Immigrant France:
Colonial heritage, labour (im)migration and settlement

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Introduction

France stands out as an exception in the context of Western European societies of destination: it was never a country of mass emigration unlike other European states whose citizens took part in massive planetary movements during the industrial revolution. In contrast to its neighbours, especially Germany, France experienced a demographic deficit in the late 19th century and was obliged, very early on, to not only rely on foreign labour but also to adopt foreigners as future citizens, in order to survive as a nation. While most of the Western European states have become destination countries for immigrants, primarily since 1945, France had been a target country for much longer - for its European neighbours as well as for populations from other continents. The category ‘foreigner’ appears as early as the 1851 census which accounted for 381,000 foreigners. By 1881, the number had increased to one million foreigners; they came to work or found refuge in France “terre d’asile”, half a million arriving during the Spanish civil war alone. Today, about one quarter of the population of France is either foreign or has a foreign ancestry that extends no more than two generations back.

However, France shares many other aspects with other major destination countries in Europe as well as with those that only recently became target countries:

Like the UK, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands, France participated actively in the first phase of “modern globalisation” - the exploration of the New World and the establishment of colonial empires. These new migratory spaces created unequal relationships of power between the metropolis and its colonised territories leading to complex flows and counter flows. The presence of populations from former Indochina, the circulation and settlement of populations from Western Africa and from the Maghreb in France (almost 90 per cent of the Algerians abroad resides in France) as well as of South Americans in Spain, Cape-Verdians or Angolans in Portugal, populations from the Indian subcontinent in the UK, etc., reflect the geography of former European colonial possessions. Not only have these long lasting frameworks shaped France’s relationship with the “South” and French representations of the “Other”, but they also have had a strong impact on the collective representation of immigrants on the whole.

All the receiving countries are confronted with transnationalisation and increasingly complex trajectories of migration in the post-Fordist, post-industrial era, whereas the significance of EU status and membership history (old, new members) determines a number of fundamental rights relating to individual mobility.

In all receiving countries there is a demand for migrant labour in different sectors of the economy. To an extent country-specific, this need for labour does not only apply to skilled workers who are easily and without any political risk put forward as desired, legitimate and even chosen immigrants. Instead, an ageing population, a need for reduced labour costs in order to remain globally competitive, and the scarcity of local workers in different sectors throughout the skill scale, means that there is also a need for workers with intermediate or low levels of technical expertise. The new French legislation thus specifically makes references to occupations where difficulties of recruitment persist.
France, along with other EU members, is a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees.

The feminisation of flows – the gradual increase of women as compared to men in the labour market – is another feature that can be observed everywhere throughout the developed world. This is one of the dimensions of our globalised world and the “age of migration”. In Europe it has specific features related to the post-wall situation in Eastern and Central Europe and to the post-colonial societal transformations in Africa, where it led recently to the increased presence of women in the public sphere and in migration flows. Women increasingly migrate not only as accompanying or following spouses but also as family bread-winners pioneering the migration chains.

We will address some of these historical shifts and innovations in more depth in our report.

Past experiences and specificities have had an impact on origins, formation and flows of migrants and immigrants who have crucially shaped current French society, particularly in the larger cities. France is today a de facto multicultural society with the ideology of republican universalism in the tradition of the French revolution remaining very strong: la République knows only French citizens without distinction of race, origin or religion, and expects the others – foreigners, newcomers – to assimilate or to integrate. The principle of equality and political priorities that republican universalism implies have influenced the policies and even more their implementation, in the areas of immigration, integration and the fight against discrimination (Weil, 2005).

Section 1 of the report historicizes the French migration experience encompassing slave trading, forced migration and colonialism, all of which have centrally impacted on later immigration flows and on the way France has perceived, received or rejected immigrants. Today, the memory of colonisation and slavery has been thrust to the forefront of political discussions on “immigration” and “national identity”.

Section 2 discusses the “formative” years of France as an immigration country and particularly focuses on the long period before 1945. It responds directly to the IDEA project’s hypotheses on the transformation of net emigration to an immigration country by investigating and specifying the demographic situation of France in the wake of the industrial revolution. France became a country of destination as early as the mid-nineteenth century, while systematically showing the lowest overseas emigration rates in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There has been a long-term tendency in France to encourage the immigration of labour having vocation to stay in the country and to be transformed into an immigration of settlement (immigration de peuplement). Elements of the policies aiming to attract immigrant workers were being developed during the late nineteenth century but a laissez-faire, non-intervention attitude nevertheless prevailed until the 1930s.

The conditions for the “birth of migration policy” became ripe before the Second World War. Section 3 sheds light on that period while also covering the post-war era until the present-day. It includes a discussion of the “trente glorieuses”, the ban on labour migration in 1974, the development of social policies and settlement and finally, in the nineties, a shift to more control and stricter policies. Immigrants were needed both to rebuild the country and contribute to reducing the population deficit. With the ordinance of November 1945 and the creation of the Office National d’Immigration, the State took charge of the management of migration. However labour market forces remained very strong and the official recruitment of
foreign labour covered only a minority of entrants. The overwhelming recourse to
regularisation has been one of the main aspects of foreign labour management during this
time. Families arrived both in the years preceding the labour migration halt in 1974 and after.
In the years following 1974, the legislation previously focusing on “temporary workers” has
been gradually shifting its priorities to those “who came to France to stay”. The eighties was
the period of stabilisation and from the nineties onwards, a tendency towards more control
and stricter admission policies can be observed.

Section 4 is devoted to contemporary developments and debates and multiple political
responses. It focuses on “chosen” (choisié) as opposed to “unwanted” or “endured” (subie)
immigration, co-development, and the return to short-term recruitment --exemplified within
the agricultural sector. It also highlights the gendered aspects of otherwise gender-neutral
policies.

1. CONTINUITIES IN FRENCH MIGRATION EXPERIENCE

Migration, immigration and the affirmation of Republican values have been constantