiving
countries, as sort of ideal-types that may have an analytical value and assist in
the explanation of different migration realities. Identifying their core
characteristics may have analytical value in itself and help in explaining policy
outcomes.

The identification of types of immigration countries and their implications
commands increasing attention in our days (King 2000, Gropas &
Triandafyllidou 2007). This is particularly relevant in the case of a European
Union that is formally embarked in the construction of a common immigration
and asylum policy. This arduous task may be made more difficult by the
existence of significant differences among member states, as the experience so far suggests. Ascertaining which differences are more relevant and how they affect national stands towards the common policy could be one of the outcomes of the exercise.

Indeed IDEA aims at comparing groups of countries in Europe. The very title of the project – “Mediterranean and Eastern European Countries as new immigration destinations in the European Union” - implicitly alluded to three groups of countries: on the one hand the Mediterranean or Southern and the Eastern European Countries that represent the ‘new’ immigration destinations in the European Union, and on the other, implicit, the ‘old’ ones in respect of which the former are new. Additionally, it could be easily reckoned that the degree of newness is rather different among the two ‘new’ groups of destination countries. In fact, one of the foremost purposes of the project was to ascertain what, if anything, new destination countries can learn from the experience of those that preceded them as receiving countries.

Therefore the project started with three predefined groups of countries, but the criteria underlying the grouping were not made explicit. It can be surmised that it was done intuitively or on the basis of common sense - a widely shared common sense at that. Yet the comparative exercise requires the identification of the criteria on which the grouping of countries rests. Are they chiefly structural factors, i.e. have to do with significant regional differences in terms of socio-economic regimes? Are they mainly historical in nature, i.e. related to the length of the immigration receiving experience and the implications that derive from chronology or timing? In other words, are migration experiences and realities among European regional groups of receiving countries significantly different because they are structurally different - and because structural socio-economic differences result in different migration patterns -, or because some developed earlier as immigration receiving countries, or both?

Of course this begs the question of whether the immigration realities and experiences of the three groups of countries are indeed relatively similar within them and significantly different among them. This paper gives for granted that
the syntheses reports for the three regional groups show that there are sufficient structural similarities within each group, as far as migration experiences and realities are concerned, to consider them meaningful. If this is the case, then it can be said that the grouping of countries that was intuitively made at the inception of the IDEA project is significant and convincing, and that it rests on sound foundations. This exercise should help to better understand the core characteristics of each group or type of receiving countries. In turn, these characteristics might help to understand different policy approaches and their underlying determinants, including prevailing attitudes towards immigration, which in turn may be affected by its impacts as they are perceived by the respective societies. A more thorough exploitation of the information contained in the national reports and in the regional syntheses is pending. At this stage, this paper is concerned mainly with the explanation of the structural differences among the regional groups, and aims only at suggesting some ideas that, if properly developed, could help to chart a territory that appears too vast at the moment.

According to the above, a set of hypotheses relative to the variables that can be relevant for the grouping of countries is proposed. Historical and socio-economic factors will be the foremost candidates for the explanation of similarities and differences. The hypotheses should be tested against the stylized facts and realities obtained in the national reports. Yet, testing the foregoing hypotheses against the empirical evidence for a large number of countries is a Herculean task that goes well beyond the possibilities of this paper at this stage, and will have to wait for further versions, although some impressionistic remarks about their possible validity will be offered.

3. Basic propositions and hypothesis

The line of reasoning can start with two basic propositions:

**Proposition 1:** On the basis of both similarities and differences, meaningful groupings of immigration receiving countries in Europe can be identified. To be significant, each group will comprise those countries which show the greater similarities among them and the greater differences with the other. The groups
selected will be meaningful and relevant if similarities prevail over differences, and if differences with countries in other groups are generally larger than among them.

**Proposition 2:** Three major regional groups of countries can be identified in Europe. Each of them is relatively homogeneous and different from the other groups, chiefly on account of historical and structural factors. The first group encompasses a number of countries located in the North Western quadrant of Europe which became countries of immigration in the third quarter of the 20th Century, if not before, and which nowadays can be termed mature or old. The second is made up of four countries in Southern Europe which experienced their migratory transition in the final quarter of the same century and which can be considered as intermediate, rather than new. The third includes a number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe which started their migratory transition in the years around the change of the century, and can be seen as recent. At least the first two groups can correspond to different types or patterns of immigration receiving countries. It is too soon to decide whether the third group will give way to a third, distinct type.

No doubt, the three aforementioned are three regions often identified in Europe. North Western Europe, Southern Europe and Central-Eastern Europe are usual regional labels. A host of variables of highly diverse nature underlie and justify such regionalization. Among them, and without disregarding the influence of geographic factors – especially clear in the case of the South –, those that have to do with the economy – from degree of development to type of socio-economic regime and welfare system – and recent political history seem the most relevant. In the case of immigration, historical factors that have to do with the chronology of the migration experience should also be considered. Indeed, IDEA aims at comparing groups of countries located in different points of the recentness/maturity scale, and implicitly enquires about what recent countries can learn from the experience of those that preceded them. It can be posited that the timing of the immigration experience, that is, the time distance that separates the present from the date in which they became an immigration receiving country, is relevant on more than one count.
Hypothesis 1: Immigration receiving countries are bound to differ significantly on account of the stage of the migration cycle in which they find themselves, as this decisively affects the composition of the population of immigrant background and the relationships and its changing relationship with the general population. In the course of their immigration experience, receiving countries go through a migration cycle – a notion inspired in the life cycle concept and borrowed by the social sciences from biology. Certain socio-demographic structures and aggregate characteristics of the immigrant population correspond to each stage of the cycle, which in turn make different socio-economic impacts and contribute to different perceptions from the general population. Borrowing from demographic parlance, this can be referred to as an ‘age effect’. Immigration realities are very much affected by the stage of the immigration cycle in which countries find themselves, and they tend to evolve as countries advance into later stages.

In a different form, the notion of migration cycle was proposed by Belgian sociologist Felice Dassetto as the set of processes through which immigrants from less developed countries enter and settle in a more developed one, in a time sequence that affects – and requires adaptations from - the immigrants themselves, the native population, and the institutions of the receiving societies. Within the migration cycle, certain stages can be recognized. Dassetto identifies three: in the first one, immigrants are above all socially marginalized foreign workers; the second is presided over by family reunion - and therefore the appearance of new actors –, settlement and acculturation, and is often accompanied by social tensions between the immigrant population and segments of the receiving society, tensions connected with the schooling of immigrant children and youngsters, the use of public services, particularly health, and the establishment of immigrant families in neighbourhoods; the third stage or moment has to do with the inclusion and integration processes of long-term residents (Dassetto 1990).

Typically, young adults, often single or unaccompanied by their families, tend to prevail in the initial stages. Family reunion flows follow after a certain, variable
time. In due time a second generation develops, and the number of elderly members increases. Gradually, the demographic composition of the immigrant population tends to resemble that of the general population. After some time, it becomes multi-generational. Of course, different immigration societies go through the immigration cycle in different forms and at different speeds. The persistence or intensity of flows at later stages obviously makes an impact on the composition of the population of immigrant background.

Yet, the realities of countries that have experienced significant immigration since long, and which have a multi-generational population of immigrant background, tend to be very different from those of countries of recent immigration in which the first generation is still prevalent or of those in which the second generation is still in the making. Immigrant populations made up primarily of individuals greatly differ from those organized around families containing more than one generation and around communities. Different socio-demographic profiles determine very different impacts, in terms of rates of labour force participation, consumption of public services and social benefits, patterns of housing and settlement, social visibility and the like. In turn, different impacts, real or perceived, may affect attitudes towards immigration from society. In addition, the ‘age effect’ also affects policies, starting with a greater concern for integration as time goes by.

The different stage of the migration cycle in which different countries find themselves is likely to determine decisive differences as far as present immigration realities are concerned. Indeed, the fact that participant countries in the IDEA project find themselves at very different stages of the immigration cycle adds considerable complexity to the comparative exercise. Comparing mature countries with other that are just becoming immigration countries is extremely difficult.

As far as this ‘age effect’ goes, there is little doubt that the components of each regional group basically share chronology. The mature countries of the North Western quadrant – namely France, Germany, Great Britain, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Sweden and Austria – became
immigration receiving countries in the course of the third quarter of the XXth Century or before. They received large numbers of immigrants in that period and, although not a few returned home, a large part of them remained after the crisis of the mid-70s. Family reunion had started to take place before that date, and greatly intensified afterwards. As a result, all these countries today host populations of immigrant background that span several generations.

Many implications derive from it. The socio-demographic profile of the populations of immigrant background, initially biased towards a marked preponderance of young adults, tended gradually to resemble that of the general population. Their activity rate tended to decline, and that of unemployment to go up. The consumption of public services increased, as did the degree of dependency on the welfare system. Immigrants became more visible, as families settled in neighbourhoods and residential segregation processes set in (Tapinos 1993). All this is likely to have had a considerable impact on perceptions and attitudes towards immigration.

Admittedly, the immigration cycle can be transited in different ways, not necessarily linear. In particular, it will depend on whether the volume of initial and intermediate flows is sustained or reduced after these stages. The structure of the immigrant population, and some of its attendant characteristics, such as the activity rate, can be rejuvenated by intense flows in mature stages, as it has recently happened in some countries, namely the UK in the early years of this century. In the case of North-western countries, massive flows tended generally to decline since the mid-70s, except for family reunion and asylum flows, at least until the mid-90s. The massive arrival of aussiedler to Germany in the early 1990s may have been the major exception to this pattern.

The intermediate countries of Southern Europe find themselves at a much earlier stage of the immigration cycle. Out-migration prevailed until the mid-1970s, then return migration was prominent, and only since the 1980s could they be seen as primarily receiving countries. This pattern is less clear in the case of Portugal, where out-migration continued to be significant after these dates and has been invigorated in recent years. Italy and Greece received
large flows during the 1990s, and Spain has undergone a vigorous immigration boom between the late 1990’s and 2008. As a result, young adults in the prime of working age are preponderant in their immigrant populations. Paramount implications of such a demographic profile include an aggregate labour force participation that is higher than that of the rest of the population, more geographic mobility, a relatively limited consumption of public services – especially in the areas of health and pensions - and welfare benefits, a favourable fiscal balance, and a significant contribution to the growth of GNP. A second generation is in the making, but it is not as yet as prominent as in more mature receiving countries.

As for the countries that make up the third group, in Central and Eastern Europe, they are still at an earlier stage of the immigration cycle, in which first-generation immigrants, often single or unaccompanied by relatives, overwhelmingly prevail.

Taking a long perspective, it can be reckoned that the effect of ‘age’ as a differentiating factor is transitory, and that it will fade away after a few decades, once all the receiving countries considered reach the mature stage. This consideration lessens its interest. There is, however, another implication of the timing variable, or more precisely of the birth date of a country as immigration receiver, that is relevant in a different sense and for reasons that go beyond the different composition of the immigrant population. It can be referred to as ‘generation effect’, to use again demographic parlance, and pave the way for another hypothesis.

**Hypothesis 2:** The position of an immigration country in the recentness/maturity scale has another implication that can be alluded to as a ‘generation effect’. It stems from the influence exerted on the course and characteristics of the immigration experience by the historical context in which their initial and formative phases took place. Especially influential elements of this context may be the types of immigration flows prevailing in that period and the socio-economic conditions that determine them, the dominant conceptions of migration, and the main characteristics of the international economic order.
and of socio-economic regimes. These influences may leave a long-lasting imprint on later stages of the immigration experience. These formative years may shape dominant orientations towards immigration that would have a long-lasting effect, or witness facts or policies that yield results that will condition further developments.

In this vein, the experience of Southern European countries is likely to diverge from that of their North Western counterparts not only because of ‘age’ but also because their formative years as immigration countries occurred at a time in which both international migration flows and the historical context in which they took place were structurally different from what they were a quarter of a century before. The same can be said of Central and Eastern Europe countries in respect of the other two groups of countries.

It can be surmised that the mature countries of North-western Europe underwent their socialization process as immigration recipients in the course of the third quarter of the 20th Century. This statement can be easily challenged arguing that France, by far the oldest country of immigration in Europe, had done so much earlier. It is certainly true, but, this notwithstanding, it can be posited that it underwent something akin to what psychologist call a second adult re-socialization during the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, and that it probably was no less influential for the later developments than any preceding experience.

Contrary to the present, the third quarter of the 20th Century was a time in which international migration flows were not yet global. The number of sending countries significantly participating in them was much smaller than today. The fact that several European countries had to resort to recruitment to meet their labour needs points in the direction of such limited scope. An unlimited, spontaneous supply of migrant labour as it exists today could not be taken for granted then. The fact that international migration flows were not global, and that only a relatively limited array of sending countries took part in them, has left its imprint on the ethnic composition of the populations of immigrant background, characterized in several receiving countries - France, UK,
Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium – by the strong preponderance of a few national groups, mostly from the Mediterranean basin or the Indian subcontinent. Although recent flows have added a considerable degree of diversity, the birthmark of that period is still perceptible.

It was also a time in which the demand for labour – and for immigrant labour, for that matter – arose to a large extent from the central sectors of the economy, including manufacturing and mining, sectors that still were relatively labour-intensive, and that very often consisted of firms organized along Fordist lines. And it was a time in which informal employment was much less extended than in our days, in which industrial relations were more regulated and in which the welfare states were growing rather than being questioned or curtailed as today.

The third quarter of the 20th Century was a time in which much less was known about the dynamics of international migration than would be known later. For instance, lacking the benefit of hindsight that is available today, the immigration authorities of the time thought that temporary schemes such as the guest-worker system could be the solution to labour needs that were often perceived as transitory. Few would think the same in our days, as precisely the experience of those countries made clear that democratic states are at pains when trying to assure temporariness.

The relative failure of that option – not so much in solving the acute labour shortages that constituted a bottleneck for economies undergoing super-growth, as someone called it (Kindleberger 1968), but in impeding the settlement of the guest-workers when they were invited to go back – would decisively mark the immigration history of several countries. The unforeseen consequences of such option may have contributed to the establishment of a negative evaluation of immigration that seems to be shared by large segments of the population, to the perception of immigration as unwanted, as the outcome of an error in calculation. The closure of borders to further immigration in the early or mid-1970s, initially temporary, soon become permanent, in a context of protracted economic slump, giving way to a new
paradigm that would be known as ‘zero migration’. In turn, the impossibility of closing the doors to immigration flows stemming from entitlements – family reunion and asylum – meant that the flows that were drastically curtailed were those of labour migration. This would reinforce the perception of a large part of immigration as unwanted, or, as it has been recently termed in France, immigration subie instead of immigration choisie.

The influence of that period is so pervasive that the North-western countries have sometimes been referred to in the literature as ‘post-migration societies’, in the sense that they are primarily concerned with managing the consequences of past migration.

Being ‘socialized’ as countries of immigration in the 1950’s and 1960’s, with Fordist economic structures and with a guest-worker approach, is bound to give way to an immigration experience very different from that of the latecomers who became countries of immigration in the 1980’s and 1990’s or later, when the era of globalization is in full swing, and informalisation and deregulation are rapidly increasing. Indeed, the Southern European countries are experiencing a ‘generation effect’ very different from the one that marked the experience of North-western ones. First of all, having been born as countries of immigration in an era of global flows can, by itself, give way to a greater diversity from the very beginning of the immigration experience. This is especially true of Italy and Spain, not so much of Portugal, were the influence of the colonial past is paramount, and of Greece, where geographic proximity counts so much. This is not the proper place to discuss the implications of a larger degree of diversity, but its relevance as a variable leaves little doubt.

The Southern European countries have become countries of immigration in a time agitated by intense winds of deregulation, informalisation and labour precariousness, something that by itself makes for a very different insertion of immigrants in the labour markets, and entails different social consequences. It is also a time in which the nexus between the underground economy and irregular migration has grown in importance. Although it is certainly not the only driver, it contributes to a higher incidence of irregular migration in the South. It
would not come to a surprise that something similar might be said of Central and Eastern European countries when sufficient time has elapsed to be able to characterize their immigration experience.

Both the Southern and the Eastern groups of countries have become countries of immigration at a time when the guest-worker model is seldom seen as a realistic option, on account of the North-western experience, the recent popularity of the notion of ‘circular migration’ notwithstanding.

As a matter of fact, this last observation might open the door to a third hypothesis, related to timing as well, and borrowed from economic history. It could be termed the hypothesis of the influence of historical precedence. Nearly half a century ago, economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron, in his seminal analysis of historical patterns of industrialization, pointed out that the experience of late-comers is bound to be markedly different from that of early-starters, if only because of the influence that the experience of the forerunners exerts on those that follow. Not only is the pace usually quicker — there is often an advantage in catching up — but the structures of production and industrial organization are different, as is the intellectual climate which surrounds the process (Gerschenkron 1962). Industrialization and immigration are admittedly very different in nature, but mutatis mutandis the distinction between early-starters and late-comers may provide a useful perspective to understand the immigration experience of the latter in Europe, especially as far as the adoption of policies is concerned. Of course, historical precedence is by no means the only source of differences. In the case of Europe, the influence of the early-starters' experience over that of the late-comers is very much reinforced by the common belonging to a supranational structure.

**Hypothesis 3:** It may be posited that the influence of historical precedence has significantly conditioned the immigration policies of Southern and Eastern European countries, and therefore their experiences and realities, on account of the fact that they have grown, or are starting to grow, as countries of immigration at a time in which other, early-starters, more developed immigration countries existed nearby, countries capable of influencing the
policies of the former, basically, but not only, on account of the common belonging to the European Union. Very likely, this has de facto limited the policy options of the latecomers. The influence of the ‘zero migration’ paradigm is perceptible in the experience of the Southern countries, not because they have accepted few immigrant workers, which is certainly not the case, but because they have done so through restrictive admission policies based on the premise that hiring an immigrant worker usually requires passing the labour market test, that is, proving that there are no national or communitarian workers available for that job. Combined with factors that will be mentioned later, these policies have contributed to high rates of irregular migration, as they conflict with an often vigorous demand for immigrant labour. Another example of such an influence has been the requirement imposed to the Accession countries of 2004 and 2007 to accept the entire Schengen acquis as a conditio sine qua non of their entry into the EU. In itself, the influence arising from historical precedence would determine that the path that leads to the mature stage would be walked by the latecomers in a different way.

4. Structural characteristics

According to all the foregoing, the ‘timing’ factor is likely to be a very relevant criterion for the meaningful grouping of countries in Europe, both for reasons that have to do with the ‘age effect’, the ‘generation effect’ and the ‘precedence effect’. Yet, it is certainly not the only one, and maybe not even the most relevant one. Socio-economic regimes, or a number of socio-economic structural characteristics, constitute another obvious candidate. To start with, different chronologies of immigration experience remit to such structural differences, and more precisely to diverse degrees of development. It is there that the reasons that explain why some countries experienced the migratory transition before than others have to be sought.

Hypothesis 4: It can be therefore posited that immigration receiving countries in Europe are bound to differ on account of their defining structural characteristics, i.e. types of economy and social system that result in different intensities and types of labour demand, and different orientations towards the
inclusion or exclusion of foreigners, and in different degrees of openness or
closeness towards the admission and incorporation of immigrants. Different
socio-economic regimes - i.e. more liberal or more corporatist; more adept to
the European social model or closer to the Anglo-Saxon model; with strong or
weak labour union bargaining; with higher or lower degrees of social protection;
with higher or lower rates of female labour force participation; with larger or
smaller informal sectors - significantly influence labour demand, admission
policies, types of flows, public perceptions of immigration, and more open or
more closed stands.

Different types of socio-economic structures or regimes result in different
demand for immigrant labour. Some socio-economic regimes are more prone
than other to admit foreign workers and to facilitate their insertion in the labour
market. The strength of labour demand and the degree in which it is filled by
immigrant workers may in turn affect public perceptions, which in turn can
influence admission policies.

The foregoing suggests that migration realities and experiences are likely to
differ among the three groups because the economies and societies of North
Western Europe are structurally different than those of the South and those of
Central and Eastern Europe, which in turn are also different among them.

To the risk of incurring in excessive generalization, it can be said that the
economies of the Southern countries demand more immigrant labour in our
days. This is due both to the fact that they are more labour-intensive than the
North-western ones and to the greater weight in their economies of the sectors
more prone to resort to immigrant labour - personal services, including
domestic service and care of dependent persons, the tourist and hospitality
industry, construction and the building trades, and intensive agriculture and fruit
picking. In most countries these are the sectors that tend to rely more on
immigrant labour, and these sectors are relatively larger in Southern
economies. Sectors which are larger in North-western economies, such as
manufacturing, have become capital-intensive and make a scant demand of
labour, basically highly-skilled.
In a period, such as the present, characterized by a marked segmentation of labour markets, the secondary labour market is the ones that assigns the least appealing jobs, very often filled by immigrant workers. And there are reasons to think that this segment is relatively larger in Southern and Eastern countries, which have a higher proportion of low-skilled occupations in their economic structures. In mature countries part of such jobs are performed by the offspring of previous immigrants.

Not surprisingly, on account of the foregoing, immigration rates in the last two decades have tended to be higher in Southern countries than in North-western ones. Spain and Italy have been, by far, the countries that have received the largest numbers of immigrants in the EU in recent years, and Greece and Portugal have registered considerable intakes at some point.

Higher immigration rates in Southern countries can be explained not only by higher demand for immigrant labour but also by less restrictive labour migration policies, either de iure or de facto, than those prevailing in North-western countries, with the exception of the UK and Ireland – another latecomer – in the first decade of the 20th Century. In general terms, Southern countries have made more efforts to widen the avenues for the legal access to the labour market, through quotas, mechanisms of nominal invitation, shortage lists, and other schemes.

The economies of North-western countries are as a rule more regulated and controlled – especially in countries with corporatist regimes -, with a larger intervention of stakeholders in the functioning of the labour market, and this lowers some of the advantages of immigrant labour, including its usually lower cost.

In Southern European countries, a considerable part of the immigrants required by the economy have either entered irregularly or have become irregular later through overstaying, probably in a higher proportion than in North-western countries. This would constitute an important difference in itself. But, in addition,
it remits to other relevant differences, such as larger underground economies, more staggering difficulties for the control of entries and stays, more permissive legal cultures and, maybe, more tolerant stands towards irregular migration.

Another structural difference has to do with the size and type of welfare systems. It may be argued that the larger welfare systems of North-western countries provide an institutional context less propitious for the incorporation of cheap labour. In addition, they may generate a higher degree of reluctance to share public goods (Brochmann & Dolvik 2006). On the Southern side, smaller, more conservative and familialistic welfare systems contribute to a larger demand for care workers which is often satisfied by immigrants.

**Hypothesis 5**: The relative weight of the different types of immigration flows – chiefly labour migration, family reunion, asylum, and irregular streams – among countries and possibly groups of countries is likely to be another differentiating variable, as they have different socio-economic impacts and contribute to different perceptions of immigration from the general population. The relative weight of types of flows in each country may have an impact on the economic and social impacts of immigration and on the perception the public has of it (more wanted or unwanted). In turn both impacts and perceptions may affect policies, flows and integration outcomes. The relative weight of types of flows in each country depends inter alia on admission policies, but these may be affected by the demand of labour that different socio-economic regimes make, past immigration impacts and their evaluation, and the ability to control flows, which affects the consistency between policies and outcomes.

A number of studies have suggested that the relative ease to access the labour market without work and residence permits in informal sectors of Southern countries may constitute an alternative option to asylum demand.

In the case of North-western countries, the combination of a peculiar immigration history with a lesser demand for immigrant labour has resulted in a greater weight of family migration and asylum seekers and refugees, and
a lesser one of workers, and this constitutes an important difference that has pervasive implications.

5. Concluding remarks

Comparing immigration receiving countries may help to better understand each country, what does have in common with other as far as its immigration experience is concerned, and in what does it differ and why. This paper has presented a series of reasons, expressed as hypotheses, as to the basic similarities and differences that can be expected among different countries and groups of countries in Europe. On the basis of these hypotheses, a considerable degree of internal homogeneity within each of the three regional groups identified in the project could be expected, as well as significant differences among the groups. The three groups seem to be meaningful, but the second, the one made by the four Southern countries of Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain seems the most homogeneous. The 'old' group of the North-western quadrant appears as more heterogeneous. Indeed it could be easily and usefully disaggregated into subgroups, as different socio-economic regimes can be identified within it (Massey et al. 1998, Jordan 2006). It is too soon to say much about the third group, the one constituted by the recent or future countries of immigration in central and Eastern Europe, especially if additional countries are included in the picture. On account of the fact that the experience of this group is still incipient, and that is too soon to try and characterize it, this paper has dealt basically with the first two groups, although parts of what has been said about the Southern countries could be extrapolated to their Eastern counterparts.

As for the reasons underlying the basic differences among the three groups, the first one has to do with their degree or newness or seniority as immigration receiving countries, something that has been referred to here as the 'age effect'. It is obvious that this factor clearly differentiates the three groups. But by its very nature this is a transient factor that will fade away with the passage of time and has, therefore, limited interest. Should this be the only or foremost
differentiating factor, there would be no reason not to think that latecomers could replicate the experience of the early-starters.

Of course, it is not the only factor. A second hypothesis posits that the birth date of countries as immigration receiving may also be relevant on account of the long-lasting influences that they may receive during their formative years, in a sort of ‘generation effect’. In the case of Europe, there is little doubt that the historical context in which the mature countries of the Northwest grew as immigration receivers and some of the strategic orientations adopted in that context decisively conditioned their further experience with immigration. It is too soon to know well which this mark will be in the case of the Southern European countries, but it can be reckoned that it is bound to be as different as the global context in which they have become socialized as countries of immigration. And they same, mutatis mutandis, can be expected of central and Eastern European countries.

In addition, it could be expected that the three groups of countries would differ on account of structural differences in economy and society, because different socio-economic regimes determine different migration regimes. And the migration regimes of North-western and Southern Europe are indeed different: in Southern countries immigration rates have tended to be higher in the last two decades; their economies make a larger demand for immigrant labour, and immigration in them is above all labour migration; asylum demand is much less prominent, and rates of favourable resolutions are lower; the demand for immigrant labour is more geared to fill unskilled jobs; the demand for highly-skilled immigrants is smaller; labour migration policies have tended to be more open, pro-active and relatively innovative; immigration seems to have been more accepted, in general terms; the proportion of immigrants in irregular condition is higher; extraordinary regularizations have been more frequent; and the control of flows finds more difficulties. The Central and Eastern countries of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic show significant differences in respect of the preceding groups, but their migration regime is still in the making.
Both structural characteristics and historical factors differentiate, therefore, the migration regimes of the three groups. In fact, given the fact that the chronology of the immigration experience may be highly related with the chronology and degree of economic development, and that the latter may be associated with different types of socio-economic structures or regimes, it can be surmised that both criteria for the grouping of countries - timing and structural characteristics – may coincide to a large extent and in most cases, although not necessarily in all. In other words, there is a certain degree of covariance between the two orders of factors. Yet, ascertaining nuances and exceptions in this coincidence can do justice to complexity. Countries such as Ireland and Finland, and to a lesser extent Norway, that structurally have much in common with the North-western group but are relative latecomers, may complicate a framework that rests on a degree of symmetry between the chronology of the immigration experience and certain socio-economic characteristics. Their inclusion in the analysis could clarify which of the two bundles of factors, structural or historical, are the most relevant. Comparing Malta and Cyprus, structurally similar but more recent as immigration countries, with the four Southern countries that have been considered here might also be enlightening (King & Thomson 2008).

Admittedly, cultural differences could also contribute to explain differences in migration regimes. Cultural variables have been left aside in this paper, because they are elusive and hard to operationalise, not because they are irrelevant. On the contrary, societal attitudes – a sort of national ethos – towards immigration may result in different degrees of acceptance or reluctance, and explain, for instance, the option for a guest-worker model and persistent reservations to accept the condition of country of immigration (Tranhardts 1995).

In any case, all the factors expressed as hypothesis suggest that the migration experiences of the three groups of countries are bound to be significantly different, and that they may correspond to three different types of migration regimes. This seems already clear in the case of the two less recent groups. It is therefore most unlikely that latecomers will replicate the experience of the early-starters. Additionally, they will not do so on account of the precedence
effect. All this limits the potentiality of more recent countries to learn from the experience of those that preceded them, although it does rule out the possibility of learning from specific decisions or courses of action.

Finally, the existence of substantial differences in migration regimes and experiences among European countries cannot but deeply condition the construction of the common immigration and asylum policy in the European Union. If such a policy is to benefit all, these differences should not be disregarded.

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Chapter 3

“Old” Immigration Countries in Europe. Concept and empirical examples

Heinz Fassmann and Ursula Reeger

1. Introduction

IDEA was essentially a comparative project, an exercise in comparison among European migration receiving countries from which to draw suggestions to improve the understanding of national immigration experiences. IDEA aimed at identifying a significant and meaningful grouping of migration receiving countries in Europe, and to gain a better understanding of the latter’s implications for policy and its development. The selection of the countries followed a specific conceptual idea: In the course of their immigration experience, receiving countries go through a specific demographic development and a policy learning process which was called migration cycle.

In this article the authors try to apply this conceptual model to the past and recent migration history of the “old” immigration countries in Europe. The authors critically judge the grouping of the old immigration countries, ask for specific as well as general driving forces and look for a general model of the shift from emigration to immigration countries. For this purpose, the most important “old” immigration countries are included into the considerations – namely Germany, France and Great Britain as well as Austria which will be described in detail.
2. Notions and concepts

2.1. The notion of “old immigration countries”

The notion “immigration country” plays an important role in the public debate and it signals a change in perception, however there is no commonly accepted definition. At least there are two different approaches: The first one defines an immigration country as a declared self perception. The political elite and the population approve and agree that immigration is part of a nation building process. Society is built upon migration – that is the general idea. Whether the real number of immigrants is high or low does not play a significant role, what is important is the general idea.

The other approach is based more on statistics. Immigration countries are defined by the surplus of immigration over emigration and thus by a positive net migration. It is assumed that the positive net migration is not a single event and the exception of the rule but more or less a steady state situation. There are no thresholds defined as to for how many years the net migration has to be positive to label a country as an immigration country but it is obvious that the majority of years in a given period has to show a positive balance.

There can be a discrepancy between the statistical definition of an immigration country and the self perception. Since the end of the 1950s or 1960s Germany for example has to be categorized as an immigration country but the acceptance as such by law, the population and the politicians emerged just recently at the beginning of the 21st century. Austria experienced the same situation with an excess of immigration over emigration since the 1960s but the statistical fact is not accepted by the public without reservation. However, in the project IDEA the statistical definition is used to delineate an immigration country.

The second point which has to be clarified is the attribute “old”. What is an old immigration country? In the IDEA context “old” is a relative term and not
an absolute number of years. The surplus of immigration over emigration happened somewhere in the past without declaring exactly when. But the attribute “old” implies that also “young” immigration countries exist where the excess from immigration over emigration is a more recent phenomenon. The terminology of “old immigration countries” is linked inevitably and mandatory to a time dependent process. The basic assumption in IDEA is the idea that European countries are shifting from emigration to immigration situations and from young to old.

2.2. The concept of a migration cycle

The transition from a young to an old immigration country is not a linear process without any frictions. International migration is changing the societal composition, accentuates the question of national or regional identity and sharpens the distributional conflicts over workplaces, on the housing market and in the public space. Especially in times of an economic downswing conflicts between the native and the new arriving population may emerge.

To concentrate on these processes of change, to underline the importance of the transition of an emigration country or a country without any significant immigration to a situation where immigration becomes the dominant demographic event, the IDEA project developed the concept of a migration cycle. It is based on the general idea that a country (or a household or an enterprise or a region) adapts to a new situation and develops mechanism to handle the new environmental conditions. Countries are “learning”, reflecting the past experiences and developing new adaptation strategies. Learning processes are time dependent and embedded in a certain temporal and spatial context. This implies by no means that all European countries pass through exactly the same cycle. Furthermore it is not postulated that the individual phases of the cycle last for the same period of time or display identical characteristics. Countries which are entering the cycle (or transition) later maybe need a shorter period of time to adapt than the early transitional states. But the concept can be used as a blue print or as a mirror for the development of immigration and emigration.
To repeat the idea of a cycle with other words and to be more precise: “Migration cycle” stands for an uncertain time period when a country or a region adapts to a new situation. Former emigration countries for example became immigration countries – or vice versa – and during this process experience at least three different phases: an initial, pre-transformative or preliminary phase, a change or intermediate or transformative phase and an adoption phase. These phases correspond to a very general concept of a system stability, disturbances and emergence of a new stability. During the initial, pre-transformation or preliminary phase emigration is more important than immigration or the net migration is zero. Important for that phase is the stability. A certain and specific demographic situation is constant for a long time and the political and societal system have adapted to it.

The second phase is the important one because the system is changing. During the change or intermediate or transformative phase a former emigration country turns step by step into a new immigration country. The steps are different in terms of length and numbers and a take-off with a significant migration surplus could be followed-up by stagnation or a short term negative balance. But the general trends are changing and from the turning point, immigration outnumbers emigration. This change of the general trend does not happen invisibly and without producing any traces. At least with the first economic crisis and the relative “overshooting” of immigration the issue becomes more and more important in the public debate. Immigration and migration control are discussed in public rather excitedly and political votes are won or lost by the matising the migration issue. New mechanisms to control migration are imposed step by step.

The change or intermediate or transformative phase is fading out into a third phase which is called adaptation phase or post-transformation phase. The main characteristic is new stability. Immigration is more or less recognized as a necessary supplement to a demographically decreasing working population on the one hand and an increasing economy on the other hand. Extreme expressions of opinion into one way or the other are losing popularity and
a new political rationality finds its way by developing a differentiated legal system to control international migration. While during the pre-transformation and transformation phase the legal system knew maybe only one gate to enter the nation state, a whole panoply of residence and settlement titles has been developed. Factual differentiation of the inflows and juridical differentiation of the people who are allowed to come or have to stay abroad are important features of this adoption phase.

On the way from new or young immigration countries to old immigration countries or between emigration and immigration countries lay the phases of the migration cycle. Many European countries are on the way of becoming immigration countries and can be classified concerning the dominant phase. Most of the new member states are in the initial or pre-transformative phase, some of them (Poland and the Czech Republic) will be entering the transformation phase soon. Most of the Western European countries are in the change or intermediate or post-transformation phase and some of them are entering the adaptation phase or post-transformation phase. Most of the Southern European countries are finding themselves in the transformation phase with high fluctuations, a very controversial debate concerning migration and with the search for the way to handle the situation in legal terms.

2.3. The main drivers

If a migration cycle is seen as an adaptation and learning process to a new demographic and economic situation it has to be asked furthermore which factors are responsible for the new circumstances. This question leads to the concept of main drivers which are defined as the most important independent variables to explain the change. Why do most of the European countries enter the second phase and leave the stable situation where emigration outnumbers immigration or where net migration was zero? Which factors are relevant for entering the migration cycle?
The selection of main drivers follows the usual migration theories for labour migration such as the push and pull model or the migration system theory and is depending on which migration is seen as relevant. The main drivers for asylum seekers are different to that of labour migrants. For them political crisis, wars and persecutions in the nearer or farther neighbouring countries and regions, the geographical distance between the region of origin and the first receiving country as well as the attractiveness of the country of reception regarding the asylum procedure are important drivers.

Regarding labour migration, the main drivers are to be found in the fields of demography, the economic and the sectoral development and the structuring of the labour market. The effects of the demographic development and the structuring of the labour market are rather long-term, while the economic development shows up as an effect in a short term way. In detail, the relations are as follows:

- Decreasing numbers of births lead – after a time delay – towards dropping numbers of entries into the labour market and to an ageing of the workforce. In that situation the demand for new labour goes up, especially when the economic growth is high and productivity gains less or equal to a working time reduction. A shrinking and ageing labour force will have a direct effect on the pull factors and will stimulate immigration especially when the economic development leads to an increase in labour demand. Furthermore an ageing society will show some effects not only on the quantity of immigration but also on its selectivity. An ageing society will increase the demand for health and care services which are preferentially taken over by the female labour force.

- The increasing economic growth leads to an increasing demand for new labour migration especially when the demographic transition is in full swing. Growth in GDP should be highly correlated with the positive net migration balance. In addition, short term external events

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1 The bivariate correlation between the birth rate and net migration is indeed negative and highly significant. Based on a long time series for Austria it can be shown, that that the correlation between the birth rate and net migration as −0.6 between 1950 and 2008: The higher the birth rate the lower net immigration and vice versa.
have to be taken into account, that lead towards an above-average increase in the demand for labour. Such events may be large investments within short periods of time (such as world championships or Olympic games). Besides this short term and cyclic effect the long term structural change from an industrial economy to a service based economy during the past decades has to be taken into consideration. Productivity gains in the service sector are limited and the qualities of the services are connected to human beings and not to machines. Especially in branches like tourism or health and personal services economic growth leads automatically to an increase in the work force.

- The authors would argue furthermore for a third independent process: the segmentation of the labour market and the tendency towards a higher qualification of the native and – to a slower tendency – the foreign population. Since the industrial and fordistic development is in full swing the labour market segmentation becomes more and more important and acts as a source for further immigration. A well developed labour market is characterized by a division of the entire market into a primary and a secondary segment. In the primary segment the well educated labourers are employed who are the source of the enterprises’ specific knowledge. These well educated labourers receive high wages and show stable careers. In the secondary labour market segment the less qualified jobs are concentrated, the wages are lower and the careers are unstable. With the higher qualification of the native population more and more school leavers are trying to enter the primary segment and leave the jobs in the secondary segment vacant.

- Finally, the state and the related modes of regulation concerning international migration have to be pointed out as main drivers. With its laws, regulations and execution practices the public authorities shape immigration in a sustainable and direct way. Of course the state does not act regardless of the mentioned factors and state action is normally related to demographic and economic developments. In times of a decreasing labour supply and the
economy being in need of more labourers, the public authorities become active and react to that situation. Thus the state is not only a main driver but is at the same time influenced by other drivers.

It is important to note that these main drivers are interacting or mutually dependent. They also display temporally different effects. Drivers like the demographic development have a long-term effect while economic influences show short-term effects. And they have to be seen from a double perspective: In which way are they expressed in target countries of migration as well as in potential countries of origin.

3. Europe: convergence and diversity of international migration

During the 19th and the beginning 20th century, Europe was a continent of emigration. Ferenczi and Wilcox claim that roughly 50 to 55 million people emigrated from Europe to the USA and approximately another ten million Europeans left for Argentina, Canada and Brazil between 1846 and 1924 (Ferenczi and Wilcox 1929: 185). But after 1945 a new time began – also for European migration. Nothing could bring better to the point the new economic and political rise of Europe than the turn of migration after the Second World War. Step-by-step most European countries turned into de facto immigration countries. But this was not the result of an encompassing strategy, but of a specific economic, demographic and political development. During the second half of the 20th century Europe turned into an immigration continent “against its will”, and the main countries involved in this development were the countries which are subsumed as „old immigration countries“ within this project.

2 In order to test the postulated links empirically at least to some extent, a data set has been compiled from the EUROSTAT data base (new cronos) containing all EU-27 countries. For the past decade (1998–2008) the annual migration balances of each member state have been extracted as dependent variables and the GDP per capita, the total fertility rate and the unemployment rate have been added as independent factors. The explanatory value of the regression model is 28 per cent and the GDP per capita turned out to be the most relevant variable: The higher the GDP per capita, the higher the positive migration balance. The second variable “unemployment” is also significant but with a negative sign: The higher unemployment in the EU-27 countries, the lower the migration balance. Finally, the total fertility rate also displays a significant effect: The lower fertility, the higher the international migration balance.
3.1. The general pattern

There are good arguments to use flow data to delineate immigration countries as well as net migration data. However in both cases the availability and accuracy of migration statistics in Europe is an unsolved problem. The individual nation states use long-established but very different instruments for determining population and migration figures, which are not necessarily easy to harmonise with each other. One possibility for using long term net migration data is offered by the Population Division of the United Nation. They provide calculated net migration as the result of comparing population figures from two different years. The calculated net migration is given by the demographic main equation: the population of t+1 is the population of t plus birth and minus death between t and t+1. The net migration is therefore not only the result of “real” migration flows but also reflecting any statistical changes and uncertainties. However, these data provide net migration figures for every country of the world dating back to 1950 and allow therefore for a recalculation of the net migration of the EU-27 for more than five decades.

It becomes apparent that until the beginning of the 1960s more people left the EU-27 than came in. Back then, Europe was still an emigration continent. The negative migration balance of more than 200,000 persons per year changed for the first time during the quinquennium 1960–1965. The recruitment of foreign labour has prevailed as a labour market related measure and many European countries satisfy their additional demand for labour coming along with a positive economic development by immigration. The positive balance only went down in times of economic crises (1968, 1973, 1980) or it did not grow with the intensity that could have been expected. As from the middle of the 1980s the international migration balance of the EU-27 with the “rest of the world” has always been positive and grew from quinquennium to quinquennium. Between 2005 and 2010 it is already at 1.3 million people, also due to preliminary and projected results. That means: Year by year the difference between the number of people
coming to the EU-27 and those who leave is 1.3 million people. In the long-time average (1950–2010) the annual gain from migration amounted to 420,000 people.

A further fact that can be shown by means of the net migration data of the UN is the convergence of European migration. In the EU-27, the variance of different net migrations on the level of the nation states decreases, but this process is not linear. It was low during the 1950s, because almost all nation states were characterized by a prevalence of emigration. During the 1960s the variance grew remarkably, because some countries had already turned into immigration countries and others still were dominated by emigration. The variance diminishes again during the 1980s, as the postulated pattern – Europe turns into an immigration continent – generally wins through. For the time being, it is only a few countries in Eastern Europe that still display a negative migration balance. But also there it is only a matter of time until immigration exceeds emigration with the reasons being a strong drop in fertility that translates into a decreasing domestic labour supply delayed in time as well as a relatively fast growing economy that longs for further workforce. In the Czech Republic Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia immigration is already outbalancing emigration since the beginning of the 1990s with the international migration balance being positive since then.
### Table 1. Calculated net migration, 1950–2010 (in 1,000).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>EU27</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950–1955</td>
<td>−51</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>−101</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>−15</td>
<td>−267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955–1960</td>
<td>−104</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>−15</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>−10</td>
<td>−201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960–1965</td>
<td>−78</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965–1970</td>
<td>−43</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>−50</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>−71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970–1975</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>−38</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975–1980</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>−11</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980–1985</td>
<td>−26</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>−50</td>
<td>−22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985–1990</td>
<td>−15</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–1995</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–2000</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–2005</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005–2010</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average p.a.</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3.2. Country-specific differentiations

As has just been pointed out, this development was not the same or parallel in all European countries. Some of them show a positive migration balance during the whole time period under consideration, other European nation states do so only in recent time periods. Table 1 documents these differences in temporal dynamics and in the following the differences shall further be discussed.

During the whole time period, France has displayed a positive net migration. On the one hand this results from an active recruitment policy that was specifically organized by the public authorities in order to attract foreign workforce. On the other hand France has received returning settler, soldiers and civil servants as well as citizens of the former colonies in the course of the decolonization process. This immigration was not only economic and labour market oriented, as it was the case in Germany, but also depending on external events. Over the entire period from the 1950s until 2007 the net migration was positive (2007: +73,000) and therefore there is no doubt to declare France as an old immigration country but the turning point from
emigration to immigration dates back to the second half of the 19th century and the shape of the graph is different to the one for Germany. The average positive net migration for the whole time period (1950–2010) is 112,000 persons. Currently (2008) there are about 3.65 million foreigners living in France and 6.5 million people have been born abroad, a fact that underlines the importance of colonial immigration and the quick granting of citizenship, mostly for the second generation born in France. With a share of foreigners of 5.7 per cent France finds itself in the European midfield.

Figure 1. Net migration in France, 1950–2010.

Since the 1950s, Germany has also almost always been experiencing a positive net migration, though it was more strongly related to economic trends. The economic crises following the first and second oil price shock are translated into considerably shrinking net migration. Less foreign labourers were recruited or remigration was promoted offensively. During the whole period from the beginning of the 1950s until the end of 2010 the net migration was positive. Only during a few years around 1975 and 1980 the migration balance turned negative.
Figure 2. Net migration in Germany, 1950–2010.

Germany is undisputedly an old immigration country but with more than one turning point from emigration to immigration. In total, the average annual net migration is +181,000 persons, the highest in the total EU-27. The stock of immigrants is about 10.5 million people who have been born abroad and 7.3 million foreign citizens, which results in a share of foreigners of 8.8 per cent.

Regarding the course of international net migration the Austrian case corresponds to the German example that is characterized by a strong link to economic trends. But there is an important difference between Austria and Germany, namely the later beginning of active recruitment and therewith the turning point of net migration from minus to plus. Germany signed the recruitment contracts already in the middle of the 1950s, whereas the Austrian government did so only at the beginning of the 1960s. The long-time average of net migration during the past six decades is anyhow +14,000, but +34,000 during the past two decades. Austria is without any doubt an immigration country but only in the statistical definition because the self perception is rather different, especially that of the political elite. The stock of immigrants in Austria amounts to about 1.4 million foreign born and 0.8 million foreign citizens, which results in a share of foreigners of 10 per cent. In this respect Austria lies in the European leading group.
The United Kingdom clearly represents a different type: It is only since the middle of the 1980s that the UK shows a continuously positive migration balance. Before then the UK was more characterized by emigration than immigration. For many decades, the UK citizens leaving for the USA, Canada and Australia outnumbered the re-migrants from the (former) colonies. Furthermore the immigration of citizens from the former colonies got more and more restricted in political and legal terms. The picture of “Britain under siege” transported by the media also had political implications. However, applying the definition used the UK became an immigration country in the statistical definition, a very young one compared to France. The turning point from emigration to immigration lies back only two decades. But the self perception did not change in the same way and the British public was surprised by the increase of immigration during the last years. In total the positive net migration amounted to 25,000 since the beginning of the 1950s, but 128,000 since the beginning of the 1990s. Currently (2008) about 3.7 million foreign citizens are residing in the UK and 6 million people have been born abroad. As is well known, the UK has – just like Ireland and Sweden – gone without the temporary arrangements concerning the immigration of labour from the new member states and has thus turned into an important target for Polish and Lithuanian workers. The share of foreigner was 4.2 per cent in the year 2000 and increased to 6.5 per cent in 2008.
It is only Southern European countries that are even younger immigration countries than the UK. The case of Spain shall be discussed in the following. At the beginning of the 1990s Spain experienced the same process as Germany and Austria did some decades ago, namely the turn of the migration balance to positive values. Following the EU-accession and the positive economic development it was not only emigration that had stopped, but a downright take-off of immigration of labour targeted at agriculture, tourism and private households started. Furthermore, immigration of elderly people from the UK, Germany and the Scandinavian countries, who want to spend their sunset years in the European sunbelt, has to be added. The long-time average of net migration since the 1950s is $+65,000$ persons, but since the beginning of the 1990s it is as high as $+296,000$. It thus exceeds the international net migration of Germany, a fact imposingly documenting the development towards an immigration country and the growing convergence in this respect. In 2008 about 4.6 million foreign citizens were registered in Spain, which results in a share of immigrants of 11.5 per cent. Spain thus finds itself among the European countries with the highest shares of immigrants, it is only outnumbered by mini-states displaying even higher shares.
4. The migration cycle: the Austrian example

In the following chapter the perspective will be changed from the European level to the level of a single member state. Austria is the example to show the transition from an emigration into an immigration country in detail and the example to proof the applicability of the concept of the migration cycle in detail. In doing so it becomes apparent that the differentiation of the phases and the cycle are always relative. There are good arguments to show, that the Austrian migration history since 1945 can be described as a cycle, with a stable phase until the beginning of the 1960s, an intermediate phase until the end of the 1990s and following a phase of regained stability. But the Austrian migration history could just as well be described by identifying two separate cycles, with the first one lasting until the middle of the 1980s, when the classic “guest worker regime” came to an end and stability came along again and a second one that has to be seen in relation with the fall of the Iron Curtain, with stability and a new balance appearing only recently.

4.1. Migration history in retrospect

Until the end of the 1950s Austria was an emigration country. The country was poor, unemployment high and the economic upswing came later than in Germany. The out-migration of Austrian nationals exceeded immigration and
the most important target regions were the USA, Canada, Australia as well as the neighbouring countries Germany and Switzerland. From the Austrians’ perspective there were many advantages related to an employment in these two neighbouring countries: Small distances, no language barriers and higher levels of income than at home made emigration for the purpose of labour an attractive option (Munz, Zuser & Kytir 2003).

This emigration went on during the 1960s with about 92,000 Austrians leaving between 1962 and 1973. This number does not include commuters (most of all in Western Austria) and seasonal workers who kept their main residences in Austria which means that the total number of Austrian employees in Germany and Switzerland was even higher. In 1973, the total number of Austrians residing in Germany was 177,000 with 101,000 being gainfully employed, in Switzerland the number of Austrians amounted to 40,000 before the oil crisis (Munz, Zuser & Kytir 2003).

Table 1. Stock of the population by nationality in Austria, 1961.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>foreign nationals</th>
<th>in % of total population</th>
<th>in % of foreign population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>total population</td>
<td>7,073,814</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian nationals</td>
<td>6,971,648</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign nationals</td>
<td>102,166</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-14</td>
<td>59,215</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>4,565</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visegrad¹</td>
<td>6,498</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>31,671</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹: Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary.
Source: Census 1961, Statistics Austria, own calculation.

International immigration remained a clear exception and only happened in the form of political refugees. In 1956/57, 180,000 Hungarians sought asylum in Austria, in 1968/69 160,000 Czechs and Slovaks left via Austria, but only 12,000 tried to get asylum in Austria. As can clearly be seen, Austria was not really the target for many of these migrants but only happened to be nearby and a direct neighbour and thus served as a transit country for the refugees.
Most of them wanted to travel on to other Western European or overseas destinations. The Austrian public expressed a lot of sympathy for these refugees from behind the Iron Curtain, whom they saw as victims of communism and who did not really want to stay.

The census 1961 counted a foreign population of only 1.4 per cent, a little more than 100,000 persons in absolute terms. The majority came from Western Europe with all the other origins playing an insignificant role. Immigration of foreign population was neither a subject of public concerns nor an issue of labour market policy. The situation changed with the Austrian “Wirtschaftswunder” – a period of economic growth – and with the return of high fertility.

In the early 1960s, Austria was facing a growing demand for labour as the economy was booming: The industrial sector was expanding, the currency was stabilized, the inflation was below five per cent and with an unemployment rate of below three per cent the goal of full employment had been achieved. The female labour force participation decreased because many women had to leave the labour market to take care for the new born baby boomers. The subsequent lack of labour force – most of all affecting the industrial sector – had several reasons: It can be seen as a long-term consequence of the human losses in World War II. Moreover, the high number of births and the lack in childcare kept women away from the labour market and the temporal extension of education brought less people into employment.

Facing the need for additional labour, the Social Partners agreed upon contingents for the employment of guest workers in 1961, with the goal of letting them in only on a temporary basis and sending them back in the case of an unfavourable economic development. They should just act as additional temporary workers. Generally speaking the Austrian migration policy was a mere question of the labour market in this first phase of guest worker immigration. Migration policy as such was not an issue and dominated by the interests of the entrepreneurs, guest workers were welcomed and seen as an
additional source for wealth but not as a part of the Austrian society. Integration was not on the agenda and a long-term residence of the imported labour force was not intended.

The Austrian recruitment of labour migrants happened later than in Germany, Switzerland or Scandinavia. The first intergovernmental recruitment agreements were set up with Spain in 1962, which in fact remained irrelevant, Turkey in 1964, and Yugoslavia in 1966. The so called rotation principle formed the basic idea at the beginning of the immigration of guest workers. They should stay only on a temporary basis with no permanent settlement, family migration or societal integration. But this idea failed due to resistances from both the employers’ and the foreign employees’ side. Enterprises didn’t want to do without the workforce they had instructed and the migrants stayed as they had a job they had no reason to give up and made more money than at home.

In practical terms the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber established recruitment centres in the sending countries and in 1967 a provisional employment centre was installed directly at one of the main train stations in Vienna (Ostbahnhof). But this concept of direct recruitment got more and more unimportant in the course of time with the ongoing immigration and the formation of networks with enterprises and guest workers already present in Austria recruiting friends and relatives in the sending countries (Baubock 1996). These new labourers entered Austria as tourists but under the economic boom conditions of the early 1970s it was quite easy for them to get an employment permit.

Starting in the larger cities in the Northern republics of Yugoslavia and with high proportions of Slovenes and Croats, guest worker migration in its initial phase brought individual young people to Austria, who were not able to find an employment in their home country after having finished school or who were interested in earning more money abroad. The quantitative increase from 1969 onwards went hand in hand with a social and geographical expansion. More and more older people with low qualifications from rural
areas in the South-Eastern parts of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia) were involved in the process. The motives of these guest workers were all the same: Maximizing income and at the same time minimizing the costs of the stay abroad in order to be able to send as much money as possible back home (Fassmann 1992).

Being successful in recruiting foreign labour, Austria was facing a first wave of immigration of guest workers in the middle of the 1960s with an annual growth of more than 10,000 foreign workers from 1965 (11,200) until 1967 (14,700). This number rose to around 40,000 in the years 1971–1973, thus representing the heyday of guest worker immigration. The economic boom went on and the employment of foreign labour reached its peak in 1973 with around 227,000 persons, with 78.5 per cent from Yugoslavia only. Guest workers made up for about ten per cent of the total Austrian labour force.

Table 2. Stock of the population by nationality in Austria, 1971.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>foreign nationals</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>females in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>abs.</td>
<td>in % of total</td>
<td>in % of foreign</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>population</td>
<td>population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total population</td>
<td>7,491,526</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian nationals</td>
<td>7,279,630</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign nationals</td>
<td>211,896</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-14</td>
<td>64,594</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>93,337</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>16,423</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visegrad¹</td>
<td>6,853</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>30,689</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹: Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary.
Source: Census 1961, Statistics Austria, own calculation.

Concerning the stock of the foreign population in the early phase of guest worker immigration, the census only gives limited information. Guest workers whose families still resided in the country of origin were not counted as parts of the resident population which is also characteristic for the way politicians and decision makers dealt with guest worker migration. But there was an additional inquiry among those whose families were still back home and a publication also containing information on “guest workers living in Austria but not belonging to the resident population” (Osterreichisches Statistisches
Zentralamt 1974). The following table comprises both groups. While the share of foreigners was only 1.4 per cent before the change from a country of emigration to immigration (1961), it had doubled to 2.8 per cent in 1971 with the census already reflecting the dominance of immigration from the Balkans.

The comparison of the composition of the population in 1961 and 1971 clearly shows that the total increase in the foreign population (more than 100,000 persons) to a great extent resulted from the immigration from Yugoslavia and Turkey. Yugoslavia was the main sending country with 44 percent of the 211,896 foreign nationals residing in Austria in 1971. All in all, the guest workers made up for 52 per cent of the total foreign population. Western Europe was accounting for one third of the foreign resident population in 1971.

The number of Turks was still comparatively low at the beginning of the 1970s with 16,423 only and displaying a clear male dominance: Only 12.7 per cent of the Turks in Austria in 1971 were females whereas 37 per cent of the residing Yugoslavs were women, a clear indicator, that family migration or an independent immigration of women in their case must already have started at least to some extent before 1971. But this clearly indicates that Yugoslav women had also entered Austria as guest workers.

In the first half of the 1970s, the economic situation changed enormously due to two parallel developments: first the pronounced economic stagnation after the first oil price shock in 1973 which marked the end of the boom era that had lasted for a long period of time. It led to growing unemployment, reduced working hours, increased inflation and public debts as well as crashing enterprises. Secondly the arrival of the baby-boom cohorts on the labour market marked the end of the internal labour shortage.

The public opinion about immigration and guest workers as such changed. While people from (former) Yugoslavia and Turkey were tolerated in times of good economic performance, the public increasingly perceived them as a threat and those who short-change the welfare system. The placard
“Kolaric” could be seen in the streets of Vienna in 1973 and is famous until today. The man whose name also in reality was Kolaric and who was working in a Vienna slaughter house, is asked by a little obviously Austrian boy, why they call him “Tschusch” (a swear word for people from the Balkans), though they have the same name. Launched by the “Aktion Mitmensch” of the Austrian advertising industry, the placard is an early example for the promotion of tolerance and the integration of migrants.

From 1974 up to 1976 there were massive attempts to reduce the foreign labour force in Austria and the official recruitment was thus stopped completely. The failure of the rotation principle and the trend towards a permanent settlement got apparent. Contrary to the official political plans and expectations, the recruitment ban led towards a consolidation of residence for a part of the foreign workers, who had gone back and forth before that depending on the labour market situation and now – in fear of losing the right to live and work in Austria – decided to stay permanently (Munz, Zuser & Kytir 2003).

In 1974 the Ministry for Social Affairs decreed a stepwise restriction of labour immigration after negotiations with the social partners. On the level of the federal states a so called “Landesverhältniszahl” was implemented which aimed at regulating the size of the average foreign labour force with regard to the total labour force. In 1976 the Aliens’ Employment Act (Auslanderbeschaftigungsgesetz) that should regulate the admission of foreigners to the Austrian labour market became operative. The Aliens’ Employment Act was based on the determination that foreigners may only be employed if the situation on the Austrian labour market as well as public and overall societal interests allow for further immigration. The Aliens’ Employment Act introduced a system of stepwise access to different types of permits with differing durations: first the employment permits (Beschaftigungsbewilligung), after one year a work permit (Arbeitserlaubnis) and certificate of exemption (Befreiungsschein) after five years of employment.
All these measures led to significant reductions in the guest worker quotas and an "export of unemployment". More than 31,000 guest workers left in 1975 and another 19,000 in 1976. This reduction continued – with only two years of an increase in foreign labour (1977, 1980) – until 1984 when the foreign labour force comprised only 139,000 persons anymore, 40 per cent less than ten years before. Yugoslavs were more affected than Turks: The number of employed Turks only dropped from 30,000 (1974) to 27,700 in 1984, whereas more than 50 per cent of the Yugoslav labour force left Austria and its labour market (1974: 169,400, 1984: 84,144). As naturalizations not yet played an important role in quantitative terms, one can assume that these guest workers really went back home or tried to get an employment somewhere else.

Table 3. Stock of the population by nationality in Austria, 1981.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>foreign nationals in % of total population</th>
<th>foreign nationals in % of foreign population</th>
<th>foreign females in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>total population</td>
<td>7,555,338</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian nationals</td>
<td>7,263,890</td>
<td>96.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign nationals</td>
<td>291,448</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-14</td>
<td>57,823</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>125,890</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>59,900</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visegrad1</td>
<td>11,722</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>36,113</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1: Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary.
Source: Census 1981, Statistics Austria, own calculation.

The census results of 1981 show that the process of family reunification had increased the number of women from Yugoslavia and Turkey with almost 45 per cent women for Yugoslavia and 40 per cent for Turkey. Those who had not left after the oil crisis had decided to stay in Austria for a longer period of time and therefore realized the plan to bring their families to Austria. Thus – and despite the successful attempts to reduce the foreign labour force – the size of the foreign resident population had grown from 212,000 in 1971 to 291,000 in 1981 (or by 37 per cent). With 63.8 per cent in the total foreign population the dominance of the guest worker migration was prolonged.
The time period between 1985 and 1994 saw two huge political changes that had massive effects on the development of international migration, not only for Austria but for Europe as a whole. First of all the Fall of the Iron Curtain in the late 1980s brought freedom of travel for the people of the former Eastern Bloc and old paths of East-West-migration were recovered. Furthermore, at the beginning of the 1990s the wars in Croatia (1991–1995) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–1995) forced millions of refugees to flee from their countries. The annual net migration of foreigners grew from +12,000 in 1985 up to +85,000 in 1991 and remained rather high until 1994 (+13,200).

Table 4. Stock of the population by nationality in Austria, 1991.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>abs.</th>
<th>foreign nationals in % of total population</th>
<th>foreign nationals in % of foreign population</th>
<th>females in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>total population</td>
<td>7,795,786</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian nationals</td>
<td>7,278,096</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign nationals</td>
<td>517,690</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-14</td>
<td>79,437</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>51.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>197,886</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>118,579</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visegrad¹</td>
<td>58,731</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>63,057</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1: Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary.

As the census data show, the size of the foreign resident population has grown enormously between 1981 and 1991, namely from 291,000 to 518,000 (+227,000 persons). With a share of more than 60 per cent in the total foreign population it was once again Yugoslavia and Turkey playing the dominant role with regard to the composition of the stock of foreigners in Austria in 1991, a point in time, when the massive wave of immigration due to the Balkan War had not started. Concerning other regions of origin, the number of people from the Eastern neighbouring countries as well as Romania and Poland residing in Austria was four times higher in 1991 compared to the results of 1981, but in absolute numbers still very low. The share of females still varied a lot by sending regions: The lowest share (39.6 per cent) can be observed for the then rather new immigration from Eastern European countries.
These severe changes in Austria’s migration landscape directly led towards changes in the public opinion about immigration driven by fears of Austria being “flooded by foreigners” and later on in marked reforms of migration policy. The right wing party FPÖ increased its share of voters from five per cent to 26.9 per cent at the end of the 1990s, in 1992 they launched a referendum called “Austria first”, which was signed by 416,500 Austrians (7.3 per cent of all eligible voters). In the referendum, among others the following requests were formulated: an expulsion of delinquent foreigners, a more severe naturalization act and a complete stop of immigration. An immediate reaction of those opposing this referendum was the “sea of lights” on the Heldenplatz in Vienna in January 1993, were about 300,000 persons took part. Organized by the NGO “SOS Mitmensch” people demonstrated against xenophobia and racism in the biggest protest the Second Republic had ever seen.

In the first half of the 1990s the Austrian political system reacted. In 1993 the “Aliens Act” became effective and half a year later Austria got a new so-called Residence Law, which in fact was an immigration law. Against the background of the migration movements after the political changes in Europe it aimed at regulating and restricting new immigration (Konig & Stadler 2003). Policy started to move towards a system of controlling migration. Austria was one of the first Western European countries that established an immigration law.

An annual quota for new immigration was established and potential immigrants were divided into different groups, basically being EU- or third country nationals. Persons wanting to immigrate to Austria needed a residence permit and had to provide evidence of their means of subsistence as well as a place to stay. This means that potential immigrants from outside the EU already had to have an employment before arriving. The residence permits were subject to the already mentioned quota and the first application had to be filed from the country of origin. EU- and EEC-citizens were exempted from these restrictions, they neither needed an authorization for immigration nor a residence permit.
The residence law from 1993 was successful in stopping the high immigration from third countries of the early 1990s. The size of the foreign labour force as well as that of the foreign population remained relatively stable between 1995 and 1999 and only grew slightly until 2002. But the comparison with the 1991 stock data shows that the foreign population had grown enormously by around 190,000 persons. They made up for nine per cent of the total population in 2001 although the number of naturalizations had been very high in the 1990s and many foreign nationals of 1991 being Austrians in 2001. With regard to the composition of the foreign population residing in Austria, the situation did not change much between 1991 and 2001: 63 per cent of all foreign nationals still have their roots in one of the classic sending countries Yugoslavia and Turkey.

Table 5. Stock of the population by nationality in Austria, 2001.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>abs.</th>
<th>foreign nationals in % of population</th>
<th>total in % of population</th>
<th>foreign nationals in % of total population</th>
<th>Females in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>total population</td>
<td>8,032,926</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian nationals</td>
<td>7,322,000</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign nationals</td>
<td>710,926</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-14</td>
<td>106,173</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>322,261</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>127,226</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visegrad¹</td>
<td>67,092</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>88,174</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹: Poland, Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary.
Source: Census 2001, Statistics Austria, own calculation.

After 2001 many laws were reformulated more restrictively trying to level down the size of new arrivals. To mention here is the so called Aliens’ Law Package (Auslanderpaket) of 2002. The Aliens’ Law Package comprises the Asylum Act, the Aliens’ Police Act and the Settlement and Residence Act and has been influenced by five EU directives (long-term residence, family reunion, free movement of EU-citizens, students, et al.) that had to be fulfilled as soon as possible. On the whole, Austria became more restrictive for third country nationals both concerning immigration and integration. But it allows more easily the employment of seasonal workers as well as the immigration
of key personnel and it defined mandatory integration courses which include language classes and some basics on legal and historical aspects of the country.

Austria developed a complex system to distinct different immigrant groups to fulfil the needs of the economy and to keep the whole influx low. The public debate on the issue of migration, foreigners and societal development is once again highly politicized, but the intellectual quality of the argumentation has changed. Only a minority asks for “Auslander raus”, which is neither legal nor rationale, and another minority is demanding open borders and unlimited immigration. The political discourse is more based on the acceptance of the reality as it was in the beginning of the 1990s the case. And integration became more and more important as it became clear that the idea of guest workers as temporary migrants is to some extent an illusion. In a demographic shrinking and ageing society with a growing economy, immigration is one of the structural phenomena of the present and the future.

4.2. Generalizing the migration history

The Austrian example demonstrates how a former emigration country became an immigration country. The example shows the changes of migration as well as the adaptation of the society and the legal system. Austria “learned” to manage the new situation and to accept the realities. This learning process was neither free from frictions nor linear. Following the concept of a migration cycle, significant phases of this learning and adaptation process can be delineated at least the initial phase, the intermediate phase and the adaptation phase.

Overall, the initial stage is characterized by low immigration, the public is not oblivious of international migration unless emigration is of bigger importance which was the case in many European countries. There are no specific political measures regulating immigration, only emigration is controlled, most of all in the sense of impeding or retaining citizens. For a long time, the
Austrian legislation envisaged emigrants to ask for permission before leaving the country.

Table 6. Phases of the transition: a non-immigration country becomes an immigration country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>phase</th>
<th>temporal (example Austria)</th>
<th>quantitative dimension</th>
<th>public perception</th>
<th>legal measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>initial</td>
<td>until the late 1950s</td>
<td>international immigration remains the exception, emigration is dominating</td>
<td>the public does not perceive immigration, at the best only emigration</td>
<td>no specific immigration policies at hand, if at all, emigration is regulated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intermediate</td>
<td>1960 up to approx. 1994</td>
<td>emerging immigration, gets more important than emigration, but is still related to cyclic phenomena, high fluctuation of balances</td>
<td>immigration becomes part of the public discourse when economy is declining and the labour market is closing</td>
<td>oscillating between liberalization and tightening of political measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adaptation</td>
<td>after 1994</td>
<td>immigration is a constant phenomenon, high fluctuations are over</td>
<td>slowly growing acceptance</td>
<td>differentiated legislation with a multitude of &quot;channels of immigration&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own scheme.

This situation changes in the intermediate phase. Immigration starts due to a growing national economy of European countries that raises the demand for additional labour on the one hand and a demographic development that leads towards a diminishing internal labour supply on the other. Immigration is coupled with economic cycles and thus fluctuating strongly. The public and politicians willingly accept this additional labour force as these people take over jobs that are poorly paid thus helping domestic enterprises. The increase of a demand driven labour migration appears as formally regulated ("Anwerbeabkommen") and is accompanied by an unregulated immigration of irregular workers. The migration regime is still poorly developed, in the case of guest worker countries often through a revival of the “Fremdarbeiter”-regime.

This kind of immigration is not perceived as a regular inflow but as an exceptional phenomenon in a booming economy. The term “guest work(er)”
signalizes the temporary limitation. Similarly, legalizations of labourers entering or being employed on an irregular basis are carried out on the basis of the erroneous expectation that this is only an exceptional case that can be “repaired”. In the early intermediate phase the public perception almost completely ignores immigration as the immigrants are predominately single males and thus not visible in the public space or in schools. Furthermore they are residing in the outskirts on construction sites and in barracks.

As the intermediate phase is proceeding, immigration becomes a constant phenomenon and more and more comes to the fore of the public. The structure and character of immigration changes from single males to family migration, and they move from the outskirts to inner city areas. The reactions of the public range from surprise to indignation. Arguments like “We are flooded.”, “We will loose our culture.” or “Foreigners are a threat to social peace.” can often be heard and are nothing more than an expression of the slow recognition of a new situation concerning immigration. Another part of the public is pleased by the cultural enrichment coming along with immigration or feels sympathy for the poor immigrants and their socially problematic situation in the host country. All this results in political polarizations and legal measures, that oscillate between liberalization and accentuation.

Finally the intermediate phase passes into a phase of adaptation. Immigration is recognized as a necessary supplement to a demographically decreasing working population. The public is not surprised anymore and comes to an arrangement with a culturally heterogeneous society. Extreme expressions of opinion into one way or the other are loosing popularity and a new political rationality finds its way. This can also be seen in the rather differentiated way of regulating immigration. While there was the type of “labour migrant” during the intermediate phase, a whole panoply of residence and settlement titles has meanwhile been developed.
5. Conclusion

The article shows that Europe became an immigration continent with a significant surplus of immigration and most of the European countries are developing into the same direction. There are strong evidences that the southern European countries are becoming immigration countries and that the Eastern European countries will go into the same direction. But the article also demonstrates that the timing and pattern of the shift from a dominant emigration to immigration situation differs from country to country. The economic and demographic development as well as the historical framing are extremely important for explaining the different migration realities.

The article furthermore expressed the content and the applicability of the migration cycle concept. The migration cycle concept assumes a general shift from an emigration to an immigration situation and delineates significant phases for this shift. It could be proved by the Austrian example that it is a useful concept to analyse migration history following a general guideline and as a reporting grid to make country reports more parallel and better comparable. But it has to be clear, that such a heuristic phase model is a rough simplification. It does not aim at stating, that all European countries are going through these phases and it should not be understood as an automatism. But it reflects a try to order observable sequences of actual migration, public perceptions and political measures and to serialize them in order to make them easier to understand. And this is helpful because simple and descriptive country report were produced in large numbers. IDEA brought scientific progress in that respect.

References


Chapter 4

The making of an immigration model: inflows, markets and policies in Southern Europe

Joao Peixoto
in collaboration with Joaquin Arango, Corrado Bonifazi, Claudia Finotelli, Catarina Sabino, Slavatore Strozza and Anna Triandafyllidou

1. Introduction

Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have in common two long periods of strong emigration (during the first globalization and after the Second World War) and now they share a relevant foreign immigration. However, dissimilarities emerge owing to the different histories of the countries, their diverse social and economic characteristics, as well as their specific cultural and colonial links with other geographical areas. During the first globalization, in the second half of the 19th century and before the First World War, these countries made an important contribution to intra-European migration and to the settlement migration towards North and South America. After the Second World War, these countries were among the main suppliers of the growing economies of Western and Northern Europe. Currently, they are experiencing a relevant inflow of foreigners. In a short time span, Southern Europe has become one of the most important areas of attraction in the continent (Bonifazi 2008). According to the available statistics, the number of foreign immigrants in this area can be estimated as ranging from between 950,000 and 1.3 million in 1991 to 8-10 million in 2006-2007: an increase of seven-eight times in just 15 years.

Many reasons for this growth of foreign immigration were common to the four countries considered. The political and economic transition in the Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE) countries strongly increased the push forces in this area. While the gradual incorporation of most of these countries in the European Union (EU) migration system promoted a relaxing of visa policies, labour migration from this area was \textit{de facto} tolerated even before the EU enlargement. This increased availability of foreign workers has matched the growing needs of domestic labour markets. By and large, many of the causes at the origin of foreign immigration were also behind its recent increase. In this respect, it is worth mentioning the economic growth; the rise in living standards and educational level of native youth that has increased their labour expectations; the persistence of a relevant informal economy and of segmentation processes in the labour markets; the effects of the low fertility on the labour supply; and the limits of Mediterranean welfare systems, largely unable to face the new needs of the populations, including the effects of relevant ageing processes.

The comparative analysis of immigration experiences in Southern European countries is not a novel exercise. Since the early 1990s, the many similarities of timing and other characteristics of immigration in these countries led to the frequent gathering of researchers and policymakers to discuss the theme. During a period that culminated in the turn of the century, several articles, books and special editions of journals were released (see, among others, King & Rybaczuk 1993, Iosifides & King 1996, Baganha 1997, Baldwin-Edwards, 1997; King and Black, 1997; Baldwin-Edwards and Arango, 1999; King, Lazaridis and Tsardanidis 2000, King 2002, VV.AA. 2004, Ritaine 2005, and, more recently, King and Thomson 2008\textsuperscript{2} and VV.AA. 2009). Many of these references designated these new immigration experiences as a Southern European or Mediterranean “model of immigration” (King 2000), which differed in several ways from the model that predominated in other European host countries during the second half of the 20th century, when the Fordist type of capitalism was dominant.

\textsuperscript{2} The purpose of King and Thomson (2008) is to enlarge the scope of the analysis to other Southern European countries, namely Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia.
From the turn of the century on, the interest in drawing comparative analysis between the Southern European countries diminished. This is somehow surprising, since the bulk of the inflows to Southern Europe occurred mostly after the late 1990s. Indeed, the framework and underlying immigration factors remained as much the same as before. But during the new century inflows changed some of their characteristics, several new policies were enacted and the overall outcomes of migration, including immigrant’s integration, varied. It seems clear that an updating of those former comparative exercises is currently in need. This is the main objective of this chapter.

The next sections are organized as follows. First, a detailed analysis of flows and stocks of foreign immigration will be done. Second, resulting from the centrality of the labour demand variables for explaining immigration in this context, a section will be devoted to immigrants’ labour market incorporation. Third, the endemic presence of irregular migration in these countries will be described, together with its explanatory factors (including the informal economy and inadequate regulations) and policy attempts to regulate it (ex-post). Next, other aspects of immigration policy will be examined, including labour recruitment, control and integration policies. As it will be seen, in a short time span several policy instruments were enacted in all Southern European countries, confirming at the same time the tentative character of many policies and the need for new approaches, compared to previous European immigration experiences. Finally, some conclusive remarks will be set.

1.1. Flows and stocks of foreign immigration

It is well known that data on international migration, which generally refers only to the regular foreign component, has different statistical sources, and even when it comes from the same type of source it is not always comparable in the time and between countries. The specific features of national legal systems have a great impact on numbers. In the Southern European case, the endemic character of irregular migration adds to the
difficulty of measurement (on the main sources on international migration in Southern Europe, see Cangiano & Strozza 2008).

At the beginning of the 21st century, according to the available sources, immigration experienced a spectacular upsurge in Italy and above all in Spain (Figure 1). The Spanish trend is the most impressive. The data of Padron Municipal, that includes also irregular migrants, registers a continuous and regular growth in the foreign inflow since 1996. The volume of this growth is really astonishing. In only 12 years the size of the inflow has increased 55 times, passing from 17,000 arrivals in 1996 to 921,000 in 2007.

Figure 1. Immigration from abroad of foreign citizens. Italy(a), Portugal(b) and Spain(c), 1990-2007. Absolute values and percentages of foreigners on the overall immigration.

Notes: (a) 2006-2007 provisional data. (b) Data referred only to solicitacoes de autorizacao de residencia (autorizacoes de permanencia concedidas and vistos de longa duracao concedidos pelos postos consulares are not considered). For 2006-2007 provisional data. (c) From 1996 data are not perfectly comparable with the previous ones for the reform of Padron Municipal.

Sources: Italy - Istat, Anagrafi comunali (Municipal Population Registers); Portugal - Servico de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras (SEF) - Ministerio da Administracao Interna; Spain - Ine, Padron Municipal de Habitantes (Municipal Population Registers).

The growing share of foreign immigration on the total inflow (foreigners and nationals) testifies to its increasing importance in the Southern European countries (Figure 1). In Italy this percentage has exceeded the 80 per cent of the total inflow from 1996 and now it is estimated at 92 per cent; in Spain it
has been over 90 per cent since 2000 and it has arrived at 96 per cent in 2007. In this respect, it is worth considering that until the early 1990s nationals were still almost half of the total inflow directed towards these two countries.

The evolution of the foreign presence in the four countries since the 1980s can be quantified using stock data from population censuses, population registers and permits to stay or residence permits (Table 1)\textsuperscript{3}. Regardless of technical differences, all the available information indicates that between 1991 and 2007 the presence of foreign citizens has increased remarkably in all the considered countries. The pace of this growth, however, seems to be much faster in Italy and above all in Spain as compared to Greece and Portugal. In Italy, in particular, data indicates that the number of regular immigrants grew from some hundreds of thousands in 1991 to 2.4-3.4 million in 2007. Consequently, also the share of foreigners on the total population has increased from about 1 per cent to 4-6 per cent. The estimated number of foreigners reaches 4.3 million, that is 7.2 per cent of the total population living in Italy, if we consider non-resident regular immigrants and illegal immigrants too (Blangiardo 2009).

\textsuperscript{3} Estimates of total foreign population, including the illegal component, are reported in some cases.
Table 1. Foreign population according to different sources in the Southern European Immigration Countries around 1991, 2001 and 2007. Absolute values (in thousands) and percentages of total population (at the end of the year or at the census data).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country /categories</th>
<th>Absolute values (in thousands)</th>
<th>% of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permits to stay holders(^{(a)})</td>
<td>649  1,448  2,415</td>
<td>1.1  2.5  4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents(^{(b)})</td>
<td>356  1,335  3,433</td>
<td>0.6  2.3  5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of total foreign pop.(^{(c)})</td>
<td>1002 2,460 4,328</td>
<td>1.8  4.3  7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAIN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permits to stay holders(^{(d)})</td>
<td>361 1,109 3,979</td>
<td>0.9  2.7  8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents (census)(^{(e)})</td>
<td>353 1,572 ...</td>
<td>0.9  3.8 ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents of Padron (total foreign population)(^{(f)})</td>
<td>... 1,978 5,221</td>
<td>... 4.8 11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREECE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permits to stay holders(^{(g)})</td>
<td>149 ... 696</td>
<td>1.5 ... 6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents(^{(h)})</td>
<td>166 762 884</td>
<td>1.6  7.0  7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of total foreign pop.(^{(i)})</td>
<td>... ... 1,092</td>
<td>... ... 9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTUGAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal residents and holders of visas(^{(j)})</td>
<td>... 351 446</td>
<td>... 3.4 4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residents (^{(k)})</td>
<td>107 233 402</td>
<td>1.1  2.2  3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate of total foreign pop.(^{(l)})</td>
<td>... ... 496</td>
<td>... ... 4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The progressive increase recorded for the stocks of foreigners in Spain is even more evident. Permit to stay holders and usual residents, who were less than 400,000, became respectively almost 4 million and over 5.2 million. This last value includes also illegal migrants. The percentage of foreigners in the Spanish population grew from less than one per cent in 1991 to 8.6 per cent and 11.3 per cent, respectively, for the two considered groups. High levels in terms of percentage of immigrants on the total population are recorded in Greece too, with 7.9 per cent of residents and 9.8 per cent of
total immigrants, including legal and an estimate of illegal presences; here the number of regular foreigners is around 0.9 million, while the stock almost arrives at 1.1 million if we include irregular migrants. In Portugal the size of legal foreign immigration is almost 450,000, around 4.2 per cent of the total population; these values would increase to 500,000 and 4.7 per cent, respectively, if an estimate of irregular immigrants was added.

By and large, labour migration and the related family migration are the two main flows directed towards Southern Europe in the last twenty five years. Southern European countries do not seem to be countries of asylum and do not attract a large number of foreign students. Statistical evidence drawn from different sources, including census, permits to stay and residence permits, confirms these characteristic of migration processes.

The main reasons for migration (work and family reunion) affect the demographic structure of immigration flows. In fact, the first working-age cohorts (20-39 years old) generally accounted for the majority of all immigrants, while the share of the youngest population (less than 20 years old) usually fluctuated around 20-30 per cent of the total. Immigration of foreigners aged 60 or older accounted for a negligible share of total arrivals in Italy, whilst the percentages recorded in Spain and Portugal are higher, owing to the relevance of retirement migration in these two countries.

The gender structure of foreign immigration flows has been relatively balanced in the recent years. In Italy and Portugal, women have generally prevailed in the current decade, while in Spain their share on the total has oscillated between 45 and 48 per cent. However, this result can reflect deep imbalances in the gender composition of the different national groups, in some cases in favour of men and in other cases in favour of women.

1.2. Main nationalities and their evolution

The evolution of foreign immigration in terms of area of origin is characterised by a rise in the size and proportion of immigration from CEE countries and
from the Third World, and a corresponding reduction of the percentage from developed countries, despite its increase in absolute terms (Table 2). Alongside these two main common trends, the situation presents important and interesting differences between the countries considered. In fact, each country has a specific area of attraction, as a result of its geographical position, its history, its colonial heritage (if it exists), and its cultural and linguistic links with other countries.

Italy is probably the country where this set of factors has been less important. The weight of foreigners of More Developed Countries (MDCs) fell from 32.7 per cent of the total in 1991 to 5.9 per cent in 2007. At the same time, immigration from CEE countries had an extraordinary increase: from 1991 to 2007 it increased 30.2-fold, totalling more than 1.6 million and representing 47 per cent of the total. There was also a strong but not so marked increase in immigration from developing countries, rising from 186,000 in 1991 to 1.6 million in 2007, representing a reduction from 52.3 to 47 per cent of the total. In the current decade there is a clear prevalence of Romanians, Albanians, and Moroccans and a gradual stabilization of many other sizeable communities.

In Spain and Portugal the weight of immigration from MDCs has always been higher than in Italy, as a result of the larger diffusion of retirement migration. In 2007 it still accounted for 22.2 per cent of the total in Spain and for 24.8 per cent in Portugal. In these two countries immigration from CEE is less important than in Italy, although Romanians have become the biggest community in Spain and Ukrainians are the third community in Portugal. The main characteristic of the Spanish migration model is the large inflow from Latin America. The tightening of the U.S. immigration policies after September 11 probably contributed to direct to Europe the flows caused by the economic crisis that troubled several Latin American countries (Pellegrino, 2004). Linguistic and cultural bonds due to the Spanish colonial past in the region are probably the main factors that explain why Spain has been chosen as a preferred destination.
As regards Portugal, a marked increase of immigration from the CEE countries has appeared in the last decade. Until the end of the 1990s, the immigration towards the country was mainly linked to its colonial past and had developed a specific migration system united by the Portuguese language⁴. The reasons for this ‘Eastern revolution’ are probably related to the Portugal EU-membership and to the enlargement of the European migration system. The larger groups in the country are today from Cape Verde, Brazil and Ukraine.

Some basic facts distinguish recent migratory trends to Greece from those observed in the rest of Southern Europe. First, the dramatic increase in the immigrant population has occurred despite the great number of “administrative deportations” (2.2 million in 1992-2001), carried out with the intention of dissuading immigrant settlement. Forced circular migration was a common pattern for Albanians. Second, one national group (Albanians) represent about 70 per cent of the whole foreign presence. No similar level of dominance of a single source country is found in the other three countries considered. More generally, proximity of the sending countries distinguishes the Greek migration experience, as even other important immigrant groups (Bulgarians and Romanians) come from neighbouring countries. Finally, Greece is the Southern European country most often sought by refugees (especially Iraqis and Afghans arriving from Turkey). Initially considered only as a country of transit, Greece has become more and more attractive to asylum seekers, as long as other EU-countries restricted asylum policies.

⁴ Most of the immigrants came from the ex-colonies in Africa (PALOP – Portuguese Speaking African Countries) and from Brazil.
| Main countries | GREECE | | ITALY | | PORTUGAL | | SPAIN |
|----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| of citizenship | Abs. val. (%) by citizenship by females | of citizenship | Abs. val. (%) by citizenship by females | of citizenship | Abs. val. (%) by citizenship by females | of citizenship | Abs. val. (%) by citizenship by females |
|----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| **1991 Census** | | | | | | | |
| Total | 167.3 | 100.0 | 46.4 | MDCs | Total | 356.2 | 100.0 | 47.1 |
| MDCs | 77.7 | 46.4 | 54.4 | MDCs | 116.5 | 32.7 | 59.3 |
| CEE | 49.8 | 29.8 | 37.8 | CEE | 53.5 | 15.0 | 48.8 |
| LDCs | 39.8 | 23.8 | 41.6 | LDCs | 186.2 | 52.3 | 38.9 |
| Albania | 20.6 | 12.3 | 29.7 | Morocco | 39.9 | 11.2 | 19.0 |
| Cyprus | 14.7 | 8.8 | 48.6 | Germany | 22.7 | 6.4 | 60.8 |
| USA | 13.9 | 8.3 | 50.9 | | 17.1 | 4.8 | 46.3 |
| Russia | 12.9 | 7.7 | 49.5 | Turkey | 15.8 | 4.4 | 64.0 |
| **2001 Census** | | | | | | | |
| Total | 762.2 | 100.0 | 45.5 | MDCs | Total | 1,334.9 | 100.0 | 50.5 |
| MDCs | 83.9 | 11.0 | 56.6 | MDCs | 180.9 | 13.5 | 63.9 |
| CEE | 577.4 | 75.8 | 45.2 | CEE | 436.7 | 32.7 | 50.9 |
| LDCs | 100.9 | 13.2 | 37.8 | LDCs | 771.3 | 53.7 | 46.9 |
| Albania | 438.0 | 57.5 | 41.3 | Albania | 173.1 | 13.0 | 43.7 |
| Bulgaria | 35.1 | 4.6 | 60.4 | Romania | 74.9 | 5.6 | 53.5 |
| Russia | 22.0 | 2.9 | 43.4 | Philippines | 54.0 | 4.0 | 61.1 |
| USA | 18.1 | 2.4 | 51.5 | F.R. Yugoslavia | 49.3 | 3.7 | 46.8 |
| **2005 Permits to stay** | | | | | | | |
| Total | 692.4 | 100.0 | 37.7 | MDCs | Total | 3,437.2 | 100.0 | 50.4 |
| MDCs | 83.9 | 11.0 | 56.6 | MDCs | 201.1 | 5.9 | 59.9 |
| CEE | 605.0 | 87.4 | 38.5 | CEE | 1,614.9 | 47.0 | 54.4 |
| LDCs | 87.4 | 12.6 | 31.9 | LDCs | 1,616.7 | 47.1 | 45.3 |
| Albania | 481.7 | 69.6 | 31.4 | Romania | 625.3 | 18.2 | 52.9 |
| Bulgaria | 44.0 | 6.4 | 65.2 | Albania | 401.9 | 11.7 | 44.7 |
| Romania | 25.4 | 3.7 | 47.2 | Morocco | 365.9 | 10.7 | 40.8 |
| Ukraine | 19.8 | 2.9 | 51.7 | China | 155.5 | 4.6 | 47.3 |
| USA | 15.8 | 2.3 | 1.2 | Ukraine | 132.7 | 3.9 | 80.4 |
| **2007 Population Registers (Anagrafo)** | | | | | | | |
| Total | 401.6 | 100.0 | 45.3 | MDCs | Total | 401.6 | 100.0 | 45.3 |
| MDCs | 99.7 | 24.8 | 46.9 | MDCs | 1,160.0 | 22.2 | 46.8 |
| CEE | 79.2 | 19.7 | 41.9 | CEE | 1,180.3 | 22.6 | 47.3 |
| LDCs | 222.7 | 55.5 | 45.8 | LDCs | 2,880.3 | 55.2 | 46.6 |
| Albania | 625.3 | 18.2 | 52.9 | Albania | 401.9 | 11.7 | 44.7 |
| Bulgaria | 401.9 | 11.7 | 44.7 | Bulgaria | 401.9 | 11.7 | 44.7 |
| Romania | 365.9 | 10.7 | 40.8 | Morocco | 365.9 | 10.7 | 40.8 |
| Ukraine | 155.5 | 4.6 | 47.3 | China | 155.5 | 4.6 | 47.3 |
| USA | 132.7 | 3.9 | 80.4 | Ukraine | 132.7 | 3.9 | 80.4 |
| **2007 Legal residents (SEF)** | | | | | | | |
| Total | 401.6 | 100.0 | 45.3 | MDCs | Total | 401.6 | 100.0 | 45.3 |
| MDCs | 99.7 | 24.8 | 46.9 | MDCs | 1,160.0 | 22.2 | 46.8 |
| CEE | 79.2 | 19.7 | 41.9 | CEE | 1,180.3 | 22.6 | 47.3 |
| LDCs | 222.7 | 55.5 | 45.8 | LDCs | 2,880.3 | 55.2 | 46.6 |
| Albania | 625.3 | 18.2 | 52.9 | Albania | 401.9 | 11.7 | 44.7 |
| Bulgaria | 401.9 | 11.7 | 44.7 | Bulgaria | 401.9 | 11.7 | 44.7 |
| Romania | 365.9 | 10.7 | 40.8 | Morocco | 365.9 | 10.7 | 40.8 |
| Ukraine | 155.5 | 4.6 | 47.3 | China | 155.5 | 4.6 | 47.3 |
| USA | 132.7 | 3.9 | 80.4 | Ukraine | 132.7 | 3.9 | 80.4 |

Notes: (a) MDCs include North America, Japan, Israel, Oceania and non former Socialist countries of Europe; CEE includes former Socialist countries of Europe and Turkey; LDCs include Africa, Latin America and Asia (except Japan and Israel). (b) Citizens of MDCs are not considered because of their strong underestimation (only 3,569). Under 15 years old are counted in a little amount (only 3,366). Sources: elaborations from national statistical sources.
2. Immigrants and the labour market

2.1. The strength of labour demand

Economic immigration has long been the main channel of entry and residence of foreign immigrants in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. This explains why the employment rate of foreign immigrants is considerably high, when compared to other Western and Northern European host countries. According to OECD data for foreign- and native-born populations in 2006 (OECD 2008), immigrants in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain show higher employment rates than natives. This applies to both male and female immigrants. However, generally, the unemployment situation of foreigners is relatively less favourable than for natives. Vulnerability to unemployment seems also to be lower for immigrant men than for women. Recent evidence suggests than the over-representation of immigrants in unemployment may mostly occur in periods of economic recession (Martin 2009).

The strong labour market orientation of immigration in Southern Europe results from various determinants. From the economic point of view, periods of rapid economic expansion (often resulting from the injection of EU funds); an economic fabric largely based in labour-intensive sectors; the seasonal character of many industries (such as agriculture and tourism); the non-transferability of many of the fast-growing industries (activities such as construction and services cannot be delocalised); the high segmentation of the labour market; the increase in flexible labour arrangements; and the importance of the informal economy are among the main drivers. These can be said to correspond to a combination of specific characteristics of these countries and general traits of the post-Fordist context.

One of the main factors is the relevance of the informal economy. The extent of informal arrangements has been growing in all post-Fordist economies, but its longer tradition in Southern Europe made it more prone to informality. A study from Schneider and Klinglmair (2004) confirms that the informal economy is a common pattern among Southern European countries,
exceeding significantly its volume in other OECD countries. The authors estimate the size of the shadow economy in 2002-2003 to be about 28.3% of GDP in Greece, 26.2% of GDP in Italy and 22.3% of GDP in Portugal and Spain. Since foreigners are over-represented in this sector, it has constituted a privileged route of entry for (irregular) labour migrants (Baganha 1998, Reyneri 1998, Mingione & Quassoli 2000, Fakiolas 2000).

From the social point of view, the native population’s living standards and educational levels have increased in the last decades, together with women emancipation, and natives started to refuse to work in less qualified jobs. Moreover, immigrants are supplying services which are often not available in the weak welfare regimes of Southern European countries. Welfare systems provide little direct assistance and rely heavily on families to care for the young, the elderly and others in need of assistance. To alleviate this burden, families on their turn rely on immigrants to fulfil tasks like housekeeping, babysitting and caring for the elderly (Sciortino 2004). In sum, constraints related to the welfare state have also contributed to the strength of labour demand in these countries.

Demographic factors such as low fertility rates and high life expectancy have also contributed to this situation. On the one hand, a shrinking population is linked to a diminished labour supply. On the other, the amount of nursing and care work is increasing as a result of population ageing. It may therefore be assumed that quantitative labour shortages and the demand for caring will not only continue but also grow.

2.2. Main occupational sectors and working conditions

The economic inclusion of foreign immigrants in Southern Europe often occurs in low skilled jobs under precarious conditions. Immigrants are often employed in some specific sectors and in the so-called 3-D jobs, which mean less stable, less paid and less protected jobs. For all countries data for economic sectors indicate that immigrants are usually employed in the
service sector (mainly domestic work, retail trade, hotels and restaurants), construction and manufacturing industry.

According to OECD data about foreign-born employment in 2005-2006 (OECD 2008), the construction sector is quite important in the four countries considered, representing 29.1% of total foreign-born employment in Greece, 19.7% in Spain, 14.8% in Portugal and 14.2% in Italy. Mining, manufacturing and the energy sector is particularly relevant for Italy, where it represents 23.6% of total foreign-born employment, known to be concentrated in Central and Northern industrial regions. Comparatively, the same sector is less important in Greece (15.4%), Portugal (13.8%) and Spain (13.0%). The service sector (mainly wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants and domestic work) is also an important recruiter of immigrants in the four countries. Regarding hotels and restaurants, the share is 14.2% in Spain, 10.2% in Greece, 8.7% in Italy and 8.2% in Portugal. Households (domestic service) account for 13.9% in Greece, 13.3% in Spain, 10.4% in Italy and 4.9% in Portugal (although in the latter data is certainly under-evaluated). Finally, the employment in agriculture is also considerable, although its weight has been declining in recent years: data for 2005-2006 show that the agriculture and fishing sector represented 6.2% in Greece, 5.6% in Spain, 3.5% in Italy and 2.0% in Portugal of total foreign-born employment.

Immigrants’ over-qualification seems a general trend in these countries. The lack of employment opportunities in their professions force migrants to accept jobs that not always correspond to their qualifications. Comparative ratios show that immigrant over-qualification compared to the native population is substantial in the countries of Southern Europe (OECD 2006). There are differences among immigrant groups, since the educational level varies according to nationality. It is mainly in the case of Eastern European immigrants that there is a considerable mismatch between educational level and type of work.

Linked to these employment patterns, the working conditions of most immigrants are poor. This applies, among other factors, to salaries and
contractual arrangements. Immigrants tend to earn less than the native-born. In all countries, temporary work has been expanding over the years. The probability of being in a temporary job is also greater for immigrants than for the native population. Temporary work is often seen as one mechanism to satisfy certain labour shortages, especially low-skilled ones, without the need to admit large numbers of workers in sectors which may eventually be subject to significant structural change. This reality reflects the greater precariousness that immigrants have to face in the labour market. According to OECD data, the share of temporary jobs among immigrants is nearly 45% in Spain and almost 30% in Portugal, i.e. 20 and 16 percentage points more, respectively, than for the native population (OECD 2006).

Finally, as regards the existence of complementarity or substitution/competition with natives’ employment, the former is by large the most common pattern. This was already well established by former comparative studies on immigrants’ insertion in Southern European labour markets. For example, Reyneri and Baganha (2001) stated that “in segmented labour markets, such as those of the Southern European countries, migrant workers are in competition only with marginal sectors of the domestic labour supply and/or in narrow occupational areas. (…) Conflicts between migrants and the local population only seldom concern labour market problems”.

3. Irregular migration and regularisation processes

3.1. The size and determinants of irregular stocks

The challenge of irregular immigration affects several countries in Europe. However, it is in Southern Europe that the number of irregular migrants is particularly high\(^5\). Since the migration crisis of the 1990s irregular migration has been perceived as a chronic disease of Southern European migration

\(^5\) Recent research on this phenomenon demonstrated that also countries like Germany, whose governmental authorities often denied the existence of irregular migration in their country, have to deal with a certain degree of irregular migration (Alt 1999 Schonwalder et al. 2004).
regimes. Actually, it would be no exaggeration if we affirmed that most foreigners that are now living regularly in Southern European countries experienced a more or less long period of irregularity before getting their first residence permit. For this reason, the estimation of the size of irregular migration turned into a prior task of the national governments and the European institutions. Admittedly, estimating irregular foreign population is not an easy task. However, there have been efforts to provide reliable estimates of irregular foreigners. First of all, the frequent regularisation processes carried out in almost all Southern European countries could provide some reliable figures about the presence of irregular migrants. In addition, some research groups tried also to carry out further estimates based on other available sources.

In Spain, based on the information provided by the municipal register (Padron), Recano and Domingo (2005) tried, quite successfully indeed, to estimate irregularity before the regularisation of 2005\(^6\). Similar efforts have been carried out by other Spanish researchers like, for instance, Pajares (2006), Cachon (2007) and Cebolla and Gonzalez (2008). Most of those researchers agreed on the fact that there were about 900,000 irregular migrants before the regularisation of 2005. According to Cebolla and Gonzalez (2008), the irregularity rate reached its peak in 2003, when 53 per cent of the foreign population was estimated to be irregular. The percentage decreased after the regularisation of 2005 and the entry of Romania and Bulgaria into the European Union.

In Italy, there have been several attempts to estimate the number of irregular migrants (Table 3). In this respect, the estimates provided by Blangiardo (2009 and others) suggest a very high share of irregularity at the end of the 1990s and a decrease afterwards. Things changed mainly after the regularisation of 2002 and the entry of Bulgaria and Romania into the European Union in 2007. The impact of the European enlargement worked as a de facto regularisation in the case of Romanian immigrants. However,

\[^6\text{The data used for this estimation did not take into account the depuration process of the municipal register and might contain a certain degree of overestimation.}\]
according to more recent figures, the number of irregular migrants has been increasing again.

Table 3. Estimates of immigrants and irregular migrants in Italy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author (a)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Immigrants (thousands)</th>
<th>Irregular migrants thousands</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birindelli [1990]</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blangiardo [1997] (b)</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>833-912</td>
<td>344-423</td>
<td>41-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blangiardo [1998] (b) (c)</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>982-1101</td>
<td>176-295</td>
<td>18-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blangiardo [2006] (b) (d)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3357</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blangiardo [2008]</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3982</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) values at the beginning of the year, if not differently stated; (b) only citizens of CEE and Third World countries; (c) April 15; (d) July 1.
Source: Strozza [2004] and some of the original sources.

Recent estimates on irregular migrant presence in Greece indicate numbers close to 200,000. More specifically Triandafyllidou and Marouf (2008) estimate irregular migrants at 167,000, Lianos et al. (2008) suggest that irregular migrants in Greece range between 172,000 and 209,000, while Maroukis (2009) arrives at an estimate of 205,000 irregular migrants living in Greece in 2007. In Portugal, official institutions provided recently some estimates on irregular migration, suggesting an amount of 50,000 (Lusa 2008).

The presence of irregular migrants in Southern European countries has been often explained with weak external controls, their recent immigration experience and a geographic position that favours clandestine entries (Baldwin-Edwards 1999). A phenomenon like irregular migration, however, cannot be explained through unilateral cause-effect relationships. As a matter of fact, the question of irregularity is part of a more general analysis on the mechanisms of international migration. Irregularity is produced, first of all, by the intersection of immigration regulations with large migration flows and reflects what Massey (1999) has called the “post-modern” paradox between global forces and restrictive policy rules. In this respect, irregular migration is the product of several factors, according to what could be summarized as an
“equation of irregularity” based on the intensity of the flows, restrictive regulations, the attractiveness of the informal economy, geographic proximity, as well as the quality of controls and the activities of the smuggling industry (Arango 2005). All these aspects have been particularly important for the development of irregular migration systems in Southern Europe.

As it will be seen in the next section, Southern European admission policies were characterized by a high degree of restrictiveness and inflexibility that hampered an effective programming of the flows. In consequence, they have been unable to carry out an efficient regulation, in spite of having recognized the necessity of foreign labour. The informal economy also represents a very important magnet for irregular migrants and turns into a further important element for the development of irregular migration systems (Reyneri 1998). That is why internal labour market controls acquire certain relevance in the struggle against irregular migration. As a matter of fact, the size of the informal economy goes along with the weakness of labour market controls in all the mentioned countries.

Together with the pull factor represented by the informal economy, the presence of irregular migrants has been clearly favoured by the geographic position of Southern European countries and the difficulties to control their maritime borders. The increase of the flows toward Southern Europe coincided with the necessity to protect the common European borders after the enforcement of the Schengen Agreement\(^7\). The lack of experience and the exposed sea borders caused a certain degree of mistrust toward Southern European member states, which was also encouraged by the media effect of boat people arriving on their coasts. Smuggling also played a role. Smuggling networks in Spain have been very active and flexible. In the last couple of years, they have shifted their main routes from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Canary Islands, due to more intensive controls in the Mediterranean area. In Italy, networks seem to be particularly active on the Southern coasts, exploiting the Libyan route, due to the efforts of the Spanish

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\(^7\) The Schengen Agreement became operative in Spain and Portugal in 1995 and in Italy and Greece only in 1998.
authorities to control the Moroccan channel. In the case of Greece, smugglers were also present at sea and land borders, ranging from small informal networks to some more mafia-like organisations. All in all, smuggling networks seem to be almost everywhere flexible organisations that are able to adapt very quickly to the defensive strategies enforced by the nation states (Pastore et al. 2006, Coslovi 2007, Carling 2007).

However, it seems to be quite evident that irregular immigration in Southern Europe usually starts with overstaying and not with a clandestine entry (see, among others, ENI-survey 2008 and Pastore et al. 2006). In this case, several favourable visa conditions come into play. Nowadays visa policy and its effects do not depend any longer on national decisions but on European policies, which define the countries whose citizens need a visa to enter the Schengen space. However, visa policy is also embedded in the interests of each country and the migration systems in which they are involved in. In this respect, some countries might be more generous than others, because of economic and historical ties. Most irregular migration systems involving Portugal consist, for instance, in overstayers proceeding from the PALOP countries, Eastern Europe and Brazil (the latter not needing a visa to access the EU). Furthermore, the existence of the Schengen space allows “false tourists” to move around Europe with a visa obtained by the foreign representation of one EU-member state, a process often fuelled by smuggling networks. This is what happened to Ukrainian immigrants that obtained their visa from Germany and moved to Italy, Spain and Portugal, where they could find a job in the construction sector and domestic service (Finotelli & Sciortino 2006).

Finally, irregular migration in Southern Europe has been also favoured by quite a tolerant attitude of the native population and the same administration. Indeed, living as an irregular is by far easier in Southern than in Northern Europe. In most Southern European countries irregular migrants have access to compulsory education and basic health services. Nevertheless, irregular migrants remain in a very precarious condition and represent a challenge to the control capacity of the state.
3.2. Regularisations as Ex Post Regulation Instruments

The regularisation of irregular immigrants is, of course, not a Southern European peculiarity. Almost all European countries had to resort to a regularisation at least once in their migration history. However, there are few doubts that the majority of such processes were carried out in Southern Europe (De Bruycker & Apap 2000). For this reason, regularisations have been often considered to be a proof for the Southern European “public ambiguity” towards irregular migration and for the “Southern” incapacity to control migration (Brochmann 1993, Baldwin-Edwards 1999). As a matter of fact, the lack of efficient recruitment procedures turned regularisations into the most useful way to “repair” *a posteriori* the structural mismatches of most Southern European migration regimes. Since the 1980s six regularisation processes have been carried out in Spain, while the Italian and Portuguese governments carried out five processes in the same period. In Greece regularisations are a more recent phenomenon, since the first one was executed in 1998, followed by two other processes in 2001 and 2005/2006 (Table 4).

**Table 4. Overview of regularisation processes in Southern European migration regimes (1985-2007).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration

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8 Estimates say that Western European countries regularized about four millions immigrants since 1973, three millions of them in Southern European countries (Papadopoulou, 2005; MPG/Weil, 2004).

9 In 2005, the German and the Dutch government, for instance, sharply criticized the Spanish regularization, fearing an “invasion” of regularized immigrants in Spain to other European countries and blaming the Spanish government for not having informed the other EU-member states in time about the process.

10 In Italy, we should add to the mentioned processes the special flows decree approved in 2006, which enlarged the quota for 2006 up to the number of applications received. The rationale behind such decision was the persuasion that most of the applications had been filed for workers already living irregularly in Italy, so that the increase of the contingent would work as a de facto regularization program. In Portugal, the legislation approved in 2007 also allowed another regularization scheme, this time based on an on-going individual approach.
Today regularisations represent, both at the national and at the international level, a very controversial issue, whose necessity is withdrawn by the majority of the political parties. Nevertheless, in the past years regularisations were not linked to a particular government majority in all Southern European countries. Both left- and right-wing governments carried out various regularisations in all countries (VV.AA. 2009). Moreover, regularisation processes show in each country a certain degree of periodicity, though all of them were presented as exceptional “one-time-only” measures by the national governments. In absence of effective recruitment systems they soon became part of the regulation system, used to ‘repair’ the lack of an efficient migration policy.

Italy and Spain regularised the highest number of irregular migrants, not only in Southern Europe but also in comparison to other European countries (Table 5). In Spain, about 1.2 millions foreigners were regularised since 1986, half of them after the regularisation of 2005, which was without any doubt the most successful regularisation ever carried out in the country. The case of Italy is similar. Irregularity increased after the surge of the flows between 1998 and 2002 and, hence, the largest number of people regularised was found in 2002.

Table 5. Results of regularization processes in Southern Europe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Greece (white card)</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985-1990</td>
<td>322 626</td>
<td>34 832</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1995</td>
<td>244 492</td>
<td>109 135</td>
<td></td>
<td>39 166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-2000</td>
<td>217 124</td>
<td>221 748</td>
<td>370 000</td>
<td>35 082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>220 000 (green card)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2007</td>
<td>634 728</td>
<td>811 049</td>
<td></td>
<td>183 833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(470 000) (a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (a) This number refers to the “decree on flows” of 2006 that worked as a “de facto” or “undeclared” regularisation of irregular immigrants that were already living in the country (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009).
(b) Data only refer to the regularisation of 2001, while data about the 2003 and 2004 regularisations and the 2007 on-going process are very scarce.
Source: own elaboration

Assessing the effects of regularisation processes is not a simple task, as there are not enough empirical studies that allow an overall answer. Nevertheless, some studies conducted in Italy and Spain outlined some
positive aspects. Given the restrictive and often inadequate orientation of the legislation, regularisations are likely to have allowed the legal inclusion and stabilisation of a large part of foreign residents, in spite of the precariousness of the residence permits issued. Since 1986, 1.4 millions of immigrants got their residence permit through a regularisation process in Italy. According to Carfagna (2002) and Blangiardo (2004), the largest part of the immigrants that have been regularised in Italy maintained their regular status over the years. Furthermore, it seems that the number of those that lost their residence permit and applied for several regularisation processes is not very relevant. The case of Spain seems to be quite similar, as regularisations contributed to the inclusion of almost half of the foreign population (Arango & Finotelli 2009). Furthermore, recent studies carried out to assess the effects of regularisation processes in Spain demonstrate that such processes could reduce the irregularity rate (Recano & Domingo 2005, Pajares 2006, Cachon 2007, Cebolla & Gonzalez 2008, Arango & Finotelli 2009). There seems to be no similar research results in Portugal and Greece. In Greece, however, the general assumption is that the number of re-applications in each process is very high.

Nevertheless, saying that regularisations were able to “stabilize” a large part of the foreign population in most Southern European countries does not mean that they are to be considered a panacea against irregularity. All in all, regularisations do not substitute an efficient immigration policy. They remain a regulation tool a posteriori, while there is no doubt that national governments cannot tackle the issue of irregular migration without seriously improving their migration policies. The real struggle against irregularity is only possible if each national regime acts on the determinants that constitute the equation of irregularity. For this reason, both the Spanish and the Portuguese government considered the last regularisations to be a necessary and exceptional decision to “clean-up-the-state” before carrying out a wider legislative reform of their migration regimes. In both countries, “stigmatized” extraordinary regularisation processes have been substituted by discrete and
individual regularisation forms. Such important policy change breaks with the past and seems to be related, among other factors, with the improvement of the labour recruitment policies and the control system in the past years.

4. Regulation and integration policies

4.1. Labour migration policies

During the first phase of Southern European immigration history, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain developed a legislation more focused on administrative issues about entry and residence than on the conception of effective regulation instruments. The development and improvement of immigration laws of that type was one of the prices Greece, Portugal and Spain had to pay, like Italy at that time, for their European membership or prospects of membership in the EU. More sophisticated regulation and control mechanisms would mostly be enacted after the early 1990s, when massive inflows start to occur in some of these countries, first Italy and Greece, then Spain and Portugal.

The intensification of immigration flows, the awareness of a large labour demand and the volume of irregular migration contributed to the development of several mechanisms of labour recruitment. Part of a broader objective of regulating the labour market, these mechanisms constituted an attempt to draw an economic migration management policy, allowing the legal provision of labour immigrants, a fair functioning of the labour market and a crackdown of irregular migration. As seen above, these instruments paralleled the enactment of several regularization schemes. Despite their tentative character and many failures, it can be argued that some of those policy initiatives were pioneering in the EU context. In a sense, they were

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11 The Spanish Regulation Act of 2004 assumes the risk of a certain volume of irregular migration, introducing the arraigo, which is an individual regularisation and an on-going regularisation system. The Portuguese immigration law of 2007 contains some mechanisms allowing the legalisation of formerly irregular situations: these include, among others, a stable labour activity, allowing individual regularisations until a maximum determined by the annual labour contingent fixed by the government, and some indicators of social integration, such as the attendance of basic education by children of immigrants already born in the country.
precursors of the EU’s later statement on the role of immigrant labour in the European economies\textsuperscript{12}. 

The legal channels of immigrants’ labour recruitment differed along the time and from country to country, although part of the rationale behind them maybe considered similar. Whether they were invitation schemes, quota systems or shortage lists, they were designed to regulate future labour immigration and avoid the need of further regularisations. These systems were usually based on labour market needs (domestic skill and labour shortages) and on labour market tests (or checks), which gave preference to natives and other resident citizens to fill a job vacancy. As the recurrent increase of irregular immigration would confirm, the outcome of these policies may be considered to have been largely ineffective.

When observed in detail in each Southern European country, the process of construction of labour admission policies was lengthy and cumbersome. In the early stages, a system of individual nomination or invitation of immigrants was coupled with the principle of the labour market tests, whereby the native, the EU and the legal third country nationals resident workforce would be protected and given priority in employment. In the mid-80s Spain was the first to introduce a labour recruitment procedure, coupled with the labour market test system. The Foreigners Bill of 1985 allowed hiring migrants presenting a nominal request in the frame of the General Regime (\textit{Regimen General}). However, the bureaucratic procedure to hire a migrant was very complex and most employers preferred the option to employ their workers irregularly. In 1986 also Italy introduced a nominal request procedure and a labour market test system that were not successful. The rule soon turned out to be too restrictive to deal with the actual inflows. A system based on an invitation scheme has been set in Greece since 1991, and again the requirement to protect local workers was enacted (Emke-Pouloupolou 2007). This policy for

\textsuperscript{12} It was only in 2000 than the (then) EU Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, Antonio Vitorino, stated that “the zero immigration policies of the past 25 years are not working”, urging for “new legal ways for immigrants to enter the EU” (cit. in Martin, Martin & Weil 2006).
labour migration (metaklisi), still in place today, is a rather complex one and its results have been far from expectations.

In a later stage, systems based in labour market quotas (or equivalent) were common to all Southern countries. Italy (1990)\textsuperscript{13} and Spain (1993) were the first to introduce this kind of system, followed by Greece (2001) and Portugal (2001). In Italy, in 1990, a new law (Martelli law) introduced the principle of immigrant inflow programming (the “programmed number”, or numero programmato) and in 1995 quotas were introduced, although in a limited volume. The Consolidation Act of 1998 on immigration and status of foreigners (the Turco-Napolitano Law), and its amendment of 2002, improved the system. Every year, the Italian Government, with one or more decrees, had to set maximum quotas of foreigners allowed to enter. The number of quotas was proportional to the needs of the Italian labour market (the necessary data was provided by the Ministry of Labour) and to the residence permits already issued for family reunification or for reasons of temporary social protection. The recruitment of foreign workers according to these lines never worked properly. It was mainly used to regularise those immigrants that were already living and working in the country.

In Spain, in 1993, together with the nominal request, the government introduced labour entry quotas (contingente). The immigration quotas were published yearly by the Ministry of Labour, after consultations with the trade unions and the employer associations. Again, the contingente never turned into an effective policy regulation instrument, since it was simply used to legalise irregular migrants already living in Spain. Further problems existed in the Spanish labour recruitment approach, such as the bad communication between the central and the autonomic government (Aparicio & Roig 2006) and the fact that the contingente and the nominal request represented “blind” recruitment tools that did not take into account that an employment relationship usually begins on the basis of trust and mutual knowledge\textsuperscript{14}.

\textsuperscript{13} The principle was set in 1990, although quotas would only be defined in 1995 and enforced in 1998.
\textsuperscript{14} This aspect is even more important in the case of domestic service, where trust is an essential condition for employment.
Greece and Portugal followed this “quotas trend” in 2001. The Greek Immigration Law of 2001 established an administrative procedure for the issuing of stay permits with the purpose of employment, based on a plan done each year by the Organization for the Employment of the Labour Force (OAED), outlining the domestic labour market needs per sector and area. The system was improved in 2005, although the underlying principle was the same. Nevertheless, the main problem of the Greek approach lied in the invitation system (metaklisi), a procedure that may be considered extremely complex and time consuming. In particular, the long waiting periods are dysfunctional to the necessities of small firms that, more than others, need quick and flexible entry policies. In Portugal, in 2001, a system of quotas for immigrant recruitment according to a report on domestic labour shortages was also envisaged. The number of visas had to match the job vacancies detected in various economic sectors (the quotas), according to a report carried out annually by the Institute of Employment and Vocational Training (IEFP). The system was a complex, bureaucratic and largely ineffective procedure and has not helped in the fight against irregular immigration.

Taking all these labour recruitment policies together, it is clear that their degree of restrictiveness and their complex administrative requirements were unable to deal with the high labour demand and vast immigrant supply, thus being incapable of regulating inflows and limiting irregular immigration. Given these constraints, the regularisation policies can be seen as a last recourse for regulating the immigrants’ insertion in the labour market, given the failure of the main regulation mechanisms.

Given the inefficacy of these systems, some countries changed profoundly their labour immigration policies in recent years, in order to develop a more adequate system meeting the labour market needs. Spain may be considered the more advanced country in this respect. In 2004, simultaneously with the announcement of the large regularisation of 2005, 15 The agricultural sector seems to represent an exception.
the Spanish government approved a new Regulation Act to make more flexible the recruitment procedure of labour immigrants. The regulation re-established *de facto* the possibility to hire foreign workers in the country of origin through a nominal offer in the *Regimen General*. As in all immigration host countries, the employment of a foreign worker according to such a procedure still depends on a previous labour market test. To make the recruitment easier, every three months a list (*Catalogo de trabajos de dificil cobertura* – Catalogue of Hard-to-fill Positions) is published, containing types of jobs for which there are usually no available candidates (Spanish citizens or from other EU countries), i.e., jobs for which the labour market test is not required. If an employer is looking to fill a vacancy listed in this catalogue, he/she can immediately begin the recruitment procedure.

The *contingente* remains another important admission channel in Spain. Furthermore, the new regulation introduced the entry visa for “job search”. The aim of this type of visa was to promote a further flexibilisation of the recruiting procedures. However, the possibility to apply for such a visa was restricted to a limited number of sectors, like the domestic sector. Very few visas have been issued for this purpose since the approval of the regulation. Finally, Spain is involved in a series of bilateral agreements, with various sending countries, which are effective in providing long- or short-term workers to the Spanish labour market. It may be argued that the recent economic crisis hitting the country has not allowed a full testing of such measures.

4.2. Control policies

Migration control policies have developed fast in the Southern countries as a reaction to relatively massive inflows initially to Italy and Greece (in the late 1980s and early 1990s) followed by Spain and Portugal (since the late 1990s). Border and internal control policies have partially developed under pressure from the EU, so that Southern countries stop being an easy route of irregular migrants heading to Northern and Western Europe. Nonetheless there are other factors that have largely conditioned the practices and
policies of migration control in the region. These include the geographical morphology of these countries, their strategic position on Mediterranean migration pathways (and Portugal in the Southern part of the European Atlantic coast), the operation of smuggling networks, their lack of previous immigration experience and their large informal economies, that have provided irregular employment opportunities for immigrants.

Moreover, all four countries are important tourism destinations, which make strict border controls more difficult to implement especially during the tourism high season. At the same time, some of their prospective immigrants (in Spain and Portugal in particular) are or have been exempted from the requirement for a visa, because of their Latin American or Luso-speaking origin. Finally, a vast irregular migration took place through the Schengen space. For example, many Eastern European immigrants crossed the continent with Schengen tourism visas to get through the Pyrenees to Spain and Portugal. These facts make enforcement at borders very difficult in practical terms.

With regard to sea border control, Southern European countries have long sea borders on the Mediterranean. Tiny islands like Lampedusa, between Sicily and North Africa, the Greek islands of Chios and Lesvos, in the Aegean Sea, or the Canary islands in the Atlantic, have become hubs of dinghy and other types of small boat illegal traffic of desperate irregular immigrants from Asia and Africa. Despite the sophisticated technological equipment used, it is still difficult to intercept all such arrivals. The importance of these last has been felt acutely since 2006, because of a dramatic and unexpected increase in arrivals of irregular migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia to the southern coasts of Europe.

The Canary islands in the Atlantic, that form part of Spanish territory, have been a preferred target destination for thousands of irregular migrants sailing off the shore of Mauritania and Senegal for a week-long journey to Tenerife. Numbers have fluctuated significantly, setting off from 4,000 in 2001, rising to over 30,000 in 2006 (a so called crisis year for the Canary islands sea border
of the EU) and falling again to 12,000 approx. in 2007 (Spanish Ministry of Interior data). During the same period (i.e. since year 2000), numbers of arrivals at the Gibraltar strait, starting from 13,000-14,000 in 2001-2002, have fallen to half of that during most of the remaining years (thus fluctuating around 7,000 per year). The inversion of the trend at the Gibraltar strait is attributed mainly to the operation of the SIVE, the integrated border control system put in place by the Spanish government and to the building of a militarised border around Ceuta and Melilla, the two Spanish enclaves in Morocco (Carling 2007).

The second most important destination in terms of numbers in 2006 has been the tiny island of Lampedusa, south of Sicily. Lampedusa receives each year\(^\text{16}\) between 15,000 and 20,000 irregular immigrants, mainly sub-Saharan Africans setting off from the Libyan coast (and more recently from Algeria and Tunisia) aboard large fishing boats or other sea vessels. The relative success of sea border control by Italian authorities may be witnessed by the almost total stop of crossings through the Adriatic in the new century (Pastore et al. 2006).

Finally, the islands of the Aegean in Greece are the preferred target destination for mainly Asian irregular immigrants (Afghans, Iraqis, Syrians, etc.), that seek to enter Europe through Turkey and cross the narrow straits from Turkish mainland to the islands of Mytilini (Lesvos), Rhodes, Samos, Chios or even some smaller islands like Leros. The Greek coastguard and police forces have intercepted nearly 9,000 people in 2007 and just over 15,000 persons in 2008.

Migration through EU’s southern sea borders is, in total numbers, relatively small. Adding up the numbers stated earlier, in 2007 it was approximately 50,000, in 2006 it was 45,000 and in 2005 it had been under 30,000. Considering that the EU27 are home to an estimated number of between 2.8

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\(\text{16}\) Nearly 16,000 irregular migrants were apprehended upon arrival in Lampedusa in 2006. There were approximately 23,000 such arrivals during the first 8 months of 2008, while numbers seem to rise in early 2009 as 2,120 people have been intercepted during the first two months of 2009, compared to 1,650 during the first two months of 2008.
and 6 million irregular migrants\textsuperscript{17}, that the EU15 (excluding Greece) received in 2004 a total of 2.6 million legal immigrants according to OECD data, and that the EU 27 have a total population of 486.5 million, it becomes evident that such irregular migration presents only a tiny fraction of overall irregular flows and stocks, and indeed a rather small number in the overall population of the EU as well as in the overall immigrant population of the EU. The nature of migration through sea borders, however, gives it a high news value: arrivals are dramatic, small boats are sometimes capsized or sink near the shore and immigrants (including pregnant women or children) often die in their attempt to reach EU territory\textsuperscript{18}.

Although the sea border is the one that is of major concern for the southern EU member states, the external EU green border at the southeast needs to be considered too. Land border control mostly affects Greece and, to a lesser degree, Italy. The northern and north-eastern land border has presented a major challenge to Greek authorities for migration control since the early 1990s. Greece has been a target of irregular immigration flows through its Northern mountainous border with Albania, Bulgaria and Turkey. Italy had experienced problems with the control of its border with Slovenia during the 1990s as regards both irregular migration control and the management of visas (citizens of former Yugoslavia or Albania would go to Slovenia and apply there for a visa to enter Italy as tourists). Nevertheless, it may be admitted that land borders do not present a major challenge for Southern European countries as they have largely internal EU borders and increasingly so no borders at all (since their participation in the Schengen no-internal-border-area).

With regard to internal controls, all four Southern European countries have practiced random controls in public places to tame irregular migration. In

\textsuperscript{17} This estimate is provided by the CLANDESTINO research project database, published on 20 February 2009, at http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/category/clandestino-database-on-irregular-migration/.

\textsuperscript{18} Both media attention on irregular arrivals through sea and the rising numbers of such arrivals have led to the more active involvement of the FRONTEX agency in the patrolling of the southern EU borders. Following the European Council Meeting on 14-15 December 2006, FRONTEX was invited to establish, as soon as possible, together with the Member States in the region, a permanent Coastal Patrols Network at their southern maritime borders.
Greece, these controls were particularly frequent during the 1990s, targeting mostly Albanian immigrants. In the early to mid-1990s massive deportations mainly of Albanian citizens became common police practice. However, internal control policies in recent years have given emphasis to actions targeting informal work. In Spain, since the regularisation of 2005, state authorities have given emphasis to labour inspections as a means to combating irregular migration. Their strategy has been three-pronged: border management has improved, irregular migrants who live in the country have been given the possibility to legalise their stay and work, and labour market inspections have been intensified. In Greece, Italy and Portugal, the intention is there to tame the informal economy and combat informal work in general, but labour inspection mechanisms remain under-resourced and to a certain extent ineffective (Maroukis 2009, Pastore 2008). Moreover, in all four countries, areas like domestic work (cleaning and caring in families) are very hard to control by their very nature and hence it is indeed implausible that any informal work control policies can effectively regulate these sectors through labour inspections.

Finally, external control policies have increasingly paid more attention to cooperation with neighbouring countries. Readmission agreements have been signed between Greece and Albania, Bulgaria and Turkey (Protocol of Readmission), while there are local cooperation agreements on the Greek-Macedonian (FYROM) border. Spain and Italy have signed readmission and mutual cooperation agreements with Morocco (Spain), Albania and Tunisia (Italy). The implementation of the Protocol of Readmission between Greece and Turkey is far from satisfactory, but Moroccan, Albanian and Tunisian authorities have been overall more cooperative.

Overall, the philosophy of enforcement of external controls has changed since the 1990s: Southern European countries do not seek to fend off their borders from the inside, or rather not only from inside. They aim at acting in cooperation with neighbouring countries that are important sending or transit countries, providing in exchange programmes of seasonal migration and development aid.
In sum, our study shows that there is limited purposeful coordination between external and internal border controls and the overall policy for managing migration flows and stocks. Border control efforts have been increasing through the years, despite the fact that during the last ten years all these countries have enacted more than one large regularisation programme. While government authorities are aware that migration cannot be stopped so long as dramatic socio-economic inequalities persist between sending and receiving countries, they do not have an effective plan for managing migration. Their control policies appear to a certain extent detached from regularisation, management and integration policies, indeed seeking to accomplish a Sisyphus task.

4.3. Integration and citizenship policies

All the Southern European countries have developed their integration policies in response to the arrival and settlement of relatively large numbers of migrants in a relatively short period of time. Although it is a euphemism to claim that they are still “new” hosts since their experience dates back to the early 1990s, it is also important to note that migration to Southern Europe took place in the post-Cold War era, largely without planning and without a legal framework. Migrants did not arrive at a period of industrial expansion – they found jobs mainly in the service industry and in particular in the secondary labour market, notably at jobs that are under paid with low prestige, and precarious condition. These overall socio-economic conditions mark also the process of immigrant integration and the policies of integration that Southern European countries have (not) developed.

Italy, the first southern country to experience significant immigration in the late 1980s, developed its first integrated migration policy that included issues of immigrant integration and political participation in 1998. Greece and Portugal have had their first comprehensive immigration laws tackling issues of integration in 2001 and Spain in 2000. Mainly during this last decade, all
four countries have developed a set of integration policies tackling the issue of health, housing, education and socio-economic assistance to migrants.

There are important differences between the four countries regarding the public administration structures that manage welfare policies. In Spain and Italy these policies pertain to regions (or Comunidades Autonomas in Spain) and hence there are different policies and practices in different regions. In Spain, migrants concentrate in the two largest cities (Barcelona and Madrid) and in the region of Andalucia in the South. It may be argued that the regional and municipal authorities in the respective regions have developed successful plans for the social integration of migrants and their Social Services have responded well to the needs of these new populations. In Italy too, regions with large immigrant populations in the North, Northeast and in the Centre are known for providing welfare assistance to legal migrants and their families, including housing, welfare allowances and other services (see Zincone 2000a, 2000b).

In Greece and Portugal there are national plans for integration that are administered in a more centralised way than in Spain and Italy. In Greece these plans for integration have often suffered from partial implementation and lack of continuity. In Portugal, the early creation of the ACIME, later renamed into ACIDI\(^19\), a High Commissioner for Immigrants whose role is to act as a go-between facilitating communication between the government and immigrants and ensuring that the latter’s rights are respected and their needs attended to, guaranteed some continuity of policies and improved immigrants’ integration prospects. The role of ACIDI in structuring the civic sphere for migrant representation and participation and promoting socio-economic integration policies at the local and national level has been crucial (Teixeira & Albuquerque 2005, see also Niessen et al. 2007\(^20\)).

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19 The High Commissioner for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities was a governmental position created in 1996. It was the basis of ACIME (High Commissariat for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities), in 2002, later designated ACIDI (High Commissariat for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue), in 2007.

20 http://www.integrationindex.eu/countries/
In all four countries, EU initiatives and European Social Fund programmes have also been visible and have given the opportunity to immigrant organisations and other NGOs, as well as municipalities and universities, to promote the social and economic integration of immigrants. Indeed, European Social Fund programmes and the more recent European Integration Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals have been instrumental in creating synergies, mobilising resources, even reorganising public administration offices with a view to providing services to migrant communities. On the whole, the outcome of these programmes has been positive, although their structural effect on the socio-economic integration of foreigners is limited. Migrants in Southern Europe remain confined largely in 3-D jobs, in poor housing and are often the target of negative stereotyping by the media.

With regard to citizenship policies, Southern European countries have overall rather restrictive approaches. In Spain, Italy, Greece, and in Portugal until 2006, third country nationals must reside in the country for at least ten years to apply for naturalisation. In Italy and Greece citizenship policies have been applied in a restrictive manner, leading to very low numbers of naturalised citizens (about 11,000 cases per year in Italy, mainly related to marriage with an Italian citizen) and about 50 cases a year in Greece. In the latter, applications from citizens of neighbouring countries have routinely been rejected during the past two decades, even when applicants satisfied all the requirements for naturalisation and even when they were married to a Greek citizen.

Naturalisation laws in all four countries relate often to ethnic descent. Naturalisation is easy if one has Greek, Spanish, Portuguese or Italian ancestors even two generations back (i.e. one grandparent). By contrast, legally resident immigrants find it much harder to naturalise even after 10 years of residence (six in Portugal). In most countries preference is given to

21 In Portugal, the modification of the law in 2006, easing the residence constraints for acquiring Portuguese citizenship by naturalisation, has produced notable results, since the number of valid requirements to get citizenship almost quadrupled between 2007 and 2008, increasing from approximately 9,000 to 35,000.
people who are of the same ethnic descent (Greece) or who can prove ancestry, besides the ones who come from former colonies (Latin American countries for Spain and Luso-speaking countries for Portugal).22

As regards the second generation, provisions vary. Overall they are more generous than naturalisation policies in three out of the four countries (with the exception of Greece that is). However, second generation provisions in Southern Europe fall short from becoming effective integration mechanisms for the children of immigrants. They often seem to perpetuate the distinction between “native” and “foreigner”, without taking into account that children born in a country or who arrived at pre-school age in that country have done all their education and have been socialised to the local and national norms and habits. It is thus morally and politically questionable to treat them as foreigners.

Taking all elements together, the process of immigrant integration in Southern European host countries has taken place mainly through labour market insertion and at the personal or family level, through informal and personalised social networks, or with the help of third sector organisations. In other words, this slow process of piecemeal integration has had less to do with formal integration policies in these countries and related state structures, like welfare services, education services, and other social agencies – being Portugal the most relevant exception. Although the importance of integration policies is not to be underestimated, in Southern Europe we witness a situation whereby immigrants find their local niches of life and work, initially even without papers, they quickly (have to) adopt the local customs and through personal relations with natives manage to take part in the local networks of clientelistic relations, that generally structure both the labour market (e.g. the process of finding employment or improving one’s work position) and interaction with the state in Southern Europe. The role of immigrants’ associations and other NGOs, including the ones linked to the Catholic Church, has helped in the process. Immigrants’ life is of course

22 In Spain, the application to citizenship for Latin Americans is possible after two years of legal residence. This is quite a striking advantage compared to the rest of the foreign population.
facilitated when appropriate integration policies (such as access to housing, health care, schooling) are provided in their cities and towns of residence.

Generally speaking, Southern European countries have developed a reactive rather than proactive framework for immigrant integration. Policies and practices have been more developed at the regional and local rather than the national level. The third sector, particularly immigrant associations and NGOs, has played an important part in assisting immigrants and integrating them in their societies of settlement. However, formal policies of integration, including overall social and political integration and citizenship acquisition, have to date showed important “deficits” that need to be addressed in the near future.

5. Conclusive remarks

The comparative study of the Southern European countries – Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain – immigration experiences allows a set of conclusive remarks, which confirm the many similarities existing in this framework but, also, some significant differences.

First, the evolution of migration flows has been quite similar. All these countries have had important emigration experiences until recently. During the 1970s and 1980s a migration turnaround took place. Emigration decreased, return migration increased (although declining later) and foreign immigration augmented. In a short time span, these countries went from net emigration to net immigration. The timing and rhythm of inflows was not exactly the same. Foreign immigration was manifest in all these countries during the 1980s, but the bulk of the movements depended on contextual factors. In Greece most of the inflows occurred during the 1990s, in Italy and Portugal during the early 2000s and in Spain all along the new century, until the recent economic recession. At the same time, emigration has not ceased completely. The most exceptional case is the one of Portugal, where immigration decreased and emigration resumed during the new century. In sum, there is a case for admitting a long-term transition from net emigration
to net immigration in Southern Europe, but the recognition of anything similar to a “mobility transition” (Zelinsky 1971), with the linearity prevailing in demographic transition models, must not be done without many reservations.

Second, despite a considerable variation in the national origin of immigrants, their demographic characteristics are very similar. Given the recent character of flows, most of them are composed by young adults, who either targeted directly the labour market or came in the framework of family reunion (although many of the latter also inserted rapidly in the labour market). This demographic profile explains why the immigrants offspring’ is only now becoming visible. The most significant exception to this age profile, although not very large in relative terms, is the presence of retirement migration coming from EU developed countries, mainly in Spain and Portugal. In gender terms, immigration is in general balanced, although an observation by specific nationalities reveals some more male- and female-oriented flows.

Third, the labour market insertion of immigrants displays many commonalities. In all cases, immigrants have high employment rates, both for male and female immigrants, confirming the labour orientation of most inflows. Immigrants are mostly inserted in the same economic sectors: construction, manufacturing (mainly Italy), hotels and restaurants, retail trade, domestic work and agriculture (except Portugal). In many of these sectors they benefit from the seasonal character of some activities, namely tourism and agriculture. When observing the type of jobs most immigrants perform, it is clear that they are mainly inserted in the so-called 3-D jobs, normally rejected by natives. They also often face overqualification for the jobs they perform, due to a relatively high educational background, and are over-exposed to precarious labour arrangements, including temporary contracts and unemployment.

Fourth, migration policies present some similarities in terms of general evolution and objectives, but also many differences resulting from institutional contexts. The main resemblance results from a similar path taken by policy approaches: all countries first started to deal with administrative norms about
the entry and residence of foreigners, mainly as a result from the EU adhesion requirements, in the case of Greece, Portugal and Spain; they afterwards looked for a stricter control and rigorous enforcement, when the inflows started to climb; they progressively sought for ways of managing labour migration, when immigration became widespread, using procedures that varied from invitation schemes to, mainly, labour quotas; they developed in later stages integration approaches, either at the national, regional or local level; and, in every case, they carried out from time to time regularisation processes, in order to regulate \textit{ex post} what they were unable to regulate \textit{ex ante}. The timing and concrete expression of these policy initiatives is, however, very different from country to country, revealing specific institutional structures and a varied political framework.

Fifth, integration outcomes are generally limited, although prospects vary from case to case. Several elements confirm that, besides a rapid insertion in the labour market, much need to be done on this field. The labour insertion itself is also confined to the least protected and desired segments of the labour market, what may be considered a situation of structural exclusion (Calavita 2005). However, it may be argued that the increase in the duration of stays (many immigrants in other contexts face harsh working conditions in the earlier stages, which are followed by upward mobility – Chiswick (1978)), the insertion in social networks (either of fellow foreign citizens, other foreigners or nationals), the support from third sector organisations and policy assistance have led and may lead in the future to some improvement.

The questions to be asked are why have all these processes evolved like this, and why did similarities showed up so often among the Southern European countries? A set of explanatory variables can thus be added – which must be understood as interrelated factors, often acting in a context of multiple causality.

A first factor has to do with the timing of inflows. Despite differences in rhythm and the non-linearity of the migration process, it may be argued that all Southern European countries are marked by the same historical imprint in
their immigration experiences. Using another terminology, they are affected by the same “generation effect”. They all have witnessed strong immigration growth and had to deal with their outcomes after the 1980s, a period characterised by de-industrialisation, flexibilisation of the labour markets and de-regulation in all advanced economies. This means that the regulation of migration, i.e., the enactment of effective recruitment and control policies, and that the prevention of integration deficits would always be of utmost difficulty – as recent immigration to many other world contexts may confirm.

A second factor has to do with the prevalent stages of the migration cycle. In all Southern European cases immigration flows are recent and display a similar demographic pattern. Most of the inflows are composed by young adults in the first stage of the migration cycle. Only now the immigrants’ offspring starts to be significant, either by means of 1.5 generation immigrants (children arrived early in their lives) or second generation, i.e., children already born in the host countries. In another terms, Southern countries are affected by the same “age effect”. Some outcomes are that the immigrants’ impacts over the welfare system are still generally positive (they are net contributors, since they are mostly engaged in the employed labour force, but this may change in the future) and that issues related to the second generation only now are becoming challenging (and they will confirm, or not, the prospects for integration).

A third factor is the type of labour demand. In all Southern European countries a vast labour intensive economic sector exists, sometimes linked to traditional activities in these countries, others to new types of demand. This is the case of agriculture, construction, some manufacturing industries, hotels and restaurants (often related with tourism) and domestic work. In all these sectors foreign manpower is substituting native manpower – as is exemplary the case of domestic work, a sector existing since long ago but now affected by a decreasing native supply. During the last decades, job creation in these sectors was vast, a process that was due to the high rates of economic growth during part of this period. The strong labour demand for immigrants is also related to the extent of the informal economy. Although informal
arrangements are now part and parcel of all advanced economies, comparative studies show that Southern European countries are the ones with higher levels of informality. This is one of the major factors explaining the endemic presence of irregular immigrants in this context.

A fourth factor results from the socio-economic structures or regimes. A number of elements can be enumerated here, sometimes revealing similarities and others differences among these countries. One of main elements is the type of the welfare state. Although there is no consensus about a “Southern European” type of welfare state, all approaches stress commonalities. The “conservative model” adopted by some authors (Esping-Andersen 1990 and Sciortino 2004), attributes to families many welfare obligations, do not directly provide many welfare services (using instead the principle of monetary transfers to the households) and protects extensively the already employed. The “Southern European model” adopted by other authors (Ferrera 1996) adds the importance of private-public partnerships and clientelism. All these traits, not always specific to this countries, help to explain the immigration demand for some sectors (for example, caring for the elderly at the households – a fast-growing immigration recruitment sector) and the segmentation of the labour market (coexistence of protected and non-protected segments). If we add the law enforcement difficulties faced by Southern states, we may also explain the very acceptance of informal and irregular situations – common to natives and foreigners.

Another important element of the socio-economic regimes is the organisation of the civil society. Again, this helps to explain some immigration and policy trends. The presence of active trade unions is a relevant variable, since it is related to the coexistence of well protected sectors of the labour force and less protected “immigration jobs” (although unions have played a dual role, as they also have campaigned for immigrants’ rights). The accrued presence of women in the labour market explains part of the immigrant recruitment for the households. The increased levels of education and, generally, social expectations among the youth explains their shunning away from the bottom sectors of the labour market. The power of individual employers and
employers organisations explain the use of irregular workforce, some labour exploitation and the lobbying for pro-immigration policies. The role of some NGOs explains the support given to immigrants and the improvement of their integration prospects, even in the absence of adequate governmental policies. The importance of the Catholic Church, in all countries but Greece, explains the strength of the pro-immigrant coalition. All these elements are linked to the modes of immigrants’ incorporation and, also, to the making of immigration policies (Zincone 2006). Last but not least, the integration in the European Union is an obvious factor constraining directly immigration policies, in a manner that approximates the Southern countries from other EU member states.

A fifth factor is the dominant perceptions and attitudes towards immigrants. Here again some similarities arise between the Southern countries, although many differences prevail. The importance of this factor is linked to the practical acceptance of immigrants in daily life, which affects their integration prospects, as well as to the role of political parties, a decisive element in modern democracies. Public opinion seems generally divided in Southern countries. Some indicators confirm the acceptance of immigration, whilst others demonstrate fear and concern. Past colonial and historical links, specific language and culture, and various stereotypes add to the complexity in this field, making into impossible to generalise to different countries and immigrant groups. All in all, perceptions and attitudes are a dependent and an independent variable – as occur with other factors mentioned beforehand. It evolves in a dynamic way, affecting and being affected by other variables.

In sum, it can be said that a Southern European model of immigration still exists, as was admitted by research during the 1990s and early 2000s (see, among others, King 2000). This model encompasses many similar traits, factors and outcomes, although specific contextual frameworks make a difference (for example, the various timings and characteristics of inflows have been accompanied by various timings and characteristics of immigration policies). A point that must be stressed is that this model is dynamic, in the sense that new dimensions are arising (for example, the
second generation), new social frameworks are built (for example, evolving social attitudes) and new policies are enacted. In this latter case, a long way has been done since the first policies were drawn – although the results have not been always much more effective. An issue that needs further observation is the effect of the current economic recession over migration (Martin 2009). It is known that previous recessions have re-shaped the world map of migrations, and maybe unexpected outcomes may now arise in the Southern context. Another issue deserving scrutiny is the possibility of this model being enlarged to other recently expanding economies in Europe, such as Ireland and Finland (besides other Southern countries, as Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia – see King & Thomson 2008).

During recent years, immigrants, native populations, civil society and governments have struggled to adapt to a new environment in Southern Europe, which is now structural and will influence many years to come. Immigration became part and parcel of Southern societies. While immigrants struggled to make a living in this new environment, local populations and institutions sought a way of dealing with immigration and its consequences. In a sense, it is not only immigrants that were looking for Southern Europe. It is Southern Europe that is looking for itself.

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Chapter 5

Patterns of immigration in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in comparative perspective

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1. Introduction and conceptual framework

International migration in countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is not a new phenomenon. It has been here for a long time. Nevertheless, as late as since the beginning of the 1990s it has started being a more important topic for scientists and researchers that looked at international migration movements from various angles and perspectives. What seemed to be missing, however, was a more systematic comparative perspective and putting the issue into a broader conceptual/theoretical framework. Just these aspects were included in the IDEA project that tried to compare migratory experience in three groups of European countries (Western European, Southern European and CEE ones) while using the perspective of IDEA conceptual framework and its key concepts of the European migration transition and cycle (see e.g. Okolski 2006, Fassman & Reeger 2008, Arango 2007; also chapters 1-3 in this volume). Hence, when making use of the historical experience of Western Europe in migration developments, one can identify the position of CEE countries in that transition/cycle and can attempt in-depth observations on similarities and differences both within the region and relative to the cycle stylized characteristics (typical of the “reference region” of Western Europe).

The main idea of the migration transition concept is that in the course of time along with overall modernization processes all European countries go through a migration transition process from an emigration to an immigration country. During this transition countries experience specific migration stages.
The main drivers for this general development can be seen in the political, demographic and economic development of both sending and receiving countries and in the paradigms of migration and control policies (Fassman & Reeger 2008). “A country’s transition … takes shorter or longer depending on a host of factors that include migration policy and other regulatory measures” (Okolski in Gorny et al. 2009). The transition from a country of emigration to a country of immigration is typically composed of characteristic stages. These stages differ by features of the migration flow itself, by the socioeconomic circumstances in the sending and receiving countries and by the transformation of the dominant migration regime (Fassman & Reeger 2008). Furthermore, there is an assumption that “young” (meaning more recent) immigration countries go through more or less similar stages within the migration transition as the “old” immigration countries did two or three decades before. There is a chronology when countries go step-by-step through at least four different phases/stages of the migration transition which can be called as follows: preliminary stage, take-off stage, stagnation stage and mature stage (Fassman & Reeger 2008).

Where are the CEE countries (with their past and current migratory patterns) represented here by Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic on their way through the defined stages and what does condition their position? What common features do they share, and, on the other hand, in which aspects do they differ? In other words, the question of uniformity or peculiarity of migration characteristics of each of the CEE countries vis-à-vis others is put forward. These are main questions and issues that are tackled within this chapter which is based on an extensive synthetic report for Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic)¹ - see Drbohlav, Hars and Grabowska-Lusinska (forthcoming). Let us point out again that what is very important for the adopted approach here is not only to bring a comparative description but also explanatory understanding as to what

¹ Preliminary work to this synthesis report was done within national reports – see Drbohlav et al. 2009, Hars 2008, Gorny et al. 2009.
Causalities stand behind the individual country’s contemporary migration transition.

Obviously, as compared to other European regions, CEE countries lag significantly behind in terms of the transition from emigration to immigration status. We accept a presumption that currently CEE countries may still fit the pattern of early stages of the ‘migration transition/cycle’. Countries of CEE seem to be from many reasons positioned along the path leading from early preliminary stage, which we suggest to call embryonic (it is the case of Poland – currently still a net emigration country), through proper preliminary stage (the case of Hungary – small nevertheless slowly growing net immigration) to take-off stage (the Czech Republic reaching a high level of net immigration with huge immigration flows).

What makes the analyzed countries specific vis-à-vis other European regions is their common heritage of more than 40 years of socialist/communist ruling (regarding migration issues, communist governments of CEE countries applied very restrictive migration regimes). This period engraved on societies many negative features that touched, besides many other spheres, also migratory issues (e.g., tolerance of undeclared work, corruption). What is common for the countries as well is that they experienced revolutionary changes in 1989 that has brought CEE, previously isolated by the Iron Curtain, back into the ‘migration continental system’ (Bonifazi et al. 2008). The final common and distinct period in the development of the migration situation in CEE starts with a deep transition processes from a centrally planned economy to prosperous democratic system coupled with a free-market economy. As a corollary, also migratory behaviour quickly became “normalised” and countries opened their borders and quickly gained both transit migrants and foreigners who stay there for different time periods. The transition seemed to have had an important impact upon migration patterns in CEE countries. There has been, however, no universal pattern and mechanism of that transition. Due to their not identical economic heritage gained during the communist era and various approaches applied within the transition processes, it is rather difficult to mutually compare the CEE
countries. In the past, the countries in question have followed different models of centrally planned economy. Whereas the economy of Czechoslovakia was very close to the classical centrally-planned model, Hungary and Poland did not follow the typical command economy form (Dorenbos 1999). They represented a kind of free-market and command-type economy amalgam - in Hungary with the introduction of market-oriented reforms since the late 1960s and in Poland with the existence of natural economy, small entrepreneurship and early introduction of market-oriented reforms as well. Thus, at dawn of the transition, the three countries differed in terms of their economic situation. Whereas in Hungary and, to lesser extent, the Czech Republic, the final decade of their socialist era and centrally planned economy may be characterized as a period of stagnation, in Poland one can speak about a period of a deep crisis (especially, after the martial law was introduced in 1981), with a rapid decline in real wages, high inflation, reduction of subsidies and imports and decrease in consumption. All countries, however, started their transition processes with labour markets being in a rather confusing state of full employment, labour misallocations and pseudo labour shortages.

“The comparison between the three countries is also challenging from the perspective of philosophy of changes: with Hungary’s application of a gradual approach, Poland’s application of a ‘big bang’ (‘shock therapy’) approach and the Czech Republic application of a mélange of both” (Okolski & Grabowska-Lusinska 2009). Nevertheless, the results of the transition process have been equally significant and far-reaching in all three countries. In this regard one cannot omit to mention a period of a fast economic growth entered by the countries in the 1990s, incorporation into western political, economic and security institutional structures (namely OECD – the Czech Republic in 1995, Poland and Hungary in 1996, NATO in 1999, the European Union in 2004, and the Schengen Zone in 2007).

A robust change of the economic system led during the transformation to a shift from, the excess demand for labour and over employment to surpluses of labour and shortages of jobs. Also, unemployment emerged as a new
phenomenon and started growing, whilst newly functioning market forces via their mechanisms contributed to selection of workers. As a corollary, the transition brought about a re-allocation of labour across enterprises, occupations, sectors and regions (with high regional variance) (Dorenbos 1999). In the course of the transition (depending on the stage that was reached) ‘new spaces’ or ‘new attraction poles’ in the CEE countries and their economies appeared. These spaces served as important destinations for new labour migrants, new inflows of workers from third countries, mainly from still less developed Eastern European countries (mostly Ukraine or Romania), or those located more to the East (chiefly Vietnam and China). In these countries modernization processes leading to intensive economic transition/transformation processes are retarded and labour markets are not able to absorb “redundant local labour force” (Taylor et al. 1996).

2. Historical experience - migration patterns up to 1990s

When trying to explain current migration patterns one cannot omit a description of historical contexts. Both commonalities and specificities of the region have been, to some extent, shaped long before revolutionary changes of the very end of the 1980s.

Since the mid-19th century the development of migration patterns CEE countries might be separated into three specific periods2: a) up to 1939; b) 1945-1989; c) since 1990 (with a distinct sub-period starting on May 1st 2004 when all the countries joined the EU). Such a division seems to be well-founded since the given periods are rather very different from each other in terms of their spatial, demographic, socio-economic, political and geopolitical aspects.

Out of doubts, a change of “ethnic structure landscapes” in the past is important for explaining the current flows. Two different processes contributed importantly to the change of ethnic structures: geopolitical

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2 The period of the WWII is not taken into account since its aftermath is typical of mass involuntary movements of people throughout the whole Europe (see e.g. Kosinski 1975).
First, since the three final decades of the 19th century until the beginning of the WWI the lands that now constitute the Czech Republic and Hungary and the South-Eastern part of present Poland belonged to the multiethnic Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The remaining part of present Poland was divided between German and Russian empires. After 1918 geopolitical situation has been changed by restoring Czechoslovakia and Poland as sovereign political entities (in 1918) and by getting Hungary the territory that was more or less the same as the present one (in 1920) (as a result of the Trianon Peace Treaty). More than 30% ethnic Hungarians, however, newly found themselves outside of Hungary, mainly in Romania (specifically in Transylvania), but also in Czechoslovakia (strictly speaking, in Slovakia), Ukraine and Serbia (Voivodina). On the other hand, the (present) Hungarian territory became ethnically more homogenous. Lands that form the present Czech Republic until 1938 constituted a federal state with Slovak lands and Carpathian Ruthenia as Czechoslovakia. In turn, independent Poland's territory was very different from it's present state. It was composed of parts of present Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine but it missed its present northern and western lands that still belonged to Germany at that time. Finally Hungary, the Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia) and Poland have become more or less ethnically homogeneous only after ethnic displacements that occurred in the aftermath of the WWII (Okolski & Grabowska-Lusinska forthcoming).

Second, prior to the WWI, migration in the three countries had many similar features while mainly stemming from the following two factors: relative retardation in European modernisation (the case of all Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and, in case of Central and Eastern Poland, Russian Empire) and multiethnic character of political entities to which those countries belonged. In fact, since the mid of the 19th century all the countries were typical of huge emigration losses, despite the controlled outflow. Destinations varied. Czechs headed mainly for metropolitan areas of the monarchy (Vienna), heavy
industrial centres of Western Europe (France, Germany), Northern America, and also for western parts of the Russian Empire, Hungarians mainly left their mother country for the USA. Poles, besides arriving to metropolitan areas such as Berlin, St. Petersburg, Kiev, Moscow, Vienna or Paris, headed in great numbers for both Americas and industrial centres of Germany. Obviously, this emigration experience has marked the future migratory development of the whole CEE region until the very beginning of the 1990s (Okolski, Grabowska-Lusinska forthcoming). Some other historical migration patterns, important for understanding the whole situation, are worth mentioning.

Between 1918 and the WWII, two process importantly contributed to some changes in migratory patterns: stricter immigration controls imposed by main destination countries (see e.g. the beginning of the 1920s in the USA) and the global economic crises between 1929 and 1933. Due chiefly to these events, lessening the emigration from the given countries and, on the other hand, some return migrations (especially at the time of crisis) and repatriations of fellow countrymen (especially immediately after the end of the war) occurred. After the Trianon Peace Treaty (see above), ethnically-motivated trans-border population movements played a role in Hungary. The Czech lands (then Czechoslovakia) and Poland received thousands of refugees who escaped from Russia (after 1917) and Germany (after 1933). These migration patterns, however, were not able to turn the overall migration balance, hence it stayed negative (Drbohlav et al. forthcoming).

Massive involuntary population movements continued after the end of WWII, particularly in Poland, and ended in 1948. They resulted in resettlements of population and returns of POWs or war fugitives (mostly forcible, on ethnic grounds). Nevertheless, in 1948 the “cold war” came and these movements were interrupted. Such abrupt discontinuation of compatriots’ resettlements led to repetitions of these movements later (e.g. massive family reunion migration in Poland in the mid of the 1950s).
Before the very end of the 1940s when migration movements in a block of socialist/communist countries have been heavily controlled and restricted, ethnic homogenisation took place. It was represented by “ethnic cleansing” policy between 1945 and 1947\(^3\) (e.g. nearly all Germans living in CEE countries were deported to Germany and “exchanges” of populations mainly between Hungary and Czechoslovakia and Poland and the Soviet Union occurred).

Some other migration features like a) huge emigration waves associated with political upheavals (namely Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1948, 1968, and Poland 1980/1981), b) heavy punishment of relatives of “illegal emigrants” who legitimately travelled abroad and did not return home in prescribed time, c) arrivals of pro-communist political asylum seekers from non-communist countries (e.g. Greeks, Chileans or Palestinians), were during the socialist/communist era more or less common (with some specific manifestations or different timing) to all the three countries.

There was also an inflow composed of foreigners (students, trainees, workers) who came within so called international aid among socialist/communist countries from less developed ones. A number of foreign students entered mixed marriages with nationals of a receiving country, which sometimes led to their settlement.

One of key differences separating the given distinctive periods, and, at the same time, augmenting similarities among the three countries (in the first two delineated periods) lay in net migration patterns. Obviously, during the first two periods all three countries experienced emigration rather than immigration. As late as 1989, after more than 40 years under the communist rule, revolutions came and brought freedom to societies – new political and, consequently, economic structures and regimes were established. Regarding migration movements it meant that the three countries have quickly started deviating from the “old model”. They started being transit and migration

\(^3\) Poland continued the ethnic displacement, under the label of “repatriation” (or family reunion), in the 1950s and 1970s.
destination countries and Hungary and mostly the Czech Republic clearly turned to net immigration ones.

On the other hand, clear differences among Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic existed during the second “socialist” period. In contrast to Czechoslovakia (the Czech Republic) and at a lesser extent Hungary that suffered from a lack of additional labour force, Poland displayed a continuous excess of labour supply. Shortly after the WWII, some regions of the present Czech Republic heavily hit by deportations of German ethnic minority, were resettled via internal immigration (of Czechs and Slovaks) but also, to much lesser extent, by recruited colonists from Bulgaria. Moreover, after 1960 the Czech lands were receiving a steady influx of temporary migrant workers from Poland, Vietnam⁴ and other socialist countries. On the other hand, Poles (unlike Czechs and Hungarians) were involved not only in labour migration related to temporary employment (e.g. in Czechoslovakia or Hungary) but also, especially in the 1980s, in petty trade activities performed under the guise of tourism. Both Czechoslovakia and Hungary belonged to major destinations of Polish petty traders. Such a circular mobility of Polish nationals gave rise in the 1980s to a massive phenomenon known as “incomplete migration”⁵ (Drbohlav et al. forthcoming).

3. Current migration patterns

Since the very late of the 1980s all the three countries have undergone a deep political and socio-economic transformation which has been accompanied by a profound transformation of migration patterns, however, of different pace and volume. The dismantling of communist regimes brought about opening of formerly closed and heavily controlled state borders which lead to re-shaping of European migration patterns. International mobility between “Eastern” and “Western” Europe has largely increased, though

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⁴ Vietnamese trainees/workers who came during the socialist era established a community that after the Velvet Revolution became a nucleus of a newly entrenched strong Vietnamese immigrant group in the Czech Republic.
⁵ Typically, incomplete migration involved so-called false tourists who were short-term (often on seasonal basis) irregular workers and whose strategy was to transfer within a relatively short time as much as possible if their foreign earnings to a household in the country of origin. Because of much lower costs of living in the home country, this enabled those migrants to substantially increase the purchasing power of their (very low) remuneration in a foreign country.
predictions of massive immigration movements to Western Europe were not fulfilled due to many simultaneously present factors such as, for example, tied migration regulations and controls along with limited opportunities on the labour markets in Western European countries, fast improvement of socio-economic situation of some post-communist countries and increase in migration between the CEE countries themselves (Zlotnik 1999, Wallace & Stola 2001). As a result, a new international migration space emerged in CEE, with its own sending and receiving countries, specific categories of migrants and specific dynamics and directions of flows. The Czech Republic and Hungary have been quickly transformed to transit and destination areas. On the other hand, Poland has been characteristic of high emigration of natives accompanied by circular mobility of foreign nationals and only a modest immigration.

The picture of migratory transition and its different degree in the three CEE countries is limited by well-known shortcomings of migration statistics, namely under-registration of migration movements and incomparability of migration related definitions in time and across countries (Hars forthcoming). Especially emigration data is underestimated, which does not allow us to rely on net migration data. The overall quality of statistical data is, to some extent, related to the volume of immigration. Thus, the Czech migration statistics is thought to be better developed then especially Polish statistical data on migration that is, by contrast, considered highly unreliable and incomplete (Gorny et al. 2009).

Each country has to cope with many particular deficiencies in migration statistics. To name the most important ones, we can mention, for example, problems tied to Polish emigration data. Official emigration data seems highly dubious since it has been quite low in contrast to the obvious increase of Polish emigrants abroad after the EU accession. More realistic picture brings Grabowska-Lusinska and Okolski (2009) who inform us about net increase of temporary emigrants from Poland between 2004 and 2006 – this increase represents some 950,000 persons. Another problem of Polish statistics is that Polish residence permit databases do not allow to differentiate between
the stocks and flows of the migrant population at a given time (Hars forthcoming). Furthermore, Czech migration flow statistics suffer from a change of definition of “immigrants”. The concept of “immigrant” has been importantly widened in the Czech Republic since 2001. Before, only permanent movements were counted. Since 2001, however, foreigners after a 1 year residence in the territory of the country have been included in the flow statistics (briefly described). Hence, an increase in immigration numbers (as seen in figure 1) can be partly ascribed to such a change in the method (Drbohlav et al. 2009).

There are various sources of the statistical migration data. Statistical data concerning international migration flows is derived from residence permit databases (Hungary and the Czech Republic) or population register as in the case of Poland. Stock statistics on migrant populations and information on migrants’ characteristics are based not only on residence permit databases/population registers but also originate from population censuses and work permit databases. Some features of migrant population, namely those concerning irregular migrants, might be known only from (research) surveys.

As for the development of migration flows, we shall concentrate on the immigration side due to the above mentioned deficiencies of the net migration data. Immigration data also well captures differences among the countries in question (see figure 1).
Figure 1. Migration inflows to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, 1989-2007.

Source: Hars (forthcoming).
Note: Until 2000, Czech data covers nationals and foreigners changing permanent residence (in the case of foreigners those who got a permanent residence permit were included). From 2001 on, foreigners were counted as immigrants when entering on a permanent residence permit or after 1 year of residence (if not permanent residence permit holders). **Hungary:** Data include foreigners holding a long-term residence permit (valid for up to 1 year), foreigners who have been residing in the country for at least a year and who currently hold a long-term permit, data are presented by actual year of entry (whatever the type when entering the country). **Poland:** Number of permanent and “fixed-time” residence permits issued.

Since early 1990s a continuous inflow of long-term immigration could be observed in each country, though of different “rhythm”. Immigration to Hungary peaked already in 1990 when thousands of ethnic Hungarians (mainly from Romania) came in to the country (Hars 2009). A rapid decline occurred in 1992-1994. However, shortly after it has dropped and during 1990s we can see quite similar levels of permanent immigration in all the three countries. Since 2001, the comparability of trends can not be easily followed as immigration statistics in the Czech Republic has been largely changed. The number of immigrants into the Czech Republic has grown from some 13,000 in 2001 to more than 104,000 in 2007. Such a “boom” has been triggered mainly by a favourable economic situation and growing labour demand and mainly comprised of immigrants from post-Soviet countries (Ukraine, Russia, Moldova), Slovakia, Vietnam or Mongolia (Drbohlav et al.
Immigration to Poland has been quite stable in time, though recently in the case of Poland growth in numbers is observable, what could be attributed to favourable economic development which might be in turn reflected by an increase of inflow not only of foreigners (from Ukraine, Germany or Belarus) but also Polish return migrants (Gorny et al. 2009).

The above mentioned trends can partly be traced when looking at migrant stocks (see figure 2). This time, data series of the Czech case are without major disruptions. The number of registered foreigners (generally staying for more than 3 months) has gradually grown (with the exception of 2001 caused by economic crisis in the country, but worldwide as well, along with application of restrictive migration measures) and since about 2004 the growth has even accelerated, hence in the new millennium the number of foreigners has almost doubled. In 2007 it reached 394,000, representing more than 3 per cent of the population. Unfortunately, there are no data series on migrant stocks in Poland – the only reliable information comes from the 2002 Census and stands at about 65,000 of foreigners (staying in Poland more than 2 months). Direct comparability is also limited by the fact that migrant stock in Hungary is differently defined to that of the Czech Republic – it covers only foreign permanent residents. However, an increase of migrant stock in recent years is also visible in Hungary (in 2007 it was some 175,000 persons). To sum up, especially following the accession to the EU the Czech Republic and Hungary entered a new period of a quite intense growth of migrant population.
Migrant populations in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic come mainly from neighbouring and/or former post-Soviet republics. Also, some long distance migrants namely from China and Vietnam belong to the most numerous migrant groups in these countries. In addition, in all three countries one can find an important segment of citizens from developed EU 15 countries and the USA (Hars forthcoming).

In the Czech Republic, since the mid of 1990s the most numerous migrant groups are represented by citizens of Ukraine, Slovakia, Vietnam, Russia and Poland. Whereas the number of Slovak and Polish citizens have not changed much from the mid of 1990s (in 2007 it reached some 68,000 and 21,000, respectively), figures of those from Ukraine (127,000 in 2007), Vietnam (51,000 in 2007) and Russia (23,000 in 2007) increased two fold.
compared to the situation in the mid of 1990s. The largest “Western” migrant
groups originate from Germany and the USA (Drbohlav et al. 2009). The
main source country of migrants in Hungary is the neighbouring Romania
(with the majority of migrants being ethnic Hungarians). Romanian migrants
clearly outnumber other foreign communities (in 2007 they represented
nearly 50% of the migrant stock figure). Other important groups are migrants
from Ukraine, Serbia, Germany, or China (Hars 2009). According to the
Census results (from 2002), the largest migrant groups in Poland came from
Ukraine (some 12,000 persons), Germany, Russia and also Belarus along
with Vietnam (Gorny et al. 2009).

The main purpose of migration to the CEE countries is work (or economic
activities in general) and related family reunification. In 2006, work and small
business were the main migration purpose of nearly 50 per cent of the
migrant stock in the Czech Republic (according to the justifications stated on
residence visas/permits) (Drbohlav et al. 2009). In Hungary a high share (50-
60 per cent) of the new and renewed resident permits were given for the
purpose of employment in 2002-2006. Moreover, the share of self
employment - entrepreneurship fluctuated around 1-10 per cent, and family
reasons were around 13-18 per cent. The share of permits issued with study
as purpose of stay ranged from 10 to 15 per cent (Hars 2009). The main
purpose of immigration to Poland is somewhat different with family reasons
on the top (62 per cent of migrants). About a third of migrants indicated job-
related reasons and some 31 per cent educational reasons (Gorny et al.
2009)\(^6\).

Consequently, the age structure of migrant populations in the CEE countries
followed the above mentioned patterns. About 85 per cent of migrant
populations in all three countries are younger than 65 years. In comparison to
the total population structure of the given countries, migrant populations can
be characterized by much smaller population segments, on one hand, of
persons aged 65+, and on the other, of children under the age of 14. While in

\(^6\) According to an ad hoc migration module of the Polish Labour Force Survey.
the Czech Republic and Hungary migrants aged between 25 and 40 dominate the migrant stock, Polish migrant population is older – main age groups are between 40 and 64 (Hars forthcoming). Moreover, migrant population in the Czech Republic is dominated by men (men amounted to about 60 per cent in the period 2001-2007), which further indicates a feature of a “traditional labour migrant population”. The share of women in Hungary and Poland equals the men.

Before targeting ourselves at the labour market position of migrants, we have to touch upon a specific segment of foreign population – asylum seekers. Since early 1990s asylum seekers have used CEE countries - especially the Czech Republic and Hungary - as a first destination to apply. Until early 2000s their numbers varied from 5,000 to 10,000 a year in Hungary and the Czech Republic and recently have significantly dropped to some 2,000 or 3,000 (Hars forthcoming). Poland, on the other hand, experienced a growth recently with the numbers ranging from 7,000 to 8,000 and composed of mainly Russians – Chechens (Gorny et al. 2009). The share of “successful” asylum seekers has been very low, possibly due to many “false” refugees who were, in fact, economic migrants (mostly on transit).

Finally, we have to mention the basic migration patterns related to employment. Currently, legal foreign labour force (foreign employees) represents 3.6 per cent in the Czech Republic\(^7\) and 1.5 per cent in Hungary\(^8\) and has been on increase. Foreign legal employees in Poland represent only about 0.1 per cent of total labour force (see figure 3).

\(^7\) Besides foreign employees in the Czech Republic, there is also an important segment of foreign trade licence holders (small entrepreneurs) - in 2007 there were some 69,000 of them (mostly Vietnamese retail traders). Hence, in sum the total economically active migrant population represented 5.6 per cent of the total economically active population in the Czech Republic (Drbohlav et al. 2009). No data on foreign trade licence holders in the other countries available.

\(^8\) Unfortunately, Hungarian data fails to cover the EU 15 citizens who need neither permits nor registration.
Despite a different extent of labour demand and/or migrant labour supply among the countries in question, its structure seems to be very similar in all three countries. In Hungary and the Czech Republic, legally employed migrants work mainly in construction sector, services and in manufacturing. Moreover, there is also a rather small but important segment of labour migrants - professionals coming from other developed countries (mainly EU 15) who are chiefly involved in more intellectually demanding jobs. By contrast, legal migrants in Poland are mostly concentrated just in this “more qualified” sector (e.g., trade, education etc.). However, such a difference in migrant employment between the countries in question is rather delusive as also in Poland construction, agriculture, trade, or services are “migrant labour sectors”, but these migrant workers are rather of irregular status (Drbohlav forthcoming). Thus, it has to be pointed out that irregular migrant labour is a common migration feature of all the three countries in question. As in Poland, irregular migrant workers in Hungary or the Czech Republic are employed in
the secondary labour market characterized by labour intensive, poorly paid jobs. Furthermore, especially in the 1990s, Poland has been known for a short-term mobility of post-Soviet foreigners accompanied by irregular petty trade across the borders (see e.g., Okolski 2004) – a phenomenon that has never taken place in the Czech Republic, and only to some extent in Hungary (Drbohlav forthcoming). Irregular employment of foreigners or, generally, the size of irregular migrant population in CEE countries is considered significant, although estimations differ (from some 40,000 to 300,00 in the Czech Republic, about 100,000 in Hungary, and from 80,000 to 200,000 in Poland) (Drbohlav et al. 2009, Hars 2009, Gorny et al. 2009). Generally, irregular labour migrants in the CEE countries come (usually with a tourist visa) from the same sending regions as legal migrants (from economically less developed countries, for the most part). Importantly, although irregular migrant workers significantly participate in the shadow economy, the “grey labour market” in CEE is to much larger extent occupied by domestic labour force (Drbohlav forthcoming).

4. Determinants of migration

This part concentrates upon “migration drivers“, key factors that are behind migration flows in the three given countries. These drivers were selected (and consequently “tested”) according to what was found important in this regard in Western European – “migratory matured countries”. Thus, we discuss here step-by-step the following structural factors: economic, demographic and geopolitical ones. Very often they are interdependent and interacting. Logically, we devote the greatest attention to economic factors that seem to be decisive for explaining the immigration patterns in the CEE region. Economy, and specifically the demand for labour has also been confirmed as the most important migration driver for “old” immigration countries such as Germany or Austria (see Fassmann 2009).

What has to be stressed is the crucial role of economic transition/transformation processes of the 1990s for triggering immigration flows to CEE countries. We try to detect economy related factors that are
important for explaining the immigration to the countries in question. The development of immigration flows in terms of its quantitative and qualitative parameters vis-à-vis the development of economic situation is, however, not easy to interpret. Such relation is conditioned in a complex way. It mirrors both external and global economic environment and its development (with booms and slowdowns) and specificities springing from slightly different transition/transformation processes (and models/ways via which transition was materialized) in individual countries that started after 1989. These processes have been influenced by heritage of the past socialist/communist era which has in given countries common but also peculiar features.

It seems that the direct relationship between the economic situation (at a macro level) and immigration has been proved in the Czech Republic. In fact, only in the Czech case the demand side matched with the foreign supply side, whilst just this fact seems to be the precondition for robust immigration. Importantly, this situation was further supported by the migration policy development that was instrumental in gaining immigrants. In Poland, this „demand-supply harmony“ has only very recently occurred (after Poland joined the EU). To some extent, continuous intensive emigration of Poles abroad is behind this fact. Under such conditions demand for foreign labour force has increased. Even this synergy, however, has not been enough to trigger massive immigration to the country - the immigration is rather very low. In Hungary, due to its specific economic structure the demand for labour has been rather low (the growth of economy in Hungary can be characterized as a “jobless growth”). As for the character of relationship between the

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9 Whereas until 1997 it was rather very liberal “non-policy policy”, after 2003 pro-foreign labour force atmosphere came also with specific measures/programmes to recruit economic immigrants.  
10 There was, however, also the boom in infrastructural and other direct investments that contributed to creating many new jobs.  
11 Hungarian economy has the job structure that refers to a more productive economy. Low wage small enterprises or self-employed jobs are missing or have a character of provisory, non-increasing family base. Other enterprises highly rely on multinational firms with limited freedom of activity (Laki 1998, GKM 2007).
immigration and the economic situation, Hungary stays somewhere in between the Polish and Czech case\textsuperscript{12}.

There are also important labour market deficiencies in CEE which function as strong ("pull") factors attracting foreign labour force. In this regard one has to mention mainly the following ones: mismatches between demand and supply of domestic labour, low motivation to work of natives, high labour costs, limited occupational and geographical (internal spatial) mobility and, importantly, tolerated practices of undeclared work. Of course, it is to some extent a simplified picture (e.g. omitting some changes over time), nevertheless, it seems that all of these "pulls" play an important role in all three countries (see more in Drbohlav, Hars, Grabowska-Lusinska forthcoming).

To elaborate on the role of undeclared work, one has to realize that there has been a persisting tolerance of informal business and employment practices (undeclared work) originating from the socialist economic system\textsuperscript{13} (e.g., Renooy et al. 2004, Fassmann 2008). This tolerance goes hand in hand with existing robust informal economies (chiefly composed of domestic workers) that serve, consequently, as an incentive for irregular migration to CEE countries (see also Reyneri 2002, Arango et al. 2009). (In fact, native and foreign informal markets to large extent overlap). Hence, in all the three countries, irregular migrants represent only one of the segments of a "grey/ shadow economy". Generally, it was estimated that the total size of undeclared work (as percentage of GDP) in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland was 9-10\textsuperscript{14} per cent, 14 and 18\textsuperscript{15} per cent, respectively, at the turn of the 20/21\textsuperscript{st} century (see Renooy et al. 2004). What is perhaps even

\textsuperscript{12} Regarding the discussed relationships see annex 1 to 3 which characterize the development of immigration vis-à-vis selected economic variables (GDP, vacancies, unemployment rate). Moreover, variables describing migration policy orientation and predominating attitudes towards foreigners were included too. One has to keep in mind, however, that the given figures depend on how the characteristics in the analysis were designed. Also, for example, so important irregular labour migrants were not taken into account. For further findings and discussions on migration and, or, within economy we refer a reader to Drbohlav, Hars, Grabowska-Lusinska (forthcoming), where it is possible to get more detailed pieces of information that contribute to more in-depth look at these issues.

\textsuperscript{13} Irrational and opaque economic environment along with insufficient legal regulation prolonged a tradition of undeclared work under new democratic economic circumstances and conditions (see e.g. Renooy et al. 2004, Fassmann 2008).

\textsuperscript{14} It concerned about 5-6 per cent of the labour force in the Czech Republic (Fassmann 2007).

\textsuperscript{15} It was over 9 per cent of the total working population in Poland (GUS 2005 – data for 2004).
more important than the given figures is that the undeclared work phenomenon\textsuperscript{16} and related “atmosphere of tolerance” is spread throughout all societies - social strata and regions of CEE countries.

Demographic situation of the CEE countries is another major migration driver, though its importance has only recently become visible. Already now, however, in harmony with many other developed European countries, the CEE region (of course, to a different extent) has suffered from several demographic problems. They originate in ageing process (low fertility levels, growing life expectancy), loosing population and putting the financial burden on economically active segments of population (see EUROSTAT 2009). What is crucial is that in contrast to the past development the role of migration in shaping demographic situation (vis-à-vis natural development) will generally be significantly increasing and the CEE region will not be the exception to this trend. Thus, significant effects upon labour markets are yet to come\textsuperscript{17} (see e.g., EUROSTAT 2009, Bijak, Kupiszewska & Kupiszewski 2008). All in all, the demographic situation has become (and even more in the future will highly probably be) an important factor that triggers immigration, directly through the growing demand for labour and “spontaneous migration movements” and indirectly by various state recruitment policies trying to saturate the weakening pool of domestic human resources\textsuperscript{18}. Apparently, these new challenges call now (and will do so in the future) for objective, in-depth and comprehensive reassessments of many established economic and social policies. The Czech Republic was the first among the CEE countries that launched programs for recruiting foreign labour force – as early as 2003 (the first one) and, then, 2009 (the second

\textsuperscript{16} On the example of Polish informal economy, Bednarski, Krynska, Pater & Walewski (2008) and Kus (2006) explain reasons for its existence and thriving. They are worth mentioning since some of their arguments have broader validity. Among the causes of current unregistered employment in Poland (including employment of foreigners), one must consider societal acceptance (higher for irregular individuals, lower for illegal companies), insufficient income from registered (official) sources, high non-salary costs of work (taxes, insurance, other burdens), hectic administration procedures and avoidance of minimum labour standards (such as minimum wage, minimum working hours, health and safety provisions). But also traditional transnational networks, especially in the border regions (circular mobility of petty traders and seasonal or occasional workers) play an important role (Gorny et al. 2009).

\textsuperscript{17} For example, following again EUROSTAT data, whilst in 2060 the ratio of persons aged 65+ to the number of persons aged 15-64 will grow almost four times in the case of Poland, it will be almost three times in the Czech Republic and a bit less also in Hungary.

\textsuperscript{18} The replacement migration concept (Replacement 2000, 2001) clearly shows us, however, that immigration as such cannot stop demographic ageing (see also Bijak, Kupiszewska & Kupiszewski 2008, Grant et al. 2004, Burcin, Drbohlav & Kucera 2005).
Without any doubts there are two major events that has significantly changed the geopolitical situation in the three CEE countries and had and still have also significant impact upon migratory realities: First, it was the breakdown of the entire Eastern communist bloc in the very end of the 1980s, and second, the accession of the CEE countries to the EU on May 1st 2004. Other geopolitical aspects tied to migration are historically built country specific realities. Poland has been exhibiting its national interests via maintaining special, close and friendly relationships with eastern neighbouring countries (Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus\(^1\)) which are excluded from most western international institutions (Gorny et al. 2009). Due to the historical development (as sketched in the previous section), contemporary Hungary has a large pool of co-ethnics residing in countries bordering on Hungary and, at the same time, also serving as dominant source of Hungarian immigration. These ethnic patterns have had an important impact upon the migratory situation and policies of contemporary Hungary (Hars 2009). The Czech Republic has also very special geopolitical links - to Slovakia. More than 70 years of common history within one Czechoslovak state as well as a significant cultural and linguistic proximity have been the key factors behind a high level of liberalization of migration admissions and labour policy towards Slovakia between 1993 and 2004 (Drbohlav et al. 2009).

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\(^1\) For example, Poland had successfully delayed the date of introducing visas for eastern neighbouring countries’ citizens, which is clear evidence that not only EU requirements, but also national interests, shape migration policy (Kicinger 2005).
during the communist era, the established migration networks and family or community-specific chains were disrupted. On the other hand, some trainees, workers and students who came during the socialist era to CEE region became „embryos“ of further immigrant inflows in the transformation era (it concerns mainly Vietnamese community in the Czech Republic). In Hungary, as indicated above, ethnic ties were the key factor behind Hungarian immigration patterns (Drbohlav forthcoming).

Interestingly, public attitudes towards migration issues and immigrants, which might represent an important contextual migration factor, have not played a significant role in influencing migration flows, at least, no evidence in the CEE context has been found.

Finally, one cannot omit factors lying behind the given state borders. We mean “push” factors, namely political and socioeconomic conditions in surrounding countries or generally migration source countries (Fassmann & Reeger 2008). In this respect we have to pay attention to “Eastern” regions – countries of the former Soviet Union and some Asian countries like Vietnam or China that mainly have been sending their labour force to the given CEE countries.

5. Migration policies

Migration policies represent an important contextual factor of the migration transition. Their impact upon migratory realities and trends in the CEE region are illustrated by two most obvious examples. First, especially in the first half of the 1990s not the migration policy but instead rather the exhibited „migration non-policies“ (typical of very liberal approaches) importantly contributed to large immigration inflows, at least in the case of the Czech Republic. Second, a common pattern characteristic of all the three countries is that gaps in migration policies have served as a pull factor flexibly used by migrants, e.g. „masked asylum seekers, or „hidden employment“ that is practiced by holders of trade licenses (more on this see: Drbohlav et al. forthcoming).
Obviously, there are some other common features shared by all the given countries in the (post)transition period. One has to start with migration policy development. First, at the beginning of the 1990s all the countries in the CEE region missed experience of “natural” labour immigration (immigration in the socialist era was rather directed and specific) and its management. Starting from scratch and despite different contextual environment, migration policies of countries in question have been gradually developed in a similar way. Hence, while simplifying, one can distinguish the following three stages of migration policy development in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (based on Lesinska, Stefanska & Szulecka forthcoming): 1) 1989 – early 1990s – institutionalization – birth of the legal system; 2) late 1990s – 2004 – stabilization and harmonization to EU standards, 3) since 2004 – consolidation of the migration regime.

The analysis of Polish, Hungarian and Czech migration policy development revealed that policymakers from CEE states have followed the traditional line (developed by the EU and Western countries) of conceptualization and implementation of migration policy. In other words, all the three countries draw the inspiration from more mature and experienced immigration countries both in terms of perception of immigration as well as models of management of migration inflows. Among the three countries, Czech migration policy has been clearly the most mature from the point of view of formulation of migration doctrine, implementation of particular activities aiming at the encouragement of inflow and settlement of foreigners (Lesinska, Stefanska & Szulecka forthcoming). There is also one pattern that was characteristic of policy making principles in the all countries in question (and to some extent, is still valid for the present situation) – that is the „power of discretion“ meaning that often the administration, instead of precisely formulating rules that have to be complied with, enabled officials to use their own discretion.

Significant influence of the EU, in other words Europeanization of migration policies (except for naturalisation and repatriation policies) is another aspect
that combines the given countries (Lesinska, Stefanska & Szulecka forthcoming). Moreover, the institutional setting that has developed in the countries in question over time seems to be very similar. The competences on the immigration issue are divided among several bodies, nevertheless, the key coordinating role is played by the Ministry of the Interior. Just this body has by far a dominant role in migration policy making. The institutional system is highly centralized - one can see rather a marginal influence of the lower level (regional and local) of administration on shaping migration or integration issues. With the exception of the Czech Republic, the same is valid for the role of the NGOs’ sector. Moreover, special bodies (as inter-ministerial committees or inter-departmental groups) dealing exclusively with migration issue, or, its selected important areas, have recently been established. Their main goal is to declare and formulate long term strategies of migration policy (migration doctrine) and to coordinate activities of a variety of institutions that focus upon immigration and immigrants’ integration into their host societies (Lesinska, Stefanska & Szulecka forthcoming).

Another common aspect is that the issue of immigration occurs very rarely in political or public discourse. Many challenges concerning migration or immigration either have not been discussed or discussions have been highly bureaucratic, without engagement of the wider public. Neither the process of drafting legal acts concerning migration, nor setting up related institutions were, with few exceptions, accompanied by any extensive political disputes. On the contrary, political disputes were rather confined to technicalities and have taken place exclusively within the state’s administration. What must be said is that in particular situations some groups of interest, such as NGOs, employers or labour unions announced publicly the point of view on immigration in the context of labour market and employment. To sum up – there is a common trend of low politicization of the migration topic with prevailing “bureaucratic” attitudes (Lesinska, Stefanska & Szulecka forthcoming).

Although the three countries share many similar aspects of migration policy development (as noted above), one finds some crucial differences. More
specifically, Czech migration policy seems to be more distinct from the policies of the other two countries, so to say in a much more mature stage in terms of policy making (Lesinska, Stefanska & Szulecka forthcoming). Thus, what is rather different among the three countries, or, rather, what separates the Czech Republic from the other two countries?

Taking into account the internal and external impulses that stood behind policy making, the Czech case was the only one when the existing and quickly changing migratory reality importantly “stimulated” progress in the migration policy field. By contrast, in Hungary and Poland the migration policy has developed rather as a response to external pressures, more specifically, it has mostly followed the EU harmonisation as such. In fact, it is to some extent only a logical consequence of more modest immigration flow to Hungary and very low inflow to Poland and its characteristics (fluidity and circularity, especially in the Polish case). Such a reality does not create a necessary “push” for policymakers to be active as intensively in the field of migration management as it has happened in case of the Czech Republic that hosts hundreds of thousands of immigrants (Lesinska, Stefanska & Szulecka forthcoming).

Furthermore, the Czech Republic clearly represents the “most mature” case (in our comparative CEE framework) in terms of formulating its migration doctrine. The basic policy principles related to international migration were announced by the Czech Government in 2003. Although they are criticised by some experts as very general and vague, with no impact upon migration policy, still the process of its conceptualisation is more developed in comparison with the two other countries under consideration. The Czech Government also launched pro-active migration measures and, consequently, implemented particular activities aiming at the encouragement of inflow of immigrants (and their admitting to the labour market) and, to some extent, their settlement (see below). Moreover, the country has been active in the case of the development of its integration policy. All in all, more systematic and more goal-oriented approaches are characteristic of the migration policy in the Czech Republic. It is worthwhile to mention here,
however, that in Poland and Hungary there are also some examples of more systemic state’s activities in migration management; policy towards co-ethnics and repatriation system is one of them. Nevertheless, at the same time, in Hungary and Poland there is no single document where migration doctrine is clearly stated. The state’s migration strategy could be only deduced from other sources such as various (mostly unpublished) documents and policymakers’ statements (Lesinska, Stefanska & Szulecka forthcoming).

The migration data clearly shows that the Czech Republic has attracted many more immigrants as compared to Poland and Hungary. It is also, to some extent, due to the state’s policy towards foreigners. While the Czech Republic has actively encouraged labour and settlement migration (even through small-scale programs), Poland and Hungary had and applied different strategies. They accepted rather short-term immigration from neighbouring countries and supported the settlement of narrowly defined groups - of co-ethnics above all. The situation has recently slightly changed, whilst an issue of active encouragement of foreign labour force has started being debated in all the three countries. Furthermore, some more liberal rules of admission of foreigners to national labour markets have been introduced. This activities are propelled by a desire to fill gaps on the labour markets where there is a growing demand for some segments of foreign labour force. The Czech Republic again leads the group while launching two projects – a pilot project for attracting skilled migrant workers to settle in the country was introduced in 2003 and in January 2009 the Green Card project for gaining new labour - both high and low qualified immigrants from selected countries (Drbohlav et al. 2009). Poland and Hungary have still a long avenue to go in order to catch up with Czech activities in this field.

Finally, there is a last difference that is worth pinpointing. Whereas in Poland and Hungary small-scale regularisation programs towards selected groups of irregular migrants have already been applied, the Czech Republic has so far never accepted such an idea (Lesinska, Stefanska & Szulecka forthcoming).
6. Migration impacts

It is not an easy task to analyze and then to compare impacts of international migration processes on societies of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. First of all, many important impacts are difficult to measure (in terms of both existed data/statistics and a design of suitable characteristics). Furthermore, there is rather a limited experience of such evaluations. Indeed, it is also linked to immature character of migration policies in CEE region where a systematic reflection of installed migration policy measures is rather rarely taken. Last but not least, only a short time has elapsed since “standard” international migrants (within a new post-communist era) started arriving into the given countries and, thus, impacts had not so much time to develop and crystallize. Obviously, due also to still rather very significant role of temporary/circular migration movements integration outcomes have not been clearly shaped yet.

In this part we concentrated upon three different areas in which migration impacts may be identified – migration impacts in the socio-economic sphere, in the spatial organization of society (the spatial distribution patterns of migrant populations) and in administrative-bureaucratic sphere (naturalization processes through which a migrant is officially accepted as a new citizen of the country).

No doubts about it, the economic impacts of migration are the most important ones in all three countries. It simply springs from a fact that immigration into CEE countries is based predominantly on economic motives and most of the migrants are represented by a labour force who stays temporarily (mostly short-term or long-term migrations) while being intensively involved in local/national labour markets/economies. Migrant populations’ common pattern is a high economic activity rate that stands above the average level of population along with below-average unemployment\(^{20}\) (Medova forthcoming). What is very important is that foreign labour force in the all three countries

\(^{20}\) One has to realize, however, that after being fired strict legal regulations often do not allow long-term migrants to stay legally in the country as unemployed.
seems to be a supplement rather than competition vis-à-vis native workers\(^\text{21}\) (Drbohlav et al. 2009, Hars 2009, Gorny et al. 2009).

One of the apparent differences among the three countries is the role played by emigration, and, more specifically, how emigration influences the behaviour of natives. Neither the Czech Republic, nor Hungary has experienced such large scale emigration movements as have been taking place in Poland, especially after the accession to the EU. The outflow of Polish workers has already caused some labour deficits which might in turn encourage further immigration of foreigners (Okolski & Mioduszewska 2009, Kaczmarczyk & Okolski 2008).

Like many other European developed countries, also the CEE countries have recently started to face a process of population ageing (see e.g.) that may and certainly will have serious economic and social impacts upon all societies. As it has been shown many times in different regional contexts (see e.g. Bijak, Kupiszwska & Kupiszewski 2008), however, immigration as such cannot be a remedy for demographic ageing and for weakening of labour force potential. The expected immigration inflows may only contribute to stabilization of the total population size of individual countries. Nevertheless, the immigration, in fact, of any size is not able at all to significantly influence changes of the population structures, namely to prevent overall ageing.

So far mostly temporary and “young” migration movements in CEE countries have not yet led to immigrants´ integration processes in forms and volumes as we know them from many developed immigration countries. For the time being, one cannot speak about significant outcomes of migrants´ incorporation into the receiving CEE societies. Integration of migrant populations accompanied with a state integration policy is in an infancy stage. Accordingly, immigrants´ integration has not so far posed any major

\(^{21}\) One of the demonstrations of this statement brings an example from the Czech Republic where foreign labour migration in districts grows as unemployment falls and vice versa (see Drbohlav 2004, Cizinci 2006, Horakova 2006).
problems for the three societies. As a matter of fact, at least in the Czech Republic, only recently immigrants’ second generation has started appearing (Medova forthcoming).

By the same token, no large separated or segregated spatial concentrations of migrant populations within cities or towns (at a minimum level of several blocks of houses) have been established in CEE countries. Nevertheless, some “embryonic zones” of such concentrations have appeared in Prague and Budapest, indeed. On the other hand, the spatial distribution of migrants is uneven. It concerns both inner parts of cities/towns and the whole country level. Also, spatial distribution patterns differ by individual immigrant ethnic groups and by migrant’ statuses (mainly long-term or temporary versus permanent migrants). It has been clearly proven that capitals represent the most important centres where migrants are concentrated (Medova forthcoming). More specifically, Prague hosts about one third of all legally staying foreigners and the concentration of foreign permanent settlers in Budapest reaches about 40 percent (Drbohlav et al. 2009, Hars 2009). On the other hand, spatial concentration of migrants – permanent settlers in Warsaw is about some 16 per cent (Gorny et al. 2009). Thus, the dominance of the capital city in migrant settlement patterns is lower in Poland. It has to do with the overall character of the Polish settlement structure within which a dominance of Warsaw itself is suppressed (see e.g. Weclawowicz 2001).

The settlement hierarchical system (reflecting socio-economic development of cities) has its important effect upon a character of spatial distribution of foreigners throughout the Czech Republic. Besides hierarchical (vertical) principle, there is also a zonal (horizontal) one (so called East-West gradient) that signalizes growing numbers of migrants from the East of the country westwards. It is in harmony with growing working opportunities for foreign labour force (employees) in industrial plants in Bohemia and with making use of proximity to German (Bavarian) and Austrian customers in Western, South-Western, and Southern parts of the country close to respective borders (it mainly concerns foreigners holding trade licenses – small traders) (Drbohlav et al. 2009). Spatial patterns are similar in Hungary although other factors seem to come to the play (e.g. ethnic character of migration, proximity
to countries of origin) (Hars 2009). The latter factor, to some extent, can also be identified in the Czech Republic.

As for naturalization processes in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, it has been evident that numbers of those who were naturalised (granted a citizenship of the given countries) symbolize the state naturalization policy as such more than anything else. Apparently, no direct relationship between a number of immigrants and number of naturalised foreigners was found (Medova forthcoming). This can be documented on the Hungarian case (see figure 4) where numbers of naturalised were manifold higher than in the Czech Republic, though the Czech Republic is a more attractive immigration destination country. The reason was that just immigrants of Hungarian origin were able to meet one of the key prerequisites for gaining the citizenship – many of them have already known Hungarian language – and could prove their Hungarian origin (Hars 2009). On the other hand, the latest trend in both countries indicates that the stock of naturalised persons has been becoming more heterogeneous in terms of their former citizenship (Medova forthcoming).

Figure 4. Naturalizations per year in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, 1993-2006.

Source: Medova (forthcoming).
7. Conclusions

Within this chapter, we have mapped contemporary and historical migration patterns, determinants of migration transition, including migration policies, and impacts of migration in the Czech Republic, Hungary and. All these were viewed in a comparative perspective and in relation to the conceptual framework built within the IDEA project (Arango 2007, Fassmann & Reeger 2008).

During the 1990s, all the three countries have undergone deep political, economic and social transition processes from communist system with planned economy towards democratic systems based on free-market economies. Since mid 1990s these countries have joined various “Western” political, economic and security institutional structures. Consequently, transformations of migratory patterns have taken place – the countries shifted from a strict regime of ‘closed borders’ into “standard” migration modes. Nevertheless, the three countries have been experiencing to some extent different migratory experience.

The resulting situation can be briefly characterized as follows: The Czech Republic having high immigration and at the same time low emigration of natives is clearly the most attractive migration destination country among the CEE countries. Also Hungary experiences positive net migration with low emigration, though of lower intensity. By contrast, Poland is typical of high emigration of natives and rather low long-term immigration. All the three countries fit the different stages of the migration transition concept, but they share one common feature – they are positioned at the early stages of the process. Whereas Poland and Hungary still seem to be in a preliminary stage, although in different sub-stages - an early preliminary (embryonic) as is the case of Poland, and a “proper” preliminary as in the case of Hungary, the Czech Republic has probably already entered so called take-off stage of the migration cycle. The differences among the given countries have their roots in historical patterns, different level of socio-economic development at
the beginning of the societal transition/transformation period, structure of the whole economy (i.e. namely sectoral and educational structures), and also in outcomes of the societal transition process.

The migration transition shifting the three countries from emigration to immigration has been determined by several important determinants (migration drivers). Chiefly economic pull factors are the most important ones. Without the successful economic transition leading to developed free-market economy, albeit materialised via different modes, there would be no such immigration. Regarding more specific economic features, namely mismatches between demand and supply of domestic labour, low motivation to work of natives, high labour costs, low internal spatial mobility and, importantly, tolerated practices of and the extent of undeclared work play important role. Generally, labour demand in immigration countries seems to be significantly high (Fassmann 2009). However, in order to get considerable immigration there must be, among other conditions, also a suitable and “willing” supply, and this condition has been fulfilled only in the Czech Republic. In Poland this demand-supply concurrence has only recently started occurring and to some extent it could be attributed to continuous intensive emigration of Poles abroad. Along with good economic performance it contributed to an increase of demand for foreign labour. On the other hand, Hungarian economic structure was behind a rather low demand for migrant workers.

Furthermore, demographic characteristics of the three countries (e.g., very low fertility and growing life expectancy leading to population ageing) represent migration factors importance of which will be growing in the future. Nevertheless, even today they started influencing some of migration policy measures aiming at foreign labour force recruitment to make up for the decreasing pool of domestic human resources.

Not only from the geopolitical perspective, the most important moment for all three countries were first of all the breakdown of the communist block of countries in 1989 and secondly, the accession to the EU in 2004. Within the
existing migration patterns one can find countries’ particular geopolitical interests being exhibited in preferential attitudes towards certain countries (e.g., Poles towards selected former post-soviet countries, Hungary to Romanian compatriots, and the Czech Republic towards Slovakia).

Other important contextual determinants were also identified. Namely historical experience, migrant social networks, and migration policies. From historical perspective, the three countries were emigration countries until the 1990s transition period. Since the aftermath of the WWII all the countries have been ethnically homogeneous (Hungary even after the WWI). This homogeneity was even strengthen during the communist/socialist era due to its very restrictive regimes (no standard international migration movements occurred). Despite this, a sort of labour immigration (workers, trainees, and students) from distant developing socialist countries (within the framework of ‘international aid’) took place especially in Czechoslovakia and partly in Hungary which in the case of Vietnamese in Czechoslovakia led to consequent establishment of a strong migrant community after 1989.

Furthermore, migration policies (or rather “non-policies” of the 1990s) played an important role in shaping migration patterns. Development of migration policies propelled by legislative harmonization of the EU led to very similar institutional settings - migration policy management is centralized with very limited involvement of regional and local institutions. Another common feature is that migration issues in the three countries have not been a big issue on the agenda of the Government, political parties, and the public, indeed. Recently, though, more pro-active and more systematic approaches concerning migration policies have emerged – especially in the Czech Republic. Just the Czech Republic (as compared to Poland and Hungary) has designed more coherent migration policy framework in terms of legal regulations, practices as well as organisational environment. Also the involvement of NGOs in migration and integration issues seems to be much more intense in the Czech Republic than in the other two countries.
All the above circumstances (determinants) led to creating immigration realities of the CEE countries under consideration. In line with what has been said, the Czech Republic hosts the largest pool of immigrants – in 2007 there were some 394,000 legally staying migrants\textsuperscript{22}, followed by Hungary (with some 175,000 migrants in the same year) and Poland that is by far the least attractive immigration destination country (with about 65,000 migrants counted in the 2002 Census).

Current immigration to the CEE countries is predominantly labour motivated. Legal labour migrants in the Czech Republic and Hungary are mainly employed in construction sector, services, hotels and restaurants, and manufacturing. Just these branches are also typical areas where irregular migrants operate (in all the three countries). There is also a rather small but important type of legal labour migrants - professionals coming from other developed countries (mainly EU15) who are involved in more intellectually demanding jobs. Interestingly, in Poland just these labour migrants dominate over other migratory types. Hence, a very important conclusion: it seems that foreign labour in all three countries is complementary rather than competitive vis-à-vis domestic workers.

Clearly, gainful employment as a principal motive and more or less the same migratory source countries (countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Post-Soviet countries, Vietnam and China) belong to important common features of countries in question. By contrast, one can find important differences in terms of length of stay in individual countries with significant numbers of migrants who stay for a long-time (several months) or permanently in the Czech Republic and Hungary, whereas in Poland short-term stays (often related to circular mobility) are dominant.

Immigration to the three CEE countries constitutes a rather recent phenomenon. Moreover, it is mostly temporary migrants who come. Hence, the impacts of immigration on the three countries have so far been apparent

\textsuperscript{22} For precise definitions of migrants in individual countries see part xx.
specifically in economic sphere and have not seriously affected the spheres of social and cultural relationships. Immigrants generally display higher economic activity rates along with lower unemployment rates, as compared to domestic population. In demographic, social, cultural and geographical areas the immigration impact has so far been rather marginal. It has been proved, though, that capital cities of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary are the major immigration hubs of the given countries.

Last but not least, based on the analysis of the migration policy development in all the three countries, several deficiencies appeared. To improve the whole situation, several policy recommendations can be put forward (at a very general level and in a simplified way) (for more on this see Drbohlav, Grabowska-Lusinska, Medova, Hars & Lesinska forthcoming):

1. to develop more complex long-term strategy of migration policy
2. to exhibit more pro-active migration policy approaches
3. to apply more advanced and multidimensional integration policies
4. to launch information campaign and educational programmes targeted at majority population
5. to tackle irregular migration in a complex way

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Source: Taken from Drbohlav et al. 2009
Notes: 1) All the characteristics are related to the year 1996 (starting point of our analysis) because of pragmatic reasons – availability of data. However, 1996 was more or less a final stage of a rapid post-1989 economic boom and of very liberal economic policies that enabled mushrooming of economic immigrants.
2) General approach was to relate all annual parameters to one reference point (situation in 1996). Hence, 1996 was taken as 100%, thus, any given parameter expresses a development vis-à-vis the 1996 level.
3) Employment of foreigners represents a total number of economically active foreigners in the Czech Republic. (1996=188,745 in absolute terms)
4) Stock of foreigners includes all foreigners with long-term and permanent permits/visas. (1996= 199,152 in absolute terms)
5) Vacancies are designed as annual average of vacant positions reported to labour offices. (1996=98,700 in absolute terms)
6) Unemployment rate was counted annual average of the general rate of unemployment. (1996=3.9%)
7) GDP represents the sum of values added by all branches of activities which are considered productive in the system of national accounts (including market and non-market services). Calculations are made at current prices and results are then converted into constant prices (of the year 2000). (1996=2,116,000 mil. CZK in absolute terms)
8) Opinion on foreigners is represented by opinion on Post-Soviets and Vietnamese within representative public opinion polls (Question: “How would you characterize your relationship to the following population groups that live in the Czech Republic …?” Respondents could choose one of the following categories: very good, rather good, not good - not bad, rather bad, very bad. We used an average of “very good” and “rather good” answers for both groups (see table 25). A suitable and comparable time-line was available only until 2001 (see more in section 3.1.1.). (1996=11.5%)
9) Specificity of constructing our “migration policy index” resides in a rather impressionistic way of measuring. It was not possible to relate the nature of migration policy to individual particular years. Hence, we evaluated it by periods which were delineated in the section 2.5. (1993-1998, 1999-2002, 2003 on). The 1993-1998 period represented 100% and the two other periods were evaluated (compared with the 1993-1998 situation) according to a nature of individual selected important policy measures which came into force in the given periods. Changes followed logic of liberal (increase of the index) versus restrictive (decrease of the index) directions of the policy (for characterization of various periods see more in section 2.5.). (1993-1998=100)

Source: Taken from Drbohlav et al. 2009
Notes: *‘Opinions on foreigners’ - This index is based on results of annual opinion polls conducted by Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) and it was calculated as an average percentage of people describing their attitude towards people of various nationalities as positive (“liking”).
‘Foreigners-stocks’ - Foreigners employed in the national economy (Central Statistical Office)
‘Employment of foreigners’ - work permits (Ministry of Labour and Social Policy)
‘GDP’ - growth of gross domestic product (Central Statistical Office)
‘Unemployment’ - Changes of unemployment rates (Central Statistical Office)
‘Vacancies’ - Total number of vacant posts estimated on the basis of the annual survey (Central Statistical Office ‘Labour Demand Survey’).

Sources: Taken from Drbohlav et al. 2009
Notes:
Vacancies are the annual average of vacant positions reported to labour offices, data from 2000 (2000=100)
Unemployment rate based on LFS
Stock of foreigners includes all foreigners with long-term and permanent permits/visas, break in the data due to data corrections between the years of 2000 and 2001
GDP at current prices deflated, 2000=100
Changes of overall xenophobia in Hungary, 1993-2007, 2000=100\%, using data of figure 6.10 of the Hungarian report (TÁRKI omnibus)

\textsuperscript{23} Due to the somewhat different business cycle in Hungary the base year of the Hungarian chart has been put to the year 2000.
Chapter 6

Uncertain future of immigration in Europe: Insights from expert-based stochastic forecasts for selected countries

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1. A research paradigm for the uncertain world

One of the central methodological problems of forecasting in general and demographic forecasting in particular is how to handle the forecasting error. In population forecasting, Keilman (1990) specified several types of possible sources of errors in deterministic population forecast. If we change from thinking in terms of deterministic forecasts and forecasting errors calculated ex-post to some measure of forecasting uncertainty calculated ex-ante, as posited by the proponents of the stochastic approach, the sources of forecast errors listed by Keilman may be interpreted as the sources of uncertainty of a forecast.

Even though the methodology of migration forecasting is much less developed than the methodology of population forecasting, what clearly transpires from Bijak's (2008) study, we may attempt to create a similar, but not identical list of sources of uncertainty in migration forecasting.

The forecasts of migration are uncertain because:

1. We cannot uniquely define migration phenomenon;
2. We cannot measure migration precisely;
3. We do not know how migration depends on explanatory variables or how to quantify the relationship;
4. We do not know how migration, or the determinants of migration, will change in the future.

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1 Written by M. Kupiszewski and D. Kupiszewska.
2 In this paper, uncertainty will be understood as a state of not having enough knowledge on a process or phenomenon now or in the future.
The key problems with the definitions of international migration, but not limited to, are the lack of international harmonisation and the changes of definitions over time (cf. Kupiszewska & Nowok 2008, Nowok et al. 2006, Nowok & Kupiszewska 2005). The differences between the IDEA countries concern among others the duration of stay criterion used to determine who is included in the migration flow count. In particular, the following categories of migration flow statistics can be observed: changes of permanent residence (e.g. in Poland), long-term migration for one year or more (e.g. immigration of non-EEA citizens to the Czech Republic and Hungary), short-term and long-term migration for more than x months (e.g. 3 months in Austria), or changes of usual residence irrespective of the duration of stay (e.g. in Spain).

Second source of uncertainty is the measurement of migration. The problems related to measurement include, among others, undercoverage due to registration avoidance. This is probably the largest source of uncertainty in migration statistics (for legal flows, especially emigration) and concerns all the countries were population registers are the source of migration flow statistics. Besides, illegal migrants in the IDEA countries are usually not included in official statistics, with the exception of Spain. In France, immigration flow data are available for non-EEA citizens only while data on emigration flows are not available at all. Greece started to provide data on immigration flows to Eurostat in 2007 (data on residence permits issued in 2006). In the countries where data on total immigration flows are available, some disaggregated statistics might be missing, for example there is no data on immigration by country of previous residence in Hungary and France and no data till 2005 on immigration by citizenship to Poland. Even if such disaggregated data are produced, there is sometimes a problem of a large value in the Unknown category (e.g. a large number of immigrants with unknown country of previous residence in Austria).

Other problems are the delays in the production and publication of statistics, differences in data published in various secondary sources and the lack of relevant metadata. The numbers published in various sources may be provisional or final, may or may not include the administrative corrections, may
be produced using different methodologies, or cover different categories of migrants (Kupiszewska & Nowok 2008, Nowok et al. 2006).

In explanatory models, where migration is modelled as a function of exogenous variables, the randomness of the parameters of a forecasting model itself or uncertain relationship between the migration and exogenous variables constitute a separate source of forecast uncertainty. In addition, the problems with definitions and measurement of the exogenous variables can be very similar to those specified above with respect to migration.

Finally we have to deal with the last source of uncertainty, closely linked with the lack of knowledge of future migration processes. Migration is very volatile and can rise very quickly to extremely high levels, as migration from Poland to Germany at the turn of 1980s and 1990s or post enlargement migration from new member states to the UK and Ireland show. These changes are dictated by external factors, not usually accounted for in the forecasting models, such as wars, far going political changes and modification of migration policies. If we look back into history until 1980 and look into forecasts of migration between the European states 25 years on (around 2005), first we would have an incorrect set of states as no one at that time predicted the fall of the Soviet Union and the creation of independent Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine and Moldova, not to mention Central Asiatic Republics, dissolution of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the latter in a violent manner. Second, at that time nobody expected the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU to accept 10 new countries formerly in the communist block and such large scale flows from new to selected old EU member states after 2004. Discontinuity of demographic processes is one of the main problems for migration forecasters.

The above considerations lead us to a conclusion that, as far a migration is concerned, we live in a very uncertain world and uncertainty is a key factor shaping the development of migration processes. However, many researchers and policy makers are under the illusion that the world is predictable. In economics, Frydman and Goldberg (2007) noted in their influential book that we are unable to precisely understand and describe the future, therefore the
forecasting error is a natural phenomenon. The authors made a plea for recognizing the limitations of economic knowledge. In demography, in parallel to economics, similar thinking developed, aiming at the incorporation of the uncertainty - both as a concept and as a quantifiable variable - into research, in particular into forecasting.

Rees and Turton (1998) offered a simple classification of possible ways of dealing with uncertainty in population forecasting:

1. To ignore it, constructing a single variant population forecast and pretending that the uncertainty does not exist;
2. To incorporate it, by constructing a multi-variant population forecast (typically with a central, high and low variant);
3. To create a stochastic forecast, which allows to give some ex-ante measures of the uncertainty.

The solution to depart from deterministic population forecasts and devise a forecast where the uncertainty of the results could be somehow quantified, that is stochastic forecasts of population, has been considered for well over a decade. The methodology of such forecasts has been proposed by Lee and Tuljapurkar (1994), Lutz, Sanderson and Scherbov (1996), Alho and Spencer (1997) and many others. Stochastic forecasts have been prepared for many developed countries, but they do not belong to a standard toolkit of national statistical institutions and international organizations yet. However, the development of the new sub-field was advanced enough to allow the pioneers to write a monograph cum textbook (Alho & Spencer 2005).

Interestingly, the development of stochastic approaches in population forecasting has led to a change in the professional self-identification. Alho and Spencer (2005) describe this change in the following way: Vaupel, they say, defined a demographer as “someone who knows Lexis” [diagram]. Cohen defined a demographer as “someone who forecasts population wrong”. Finally Alho and Spencer (idem) themselves define a statistical demographer as “someone who knows Lexis, forecasts population wrong, but can at least quantify the uncertainty”. Somewhat anecdotal, this change of definition shows
the evolution of modern demography and perhaps a similar process may be observed in future in other social sciences.

The development of stochastic forecasting of population had quite limited impact on the way the components of population change have been forecasted. As Bijak (2008) demonstrated, there were some attempts at modelling and forecasting migration using probabilistic and stochastic methods, but this was not the mainstream of the existing research. Bijak (2008) proposed a new methodology, in which methods of Bayesian statistics were applied to produce forecasts of international migration flows between Germany and three European countries: Italy, Poland and Switzerland.

A similar methodology to that proposed by Bijak, extended through the application of the Delphi method to complement information on immigration reported by national statistical offices, was used in the current study. The forecasts were prepared for seven European countries: Austria, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland and Portugal. The forecasts concerned total immigration flows (nationals and foreign citizens together), except for France, where immigration of foreigners was forecasted (in line with the data availability). In all cases, the definitions used by national statistical offices in their demographic statistics were assumed. The methodology and results of this study, presented in subsequent sections of the current chapter, are described in more detail in Bijak and Wisniowski (2009).

2. Bayesian forecasting of migration – a methodological outline

2.1. Why forecast migration?

Forecasting migration is a very difficult research task for the reasons outlined above; in particular the lack of comprehensive migration theories and the lack of data, including short time series (Willekens 1994, Kupiszewski 2002). On the other hand, migration forecasts with suitable uncertainty assessments are

3 Written by A. Wisniowski and J. Bijak.
crucial for obtaining credible population predictions, as well as for other policy and planning purposes.

It has to be noted that in general the primary aim of socio-economic forecasting is not to predict the future with a 100 percent accuracy, as this is impossible. The forecasters' goal is rather to provide input to guide the political decision making process. Therefore, the key issue in the forecasting process is not to offer an (improbable) point estimate of the future values of some variables, but rather to provide a reliable, quantitative assessment of the related uncertainty span. In the current study, this was attempted by the estimation of predictive probability distributions (i.e. probability distributions of the future volumes of immigration flows). Such distributions are a way of illustrating how probable are in our view particular immigration futures.

Keeping these considerations in mind, we aimed to provide forecasts of immigration into the seven European countries in the horizon of 2025. To do it, we relied both on quantitative data and the knowledge of country-specific migration experts.

2.2. Methodology of forecasting

Willekens (1994) noted that the problems with migration predictions mentioned above call for including expert knowledge in the forecasting exercise. The methodology that allows to combine the subjective expertise and the data in a coherent and structured manner is the so-called Bayesian approach, dating back to the theorem proposed by an 18th century English statistician, Rev. Thomas Bayes (1763). This approach allows for combining expert judgements or opinions, treated as the ‘prior’ knowledge, with data.

The variables forecasted in the current study were immigration inflows, both total and from up to three most important sources of immigration (countries of previous residence or – in the case of immigration to France and Hungary - countries of citizenship). It should be noted that no harmonisation of migration data was envisaged in the project. As a result, the predictions of flows obtained
for various countries were virtually incomparable. Hence, rather than providing comparisons of the flows forecasted for different countries, we concentrated on the consistency of the forecasted immigration volumes and population stocks for a given country, within its demographic balance equation.

2.3. Statistical models

The employed statistical tools were the following simple time series models:

1) For the total immigration flows – the autoregressive model (AR) of order 1, stationary, i.e. exhibiting stable characteristics over time) and, for the sake of comparison, the so-called random walk with drift (not stationary). The models were enabled to capture the changing variability of migration (known as stochastic volatility).

2) For modelling the most important sources of immigration – vector autoregressive (VAR) models of order 1 were applied to log-ratio transformed variables, ensuring the summation of the shares to the total.

3) Additionally, for assessing the impact of the selected demographic and economic variables, the VAR models of order 1 were used.

In general, the AR models assume that the number of immigrants in a given year depends on their number one year before and some purely random change that reflects all the uncertainty (on average this change is assumed to be zero). It can be shown that in an AR process the number of immigrants in a given year is a sum of all these random components from the very beginning of the process (in practice it is the first observation in the series). This specification allows us to describe three different patterns of behaviour: stationary, non-stationary (random walk) and explosive.

In the case of a stationary AR process, the older the random component, the less influence it has on today’s immigration flow. Then the expected value of the immigration flow is constant, which means that the process is on average stable in time. Any shock (e.g. radical liberalisation of the immigration policy) will change the number of immigrants only temporarily (say, for a few years), and in the long-run this number will return to the average observed before the
shock. Hence, the forecasting based on a AR model is relatively precise. The addition of a trend term (e.g. linear, logistic or logarithmic) allows to introduce increasing (or decreasing) deterministic tendency, along which the process develops.

In a random walk model (which is a special case of AR), all random components have equal influence on today’s value. As a result, the process is non-stationary, which means that it is unstable in time and the precision with which we are able to predict the number of immigrants is getting smaller with the forecasting horizon (e.g. such a model may be used to describe the situation where we are unable to predict the behaviour of immigration flows after the liberalisation of the policy in the long-run). A drift term (i.e. a constant value added in each step) introduces increasing (or decreasing) tendency, along which these characteristics hold.

The last possibility (as far as AR models are concerned) is the ‘explosion’ of the process under study. In this scheme, the more distant are the past changes, the more influence they have today. In the current application, this would lead to the number of immigrants growing exponentially, achieving very large values. After some period of time, the predicted values would become simply implausible.

Finally, the vector autoregressive (VAR) models are multi-dimensional generalisations of the AR model, including not only the variable of interest (here: migration flow or share of flow from a specified country), but also other variables, such as the considered migration determinants or shares of flow from other countries. In the VAR models the potential instantaneous and lagged relationships among all the variables under study are analysed jointly.

2.4. Prior expert knowledge elicitation

The prior knowledge, a very important element of analysis in the Bayesian framework, was obtained by means of a Delphi survey from country-specific
migration experts selected by the national teams participating in the IDEA project.

The Delphi survey is a technique that allows for the acquiring of the anonymous opinions and judgements of the respondents and provides a ground for reaching an informed consensus among them. Originally, the usual applications of the Delphi survey concerned forecasting. In the current study we used it as a pool for obtaining the expert knowledge that served only as a part of the input to the model that produced the forecasts. One of the most important characteristic of the Delphi is that the answers are obtained iteratively. After each round the anonymised statistical summary of the preceding round is provided to the respondents. In the consecutive rounds they can reformulate their judgements and views and reach an agreement.

There are two major concerns that require attention during the preparation of the Delphi survey: the proper formulation of the questions and the selection of the experts. The questions should account for the hints provided by the cognitive psychology, so as to ensure the correct interpretation and unambiguous answers. Apart from this problem, in the current study the two additional problems were identified.

Firstly, the questions concerned the characteristics of the immigration processes, which were then transformed to the characteristics of the models that served as a forecasting tool. It could have been a case, however, that the underlying model of the expert, which led her or him to such an opinion, has been different, what could have caused inconsistencies. The second issue relates to the survey questions concerning subjective probabilities. The literature on the subject (see e.g. Kadane & Wolfson 1998 or Rowe & Wright 2001) points out that the respondents tend to perceive probabilities as frequencies, they are also overconfident with respect to their beliefs and thus provide too narrow uncertainty spans. Inconsistent answers may be given to differently formulated questions. Another issue is that the group of experts can comprise specialists usually not trained in the statistics and hence not familiar with the terms and concepts used for the model formulation.
As far as the selection of the experts is concerned, it is required that their joint knowledge should be heterogeneous and embrace the whole domain of the problem. The group of experts should not be too numerous nor too small. Usually it should be from 5 to 20 experts (Armstrong 1985, Rowe & Wright 2001).

The anonymous survey in the current exercise comprised of two stages. Answers were obtained from between 6 and 14 experts per country. The survey was addressed to experts with various professional backgrounds, from demography, economics and sociology, through political science and law, to public administration and thus ensuring the heterogeneity of their joint knowledge on migration. The questions concerned the characteristics of the immigration processes in the period 2007-2025, namely the trend, type of the process and its variability, and the uncertainty of the process behaviour in the future. The experts were also asked about the impact of economic variables (GDP per capita growth and unemployment rate in the receiving country) and demographic variables (natural population growth rate and share of the productive-age population in the receiving country) on immigration. Additionally, they identified three (in case of Poland two) most important sources of immigration to their countries in the future.

The answers were transformed to a form required by the model (e.g. expressed as prior probability distributions or deterministic trends) and then combined with the data on immigration flows produced by the national statistical institutions (mostly available in the Eurostat database) in order to produce forecasts.

3. Bayesian forecasting of immigration – results

The focal point of the interpretation of the Bayesian forecasting results is the assessment of the modification to the prior expectations formulated in the subjective expert knowledge, by the quantitative and objective, yet still flawed, data.
As far as the underlying model for the forecasting is concerned, the data gave clear preference to the non-stationary and thus hardly predictable random walk process in most of the countries. This conclusion is in line with some other studies (for more discussion see e.g. Pijpers 2008).

The predictions are presented in terms of central tendencies (medians) with uncertainty spans, which are based on symmetric quintiles of the predictive distributions. Hence, the 50-percent ranges are based on the predictive quartiles (lower and upper), the 80-percent ranges on the quintiles of rank 0.1 and 0.9, and the 90-percent ranges on the quintiles of rank 0.05 and 0.95. These uncertainty assessments reflect our beliefs, based on the expert knowledge and statistical data, that the future migration inflow will fall in a given interval with a pre-defined probability. Especially note that the probability of migration not being higher than the upper values of the 50-percent, 80-percent and 90-percent intervals, equals respectively 0.75, 0.90 and 0.95.

3.1. Forecasting total immigration flows

An example of a quintile-based ex-ante assessments of the predictive uncertainty for Poland and Italy are illustrated in Figure 1. The forecasts for Italy are characterised by relatively large uncertainty. The median expectations of immigration flows follow the past increasing tendency: from 305 thousand in 2005, through 370 thousand in 2016, to 434 thousand in 2025. Broad 50-percent intervals indicate large uncertainty of the expected future flows. The upper bound amounts to 839 thousand people in 2016 and 1.4 million in 2025. These values should be judged as barely plausible. Hence, we advise the forecast users to treat such extreme values only as an indication of the orders of magnitude. There are two main reasons for such high uncertainty: firstly, the steadily increasing inflows of immigrants in the past, secondly, the prior input to the models based on the experts' anticipations of the explosive patterns of the future immigration to Italy. These factors, together with the data that were affected by the regularisations in the past, lead to the conclusion that these

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4 Written by A. Wisniowski and J. Bijak.
outcomes should be seen as an indication of the extremely high level of uncertainty of the future immigration inflows.

As compared with Italy, the flows forecasted for Poland are relatively moderate and stable. Predictive median tendency indicates an increase in the permanent immigration to Poland from the initial 15 thousand people in 2007, through 28 thousand in 2016, to 53 thousand people in 2025. The 50-percent intervals are relatively narrow, yet showing an increasing predictive uncertainty: from between 16 and 54 thousand people forecasted to immigrate in 2016, and between 21 and 158 thousand in 2025.

The forecasts for the rest of the countries are presented in Figure 3 (on the left-hand side). The general conclusion is that the immigration flows are expected to increase in all the countries (in terms of the median variant). As far as the uncertainty is concerned, while it is growing over time in all the cases, its magnitude differs among countries. The widest uncertainty spans are observed for Austria, the Czech Republic and Italy, whereas the narrowest ones were obtained for France and Hungary. In all the cases (including Italy and Poland), with the exception of Portugal, the expert knowledge increased the uncertainty of the forecasts. This result may stem from the fact that the experts have the knowledge about the past events not reflected in the data, and based on it, they formulate their opinions and judgements concerning the future, increasing merely data-based uncertainty.
Figure 1. Immigration to Italy and Poland.

Note: the frame indicates a 10-year forecast horizon
Source: Data until 2006 (Italy) or 2007 (Poland): Eurostat and NSIs with own recalculations; forecast: own computations

3.2. Forecasts for the most important migration directions

Figure 2 presents examples of median forecasts of cumulative source country shares (here, cumulative shares of migrants from the main countries of previous residence in the total immigration), again for Italy and Poland. For the sake of clarity of the presentation, the uncertainty spans were omitted here. However, the predictive uncertainty of the shares appeared to be so high, that the analysis of different combinations of quintile-based predictions became meaningless. The forecasted numbers of migrants coming from the main source countries are conditional on the median values of the predicted shares (presented in Figure 2) and overall immigration volumes (presented in Figure 1).

For Italy, the three most important countries of origin of immigrants were Romania, Albania and Morocco. The available data series were very short, covering only ten years (1995–2004). In the last observation year, out of the
total registered inflow of 415 thousand people 15% came from Romania (64 thousand), 9% from Albania (37 thousand) and 7% from Morocco (31 thousand). According to the median forecasts, the share of inflow from Morocco is envisaged to remain stable at just below 8% throughout the forecast horizon, which would correspond to 28 thousand immigrants in 2015 and 34 thousand in 2025. At the same time, the share of inflows from Romania would rapidly decline to about 10% and remain relatively constant, while the one from Albania – stabilise just around 12% starting from 2008. In absolute terms, however, these inflows would follow an increasing tendency: from Romania to 38 thousand people in 2015 and 45 thousand in 2025, and from Albania to 44 and 52 thousand people in the same years.

For Poland, two most important directions of future inflows were identified by the experts: Ukraine (immigration) and the United Kingdom (return migration). In 2007, out of 15 thousand immigrants newly registered for permanent residence, 777 people (5%) came from Ukraine and 3.9 thousand (26%) from the UK. The median forecasts, prepared on the basis of the 1990–2007 data, indicate that the share of immigrants from Ukraine would first increase to 10% already in 2008 and to over 11% in 2013, only to decline below 10% in 2016 and ultimately to 6% in 2025. The return migration from the UK would follow a similar pattern: from below 15% in 2008, through a peak over 18% in 2014, below 17% in 2016, down to below 10% in 2025. Both these trajectories are a result of including in the forecast a trend suggested by experts in the survey. The shares for 2016 would correspond to 2.8 thousand immigrants from Ukraine and 4.8 thousand return migrants from the United Kingdom, among 28.2 thousand immigrants altogether. For 2025, the respective numbers would equal 3.3 thousand for Ukraine and 5.1 thousand for the UK, out of the total of 53.1 thousand permanent immigrants in total.

Figure 3 (right-hand side) presents the forecasts of cumulative source country shares for the other countries. As mentioned before, the predictive uncertainty was too large to draw any meaningful conclusions upon it. The forecasted shares are in line with the tendencies indicated by the experts. For instance, in Austria the future shares of immigrants arriving from ex-Yugoslavian countries
and from Turkey are expected to increase. For France, an increase of the share of Chinese citizens is foreseen, so as the share of citizens of Serbia and Montenegro in the inflows to Hungary.

3.3. Impact of economic and demographic variables

The analysis of the impact of additional economic and demographic variables shows a rather clear pattern. Firstly, the two macroeconomic covariates considered (GDP growth rate and unemployment rate in the receiving country) appeared to have hardly any influence on migration, even when the data were supported with the expert judgement. The only exceptions concern the economic growth in France (instantaneous impact) and Portugal (one-year time lag). A tentative conclusion might be that available data in general do not allow for a formal inference on the interrelations between immigration and its two most important (e.g. according to Jennissen 2004) economic determinants.

The impact of the two demographic variables (the natural population growth rate and the share of the productive-age population in the destination country) was significant in most of the cases, except for Portugal. For Austria, the significance concerned the lagged share of the productive-age population only, while for the five remaining countries various combinations of lagged and/or instantaneous influence of both demographic covariates was found. A tentative conclusion might indicate some role of the two demographic factors in shaping immigration flows.

Despite the explanatory potential of the demographic migration determinants under study, the conditional forecasts yielded on their basis remain unsatisfactory from the decision-making point of view. In the cases with the “best” test results (France and Italy), the forecasts very quickly reach implausible values with very high uncertainty spans. Hence, it seems that even if there is significant impact of the demographic covariates, the price to pay for including them in the forecasts can be extremely high predictive uncertainty.
Moreover, in many cases, despite the significant impact of the variables on migration inflows, the interpretation of the model parameters was counterintuitive. This means that the positive outcomes of significance tests alone do not guarantee reliable scenario-based predictions, and that the latter need to be treated with utmost caution.
Figure 3. Immigration (left) and cumulative source country shares (right), for Austria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary and Portugal.

Note: the frame indicates a 10-year forecast horizon (left), the blue vertical lines – the end of the data (right); codes: BR - Brazil, CN - China, CS - Serbia and Montenegro, CV - Cape Verde, DE - Germany, ex-YU – former Yugoslavia, GW - Guinea Bissau, MA - Morocco, RO - Romania, SK - Slovakia, TR - Turkey, UA - Ukraine, VN – Vietnam, Rest – rest of the world.

Source: Eurostat and NSIs with own recalculations; forecast: own computations
4. Conclusions\textsuperscript{5}

The outcomes of the IDEA forecasting exercise can be summarised as follows (for details, see Bijak & Wisniowski 2009). Firstly, migration appears to be a hardly predictable demographic process, which is strongly in accordance with some other research (see e.g. Pijpers 2008). Moreover, assuming stationarity of immigration, while it is in fact a non-stationary variable, seems faulty from the methodological point of view, as it can bring about very serious forecast errors and lead the forecast users astray. A recent, spectacular example is the study prepared for the British Home Office (Dustmann et al. 2003), in which stationarity of the underlying model was assumed explicitly (idem). The forecasted volumes of immigrants to the United Kingdom after the 2004 European Union enlargement were underestimated by over an order of magnitude (cf. IPPR 2008).

Secondly, precise forecasting of the exact values of immigration flows is virtually impossible, especially in the light of the above. However, the predictive uncertainty can be taken into account by using the stochastic approach (Keilman 1990, Lutz et al. 2004). The randomness can be quantified and expressed in the probabilistic terms. It should be stressed that the stochastic methodology of migration forecasting does not impact the character of the process itself. It just addresses the fact that migration is difficult to predict. Consequently, the use of deterministic models is not a solution. Without an appropriate warning, it merely blurs the picture, giving the forecast users and decision makers an untrue impression that migration can be predicted.

As to the subjective prior information obtained using the Delphi survey, which served as an input to the forecasting models in the current study, its impact on the final outcome was diverse. As far as the estimation of the model parameters is concerned, especially with respect to the precision of the forecasts, the expert knowledge appeared to play a very important role. Nonetheless, the model selection and thus the determination of the very nature of the process seemed to be almost unaffected by the experts' beliefs. Given

\textsuperscript{5} Written by A. Wisniowski and J. Bijak.
the prevailing selection of random walk models, often independently from the experts expectations, we argue that the uncertain and barely predictable character of migration flows is not just a characteristic of a particular forecasting model, but an immanent and general feature of migration. This implies, again confirming some earlier suggestions (e.g., Holzer 1959, Keyfitz 1981), that migration should be forecasted for a relatively short period, encompassing five to ten years at the most. The uncertainty of the predicted migration flows is growing over time, mainly due to its non-stationary characteristic. The usage of the horizons of more than a decade ahead will lead to very broad uncertainty spans, which will constitute a meaningless piece of information for the policy makers.

Finally, the impact of migration covariates proved to be difficult to detect. Due to the shortness of the time series and hardly predictable nature of migration itself, the impact of the economic variables was very limited, if any. On the other hand, even despite the significant impact of the demographic covariates, in many cases the counter-intuitive signs of the parameter estimates and resulting meaningless forecasts render the interpretation of the outcome at least dubious. It should be borne in mind that these results may stem from the usage of the flawed and short series of data, or from a narrow scope of measures chosen for the study. Moreover, the uncertainty of the forecasts had at least three sources: the uncertainty of the migration processes, the uncertainty of the covariates and the uncertainty of the mechanisms of interactions and interrelations among them. These outcomes support earlier suppositions that additional, theory-based determinants of migration, although extremely helpful in explaining the processes ex post, are of very limited use when it comes to forecasting (cf. Kupiszewski 2002). The results of the current study seem to indicate that demographic factors play a significant role in shaping migration processes, but at the same time they fail to contribute to more meaningful and precise migration forecasts, even despite the very important support of expert judgement.

The most important implication of the above conclusions for the forecast users is that the migration is indeed uncertain. This may be seen as an undesirable
feature. However, the degree of the uncertainty can be quantified and evaluated using the statistical data, additionally enhanced by the expert knowledge. Such an assessment is itself an important piece of information for the decision makers. Migration forecasts, such as the ones presented in the current study, may serve as a basis for the decisions of the policy makers. Their actions will strongly depend on the nature, objectives and constraints of a particular decision problem, as well as their preferences and views. The proper assessment of the consequences of the possible underestimation or overestimation of the future migration flows is crucial. The central tendency (median) trajectories, well-suited only for problems where an underestimation of future migration would be associated with the same costs as an overestimation by the same amount, may not work well with other decision tasks, or other subjective priorities of the decision makers. In some cases, the underestimation of future migration inflows will be more costly than its overestimation, as for example in assigning budgets to migrant integration programmes. Then, it would seem rational to use the above-median variants, in order to “stay on the safe side”. In other examples, overestimation can be more problematic, as in the case of the inflows required to fill the local labour market shortages. In such cases, the use of below-median forecast variants as input in the decision making process is recommended. Irrespective of the selection, the predictive uncertainty has to be always kept in mind. It should be emphasised that the solution that definitely has to be avoided is just taking the median (or any other) trajectories and treating them as universal, deterministic predictions – they will (almost) surely never come true.

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Policy recommendations based on the IDEA project

Magdalena Lesinska

1. The logic of policy recommendations in the IDEA project

The main aim of the IDEA project has been to improve our understanding of the past and present of migration processes in Europe, their logic and consequences for policy developments.

The assumption is that among the main drivers having an impact on migration processes, such as labour market, development gap, demographic factor or international situation, a state’s migration policy is one of the most influential. In other words, there is an idea that human flows could be (obviously, to some extent) regulated through political measures (Boswell 2007, Cornelius et al. 2004, Hollifield 2000).

Every immigration country has its own unique peculiarity. What distinguishes one from the other is history and tradition of immigration, qualitative and quantitative characteristics of inflows, and also the way of how the state reacts to entries and settlement of newcomers. Moreover, every country is part of a regional, European and a worldwide migration system; therefore not only does the national milieu have to be taken into account in the formation of migration regime, but also a wider international context should be considered (Lahav 2004).

Although patterns of immigration in Western, Southern and Eastern Europe are hardly comparable in a direct way, all the countries experience similar challenges and face the same dilemmas related to controlling, managing and integration of immigrants. Exchanging the national experiences via better knowledge and understanding of history and an internal logic of immigration cycle, which every country is passing through, is one of the most important
aims of the IDEA project. Policy recommendations formulated below are mainly based on the content of final products of the IDEA: Policy Briefs, National and Regional Reports, and Working Papers prepared by eleven teams partaking in the project\(^1\).

1.1. Background of formulation of migration policy

Formulation of migration policy requires first and foremost the conceptualisation of a state’s interests related to immigration. It means submitting a set of key questions and finding a commonly accepted response to at least some of them:

- Does the state need or does not need immigration (and if so why)?
- What kind of immigration is needed?
- How to encourage the desired inflows and how to restrain undesired ones?
- How to deal with the immigrants who have already been in the country?

Political recommendations are formulated mostly for policymakers (representing, generally speaking, the state’s government and administration); therefore the centre of gravity is put on the state and its functions. The recommendations proposed in the IDEA project, as a result of the thorough analysis of migration processes in 9 countries representing three European parts of diversified maturity in the European immigration cycle, concern migration policy and managing of human mobility. Immigrants, however, are not one consistent group. On the contrary, in the literature many typologies describing particular migrating groups could be found. To make some order in analysing the logic and content of recommendations addressed to migration policy, generally it could be said that there are two main groups of immigrants requiring a state’s activity:

\(^1\) All of IDEA Policy Briefs and Working Papers are available at IDEA project website: www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl
• potential (expected) immigrants; including two different types: desired (those who the state wants to come) and undesired (those ones who the state does not want to come).

• real migrants (who have already come); including two different types: wanted (those who the state wants to stay) and unwanted (those who the state does not want to stay).

These two groups require different approaches from states. To the first group mechanisms of encouraging (such as special entry and recruitment schemes) or discouraging (strict visa policy, restrictive rules of admission to labour market) are introduced. Subsequently, the second group is also treated differently, according to the state’s categorisation who is wanted and who is unwanted (which is always very questionable); the first type is encouraged to stay, and the second one - to leave the country.

To sum up, the main aim of migration policy could be very shortly characterised as regulating and controlling international migration flows according to the state’s interests. These are the imperative in the formulation of migration policy. However, it would be incomplete without taking into account points of view and interests of other actors taking part in the whole process: immigrants themselves as well as transit or sending countries.

Following this line of argumentation, at least three main concerns should be pointed out here as guidelines in migration policy development:

• interests of the state versus interests of immigrants,

• interests of the state versus the interests of other political entities, such as neighbouring countries, source countries, the EU; moreover, the ability of the state to manage migration flows has always been limited and conditioned by many factors which are independent and uncontrollable by the state, such as political crisis or war and mass asylum inflows as its consequence).

• idealism versus pragmatism; which is especially noticeable in the case of asylum policy or integration policy, then the consensus
between the so called human rights approach and a line of practicality (represented usually by policymakers) is sometimes difficult to achieve.

These represent also a kind of dilemmas which policymakers have to confront, but also could be treated as a rationale for migration policy formation.

1.2. Immigration as a challenge

There are some commonalities within the logic lying behind migration policy in every country, regardless of the level of maturity already reached. All of destination countries have to face and be confronted with the same challenges related to immigration. Taking into account their character, they could be described as pre- and post-immigration challenges.

The pre-immigration challenges are related to the immigrant group described above as a potential one. These reflect the state’s interests related to labour market needs, economic development, demographic situation, etc. Policymakers attempt to respond to these challenges by implementing effective ways of admission and recruitment of selected groups, such as high-skilled or seasonal workers. The pre-immigration challenges concern also undesired migration inflows (first and foremost irregular ones) and state’s retort in stricter border controlling.

Subsequently, post-immigration challenges expose direct and indirect results of immigrants’ being and functioning in the labour market and social life of a destination country. Integration policy is a priority here to counteract discrimination, marginalization, social exclusion of new comers, as well as weak social cohesion, ethnic and cultural tensions, irregular employment of immigrants, etc.
1.3. On the way toward mature migration policy

Following the migration cycle concept that particular countries move forward from emigration to immigration states by passing different stages towards the final - “mature” one, and migration policy is one of the main drivers of this process, the question arises: what does mature migration policy mean today? And taking it as a final goal, what could “younger” countries - being at a primary stage on the way towards maturity - learn from the “older” and more experienced ones?

Following the traditional approach, the ideal policy should be:

- predictive and well planned (based on a widely accepted long-term strategy defining the state’s interests, and aims to be achieved via migration policy),
- well organized (supported by a legal framework as a normative basis and an appropriate bureaucratic structure which should ensure successful implementation),
- rational (based on the thorough analysis of all available sources and data as well as experience of other countries), and, what is the greatest challenge,
- efficient (there should be a consistency between intended objectives and final outcomes of migration policy).

It is a difficult task (possible at all?) to evaluate migration policy according to those ideal characteristics. From more practical point of view, a basic condition seems to be more important, namely, weather migration policy corresponds well to the actual state of affairs and if the demand for the state’s intervention in regulating migration flows is met sufficiently.

2. Overview of policy recommendations

Taking into account the thesis that migration cycle is also a cycle of influencing by teaching and learning process, the key question is what the
countries, being at different stages of development, could learn from each other?

2.1. General lessons from Western and Southern countries

Immigration is an unavoidable and indispensable phenomenon, mostly for demographic and economic reasons. However, there are two different perspectives of treating immigration - as a solution (to economic or demographic needs) and as a problem (as a threat to social cohesion, national identity, security and welfare system). Depending on which perspective of looking at immigration prevails, it influences the way of how migration policy is formulated.

**The economic imperative rules migration policy.** It dictates not only the way the state reacts, but also if this reaction takes place at all. As Mirjana Morokvasic notices, “most workers arrived not via the official recruitment channels, but as tourists, as workers under “nominal contracts”, and the authorities closed their eyes as long as the workers responded to the immediate needs of the labour market” (IDEA Policy Brief France).

Growing importance of demography argument. Immigration is necessary to stabilise labour force and population size in times of negative natural growth, low fertility, and in consequence, ageing and shrinking society. It is not a time for a question if we need immigrants at all, but what type and how many.

Priority for qualified immigrants and demand-oriented proactive migration policy as result of common awareness of competition for “qualified, talented and motivated” immigrants (IDEA Policy Brief Austria). At the same time “attracting the best should not be to the detriment of the countries of origin, depriving them of their “brains” neither should it imply “de-skilling”, non recognition or inadequate recognition of the credentials and know-how of immigrants” (IDEA Policy Brief France).
Integration has to be treated as an issue of main concern. Immigration has to be accepted as a permanent process, not as a temporary phenomenon, but with long-term consequences, leading very often to settlement. The number of immigrants who have stayed in France, according to various sources and in different historical periods, is estimated at between 50 to 60%. It means that for approximately 40-60% of immigrants, temporary migration has transformed into long-term settlement (IDEA Policy Brief France). It required offering “a clear life perspective for immigrants” from the destination country (IDEA Policy Brief Austria). Moreover, integration activities should be addressed not only to regular migrants, but also to irregular ones, who are the most vulnerable to social exclusion and marginalization (free access to basic health care services, education for minor children, irrespectively of their legal status, should be provided) (IDEA Policy Brief Spain and Italy).

Controlling quantity of immigrants. Migration policy should define upper limits for immigration for certain periods of time; these limits depend on economic needs and social acceptance of immigrants (IDEA Policy Brief Austria).

The interdependence between more restrictive policy and less immigration is not truthful. Example of Western countries is clear evidence that restrictive policy is largely ineffective and “transforms migration flows into business opportunities for traffickers and smugglers. Illegal entries have not been stopped in spite of the measures taken – rather migrants tend to rely more and more on professional intermediaries” (IDEA Policy Brief France).

Immigration as well as migration policy need certain social acceptance of native population. Information policy and a broad public debate to achieve societal consensus is necessary.

Irregular immigration and illegal employment require a complex approach and tackling root causes. Effective promotion of channels for
legal immigration is required in order to cope with economic demand as well as to counteract the extent of irregular inflows.

A few key issues enumerated above will be presented in detail in a further section of the paper.

3. Three main questions constituting the pillars of migration policy

**Question One:** *How to manage labour migration? Searching for more flexible and effective admission rules and recruitment schemes*

Immigration represents a long-term solution to labour and skill needs in a national economy and, at the same time, supports a state’s development. The main challenge could be formulated as follows: how to design the policy recognizing the real demand of labour market for foreign labour and matching the demand with immigration flows. This dilemma is also highly discussed at the EU level\(^2\).

As it was mentioned, in all the countries there has been a demand, though of varying degree, for short-term labour migration. This type of immigrants enters the country for limited period of time to fulfil labour shortages resulting usually from the economic growth. As it was described by Heinz Fassmann and Ursula Reeger analysing the case of Western countries, “foreign workers were supposed to behave like spinning tops on the domestic labour market. They should come and go, if possible alone and without families, and be very flexible both occupationally and geographically. This would bring maximum benefits to Austrian and German businesses while relieving society from fundamental questions of integration, which were inevitable when labour migrants began to settle” (IDEA Working Paper 3). However, the situation when circular and short-term type immigration transforms into settlement is usually out of state’s control; an example of Western countries in the 60s and 70s showed it very convincingly.

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In time, several mechanisms have been designed and implemented for legal recruitment: quota systems (definition of labour quotas per economic sector followed by the process of granting of work visas), point system, or shortage lists. All of them have, however, some limits and questionable efficiency.

The common recommendation which occurs in all the cases analysed is a call for effective monitoring of labour market to overcome mismatches between market demand and state regulations. The system of monitoring should be well grounded institutionally (not pending on the political cycle), cohesive in tasks, effective regarding the flow of information between partners/institutions involved, multi-level and systematic. The most important aim of that system would focus not only on the monitoring of the demand for a foreign labour force in terms of its dynamics of inflow, scale and structure, but mostly on the fluctuations of foreigners' presence in the labour market and the role of foreign workers: whether they complement or substitute the domestic labour. It requires therefore an adequate, up-to-date and detailed database regarding the shortages and consequently the demand for foreign workers. The system of monitoring should include all sectors of the labour market, also domestic services.

However, as the example of the Southern European countries confirms, it is a key but not sufficient activity. The main weakness of recruitment system is that procedures to hire an immigrant are too complex and time-consuming (these last usually few months), which is unacceptable for seasonal employment in agriculture or small companies, where quick and flexible rules of entry and recruitment are necessary. Additionally, there is an obligation of checking on the availability of the local workforce (to protect local workers), which also prolongs the time of recruitment and makes the system more restrictive and inflexible; thus some employers prefer an easier option and employ the workers irregularly.

Again, the Southern countries' experiences are worth presenting here. The nominal request system introduced in the mid 1980s in Spain and Italy
occurred to be unsuccessful. In Greece the invitation scheme was implemented since 1991 (“allowing immigrants to work in Greece, for a specific employer and for specific type of work, only if there is an available position for them which cannot be filled by the Greek labour force or the immigrant labour force that already resides in Greece” (IDEA Working Paper 9) and also was criticised for its restrictiveness. Similarly, systems based in labour market quotas (introduced as a pioneering solution, a system of annual quotas for economic migrants at all skill levels) implemented since 1990s in Southern countries (such as the “programmed number”, or *numero programmato* in Italy or *contingente* in Spain) have never worked properly as effective labour channels.

Quota system was also criticised: “The large number of immigrants working in the low-paid, low-skilled segments of the labour market in Italy are meeting a demand for labour that the quota system has difficulty in quantifying. This means that the demand for labour is underestimated specifically as regards the new migration flows, and so the maximum quota for annual entries is also underestimated. (…) Considering also that the directions and dimensions of the new immigration flows are constantly changing, any predetermined estimate of the maximum quotas for new entries, used as a tool in planning and managing the flows, must take into account various new factors, and so the quota should be a flexible instrument that can be corrected as and when it is necessary.” (IDEA Working Paper 5)

The lesson from attempts to create the effective recruitment system could be summarised as follows: “Taking all these labour immigration policies together, it is clear that their degree of restrictiveness and their complex administrative requirements were unable to deal with the high labour demand and vast immigrant supply, thus being incapable of regulating inflows and limiting irregular immigration. Moreover, it was the cause of the continuity and large volume of irregular inflows” (IDEA Working Paper 9). There is no ideal system; serious loopholes could be found in each of them. Employers officially recruit foreign workers and declare hiring them in a particular occupation and then employ them in other activities once the recruitment
procedure has been concluded. What is also worth noticing is that very often the legal channels of entry have served to legalise irregular migrants already staying in the country, instead of being a measure to recruit new immigrants.

To overcome the above mentioned weaknesses and to improve the system of legal recruitment, some recent initiatives are worth being presented here.

1. The list of vacant positions. In Spain to make the recruitment easier, every three months a list (Catalogo de trabajos de dificil cobertura – Catalogue of Hard-to-fill Positions) is released. It contains information on the positions which are not filled by available workers (nationals or citizens of other EU countries). The system allows an employer looking to fill a vacancy listed in this catalogue to start a recruitment procedure immediately. Then the system allows for “eluding the priority check of the labour market and represents, thus, a step forward in the conception of workable immigration policies” (IDEA Policy Brief Spain).

2. The system of entry visa for “job search” (Portugal and Spain). The aim of this type of visa is to promote a further flexibilisation of the recruitment procedures. However, the possibility to apply for such a visa is limited to a certain number of employment sectors, like the domestic one. However, the visa for job search (according to Spanish experts) still has a symbolic character as it has been issued to a very limited number of immigrants since its introduction.

3. “Global contingent” of labour needs (the report of total labour needs, published every year) introduced in 2007 in Portugal. The system includes the announcement of job vacancies abroad and the subsequent issuance of visas. “This new framework represents an attempt to improve and make effective the issuance of residence and temporary visas for work purposes. Foreign citizens have direct access to job offers through the IEFP website, and there is also the possibility of a direct contact between the potential candidates and the recruiters” (IDEA Working Paper 9). Quota regulations
need to be flexible and open for modification according to the necessities of the labour market during a year.

4. Recruitment schemes based on bilateral agreements with sending countries to establish an effective system of providing long- or short-term workers to the national labour market by specialised agencies.

**Question Two:** How to tackle irregular immigration? Controlling, regularisation and addressing root causes.

In all the countries, though to a different extent, irregular immigration has become a structural feature of migration regimes and represents one of the most important challenges for national governments. What system factors rooted in the state’s regime reinforce irregular migration? The conclusion from the analyses made in the IDEA project is clear in this matter - the most important are: the existence of shadow economy and the common acceptance for its existence, the lack of or too restrictive legal entry and recruitment procedures, weak administration structure, the ineffective system of labour market controlling, and the lack of transparent scheme of regularisation.

Taking into account migration history, the best case to analyse the problem of irregular immigration are Southern countries. From the 1980s there has been a dynamic increase in immigration flows to these countries. Although the demand for foreign workers was recognised by the state, the legislation did not reflect this trend and still was characterised by “a high degree of restrictiveness and inflexibility that hampered an effective programming of the flows” (IDEA Working Paper 9). Awkward admission rules together with weak external controls, a large scale of informal economy (according to recent estimates around 20 percent of GDP, in Greece even 28 percent) and common social acceptance of informal employment - all of those factors have contributed to a growing number of irregulars in Southern European countries.
Special attention should be given here to the role of informal economy which serves as a magnet for irregular employment; its relatively large size and a specific structure facilitate immigrants’ flexibility and “invisibility” in the labour market. The attraction of unregistered employment is strengthened by societal acceptance, relatively high non-salary costs of work and time-consuming and complex administration procedures in the case of an attempt to register. Moreover the size of shadow economy goes along with the weakness of labour market controls.

Irregular immigration is also one of the unintended consequences of too restrictive immigration policies. As the case of Italy and other Mediterranean countries shows clearly, when a rather open system of entries has become restricted (it happened under the pressure of Western European countries which perceived Southern states as the backdoors for the entry flows), and there is the demand for foreigners’ work, more and more immigrants start to use illegal ways to access the territory and the labour market. The lesson is that if the entry channels for the labour migration underestimate the real needs of the national economy, irregular migration increases.

There is a well known catalogue of the state’s activities undertaken against irregularity in migration. They could be divided into external (border controls, cooperation with countries of origin) and internal (labour market controls, regularisation).

The role and problems with effective border controlling (especially in the case of Spain, Greece and Italy) are well known. However, they cannot be separated from an active presence in the countries of origin and operating cooperation with their institutions. The case of Southern countries shows clearly that a traditional approach, based on the priority of strict control of external borders, has been modified as a result of its visible inefficiency and complete with an overlapping priority of cooperation with neighbouring countries that are important sending or transit countries.
The lesson which should be considered as especially valuable is the role of bilateral agreements with sending countries. They represent condition *sine qua non* for reducing irregular immigration successfully. The state should provide a legal alternative to illegal entries; through bilateral agreements privileged entry quotas could be offered as a compensation for the introduction of the visa system. Bilateral agreements, as the Spanish example shows, has to be connected with broader public campaigns against irregular migration as well as with the formation of the institutional framework of interstate cooperation (e.g. working groups with relevant authorities of destination and sending countries). In 2006 the Spanish government introduced a two-year Africa-Plan; its objective has been to create a close cooperation system with several African countries to achieve an effective management of the migration flows from Africa to Europe. The recent initiative of the Portuguese government to open the “Support Centre for Migrants in the Sending Country” in Cape Verde is also a good example. Practice shows also that bilateral agreements are a precondition for effective expulsion processes (most of the executed expulsions in Spain have been carried out via readmission agreements) as well as voluntary returns\(^3\).

Immigration issue should be an integral and significant part of neighbouring policy at the national and the EU levels. Close cooperation between Mediterranean EU countries and Northern Africa Region on migration issue, within the framework of the EU neighbourhood policy, could be seen as a good practice here. The immigration issue should be also high on the political agenda in the case of the Eastern EU policy of neighbourhood. It could be a task for Polish policymakers to identify a common Eastern policy as a priority of its Presidency in 2011, including the migration issue in it.

Another important activity is *internal controlling of the labour market*. In recent years in all the countries analysed, the number of inspections has increased significantly as a relevant activity against informal employment. Its

\(^3\) See also very recently adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals.
effectiveness is questionable, though, especially in the case of sectors traditionally recognized as immigrants’ niches (agriculture, petty trade, and especially domestic work). It is implausible indeed that any country could effectively regulate these sectors through labour inspections. In Southern countries an interesting shift towards somewhat different incentives could be noticed; for instance, a tax relief for those who employ officially a babysitter or caregiver for an elderly person, introduction of flexible insurance schemes for cleaners, construction workers and domestic servants who have more than one employer. “They are able to register with the dependent employee welfare fund under special conditions and hence both have affordable insurance and retain their legal migration status” (Comparative Report of Southern Countries). These solutions could lead to the emergence of this sector out of the shadow economy. Labour market inspections should be also accompanied by wide public campaigns against informal work (IDEA Policy Briefs Spain and Greece).

Regularisation programmes have become a measure used regularly by Southern countries (even if every subsequent regularisation programme has been presented as an exceptional “one –time-only” remedy). “The lack of efficient recruitment procedures turned regularisations into the most useful way to “repair” a posteriori the structural mismatches” in migration policy (IDEA Working Paper 9).

The structural weaknesses of regularisation processes are evident in the Southern case. A high recognition rate is not reflected in the success in stability and integration of the legalised population. The main criticism was related to a short time (usually one year) of residence permit obtained as a result of regularisation which must be renewed afterwards. As a consequence, many of the regularised immigrants fall back into illegality as soon as their residence permit has expired. Another weak point stressed by the experts is that mass regularisations are supposed to produce a pull-effect that attracts further irregular migration, instead of reducing the rate of irregularity.
The main conclusion from analyses of mass regularisations is that they are not an appropriate and effective instrument against irregular immigrants (IDEA Policy Briefs Spain, Portugal and Greece). In Spain and Portugal they have been substituted by a more discrete, individual and on-going regularisation system. The introduction of individual and permanent regulation schemes should be taken into consideration in all the countries, not as a main tool, however, but as a correction mechanism together with the setting of active policies and more effective controls.

**Question Three: How to solve the eternal problem of integration?**

Despite all the differences, in every country of immigration integration is treated as a priority, at least it is declared so. There is, however, a distance between countries with active and developed integration policy at the practical level, (most of Western and Southern states, the Czech Republic could be also included to this group) and these where integration policy is just a set of initiatives limited to selected groups, such as refugees and repatriates, and has not been even a subject of any considerable debate (cases of Poland or Hungary) (IDEA Policy Briefs Poland and Hungary).

Firstly, it has to be noticed, that integration policy is strictly influenced by some system characteristics of a state. Integration policy is focused mainly on areas of health services, housing, welfare schemes, education and labour market; therefore it is related to and dependent on the national welfare system which varies from country to country. Moreover, in federal countries with a high level of decentralization, as Spain or Italy, the regional and even municipal authorities have large independence in the implementation of particular policies. Overall, it seems to be a positive resolution for integration policy, following the principle of subsidiarity (which assumes that a political decision-making system should be taken as close as possible to the governed to ensure that the decisions are indispensable and respond well to their needs) and taking into account the fact of diversity and the strong territorial dispersion of immigrants. It may be assumed that regional authorities posses better knowledge about immigrants’ needs to frame successful plans for social integration and design a more appropriate
structure of services. “The integration of immigrants is a policy area where a local approach is critical” (IDEA Policy Brief France). Moreover, “more attention should be paid to “organizational structures” that would deal with immigrants’ integration at regional and local levels” (IDEA Policy Brief the Czech Republic).

No one should be excluded from basic integration activities, even irregular immigrants. This group is even more vulnerable to social exclusion, discrimination and marginalization than others and cannot be deprived of basic needs and rights. In this sense, Southern countries have introduced a somewhat innovative approach; irregular migrants in Spain or Italy have access to primary school and health provisions like nationals. “The law also recognizes that the rights to healthcare and education are fundamental human rights that must be guaranteed regardless of a person’s legal status. Consequently, urgent hospital or other medical treatment is also available for foreigners without permits to stay, as is the right to compulsory schooling for foreign minors” (IDEA Working Paper 5).

In order to plan integration initiatives more effectively, good orientation in immigrants’ situation is required together with facilitated communication between authorities and immigrants, especially via their organizations. Encouragement and assistance of self-organizing processes, as well as wide support of immigrants’ organizations are also one of the priorities of integration policy. Here the role of the European funds cannot be overestimated. “Indeed, European Social Fund programmes and the more recent European Integration Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals have been instrumental in creating synergies, mobilising resources, even reorganising public administration offices with a view to providing services to migrant communities” (IDEA Working Paper 9).

Information policy is also a key part and has a powerful impact on integration process, first and foremost, by increasing national citizens’ ability to deal with diversity. “Stereotypes about migrants are often an obstacle to the implementation and success of immigration policies and integration
programmes. An ever closer cooperation between the political agenda and the media (...) should be emphasized, as well as awareness-raising campaigns for media on immigration issues. Furthermore, a deeper knowledge on migration should be increased in order to avoid false and negative image of immigrants” (IDEA Policy Brief Portugal).

Taking into account that immigrants, especially those of the first generation, appear trapped in the low skill low pay sectors of the labour market and vulnerable to discrimination and inequality on wages, special attention to anti-discriminatory measures should be paid\textsuperscript{4}.

The introduction of those measures may make legal employment more desirable for immigrants. Therefore, it is recommended that the system of data collection pertaining to foreigners employed by companies be created to serve also as a system of monitoring discriminatory practices towards foreigners. Such a system, allowing for gathering and managing data on foreigners’ presence on the labour market and the unlawful or reprehensible practices towards foreign workers, should constitute a basis for the creation and implementation of adequate anti-discriminatory measures. “One of the most important antidiscriminatory measures is the availability and clarity of the information on what the labour discrimination means, what the consequences of it are, how to respond to it, where to report cases of discriminative acts, how to apply for compensation, where to find a competent legal advisor and support, etc. Therefore, a proper information campaign addressed to employees as well as employers is also required. Such a campaign should be based on the multicultural and human rights issues and would have educational, informative and preventive character” (IDEA Policy Brief Poland). Taking into account that the freedom from labour discrimination is granted only to those foreigners, who possess the legal entitlement to work, there should be initiated some activities aimed at

\textsuperscript{4} A strong legal foundation on anti-discrimination measures has been adopted at the EU level; see: Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin on and Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.
detecting and solving the problems of serious discrimination of foreigners working partly or fully in contradiction to the immigration rules.

4. What could be learnt from migration policy analysis – some final thoughts

Summing up analysis provided above, it is worth pointing out some final conclusions. They constitute, at the same time, a continuation of a catalogue of problems to cope with on the way towards mature migration policy. Despite the level of maturity already reached by particular national states in the migration cycle, conclusions presented below seem to be common to all of the countries examined. In presenting some selected important issues I would like to point out not only the rationale, which is well known and accepted, but also to signalize some controversies around them.

4.1. Europeanization of policy and its influence

Is there a chance for true Europeanisation of migration policy? As it could be noticed, this chance is rooted in sharing by all states the same main logic which is based on the community of interests. As the analyses prepared during the IDEA project show without any doubts, each state has similar interests and concerns related to immigration. Each state faces the same set of challenges presented above. Not idealism (of being one European community) but just pragmatism should be a push factor towards greater cooperation.

Undoubtedly, one of the consequences of the whole process of Europeanisation is elaboration of the common general legal and political framework based on obligatory *acquis* and a collection of recommendations and best practices, which all countries should follow (via an open method of co-ordination introduced by the EU). For the new member states, accession to the EU was a determining powerful impulse and acceleration in the evolution of national migration policies (Policy Brief: Hungary). Institutions and measures designed by more mature immigration countries have been transposed, during the process of harmonization with the EU, to the new
ones. Especially the initiatives related to integration have been very much triggered by the recent developments of the EC “soft law”, particularly the Common Basic Principles of Integration and the Commission’s communication on the proposed Common Agenda for Integration of Third Country Nationals in the European Union, supported by the INTI (European Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals as a financing instrument) and the Network of National Contacts Points on Integration (as an institutional structure established for exchanging and discussing best practices). The role of Annual Reports on Migration and Integration, which monitor the process of policy developments as well as provide a full package of information on the establishment of the EU framework in these matters, is also worth underlining.

What is also noticeable is a kind of synchronization of ways of perception of immigration. Western European states, as mature immigration regimes, have emerged as the primary reference points for policymakers in other countries, especially the Eastern ones. There, public imagery of immigration is perceived in a very “mature” way, as a highly problematic issue. The focus is, first and foremost, on the problem of integration, potential conflicts, or the state’s security and public order which need to be protected – although none of the phenomena mentioned has appeared in reality.

There is also a cost of Europeanisation. Even if a particular country wishes to preserve the national interests and introduces innovative or independent activities, the limits of self-determination established by the EU have to be always taken into account. Standardisation of rules has positive sides, but could also restrain innovation; it is much easier to follow the common tracks, checked and tested ones, than to experiment with new paths and solutions. This trend could be noticeable in the case of the new member states which, first of all, analyse the political recommendations of more mature countries. However, it must be again underlined here that Eastern countries do not necessary follow the same path in the migration circle.
4.2. Make immigration a public not an administrative issue

Mature migration policy – to be effective – requires legitimisation through social consensus and public support. Immigration should be a subject of broad debate, including not only representatives of administration, scholars and experts, but also a wide range of social actors and the media.

There is a common negative image of immigration, which is noticeable in Western countries. “In the public imagery in France, the focus is more on immigrants as social problems, on the “failure of their integration”, rather than on positive outcomes of migration and on immigrants’ multiple and outstanding contributions to social, cultural, economic, scientific and political life” (IDEA Policy Brief France). Therefore, there is an urgent need to combat negative myths resulting from ignorance, visible also among policymakers. The “discourse of fear” present in many countries of Europe should not be the only driver influencing the public opinion. Immigration should be recognised and presented in a more balanced way, not only as a threat but also as a value and opportunity. There must be stressed that human mobility is “a value in itself which corresponds to an increase in personal freedom” and “with a migration and integration policy conceptualized in a methodological, scrupulous way, the benefits of migration will prevail” (IDEA Policy Brief France).

In more mature countries immigration issue is picked up regularly in time of political instability or public elections by politicians and has become a major debated issue, very often highly polarizing the public opinion. On the contrary, in the case of Eastern countries immigration is rarely visible in the public discourse and, due to rather small scale of immigration, it is not controversial issue at all.

What is also worth noticing is that if migration is not an issue of public interest, and a minor subject in political debates it could have an important effect on the way the policy is implemented. The fact that migration is not
a controversial topic means, in practice, the lack of or very limited public
debates around the legal and political actions undertaken by policymakers in
this field. In the countries examined the process of wider consultations with
representatives of a non-governmental and academic sector on migration
policy is rather limited. In consequence, the process of policy implementation
could be easier and quicker; however, it does not necessary mean that it
would be more effective.

5. What kind of migration policy in the era of circular (fluid) migration?
   Lesson from Poland

“Before they settle in another country, most people tend to circulate between
their place of origin and the country or countries of residence. Others, for
different reasons, never settle, but commute for a considerable portion of
their lifetimes (“settle in mobility”) before “returning” or starting another move
(multiple migrants)” (IDEA Policy Brief France).

“The term “fluid migration” is proposed to describe the phenomenon of inflow
of the foreign nationals to Poland. Fluidity of migrations means ‘being here
and there’, and at the same time ‘deliberately keeping various options open’
(mostly with respect to the labour market). Such migrants are characterised
by a high level of flexibility to change the country of residence and
employment. Many of those migrants live in transnational social spaces
sustaining strong ties with both the country of origin and the country of
residence. Circulation, involving earning money in Poland and spending it in
the home country, seems a rational choice for migrants originating from the
neighbouring countries” (IDEA Policy Brief Poland).

Facilitating this kind of mobility, back-and-forth movements, reinforced by
modern economy and characterized by post-industrial flexibility and
insecurity, will be the greatest challenge for immigration states. Its managing
would require interstate and/or regional cooperation and could imply multiple
entry or long-term visas and the free movement of persons within the
framework of regional integration processes or that of the development of the
regions of origin. It would also enforce going beyond a traditional approach that state is able to control migration via strict rules and accepting the fact that the state is only one body among variety of actors in the process of human mobility with limited power of influencing its directions, patterns and numbers. The final lesson is that migration policy should be as flexible as never before to respond to contemporary immigration.

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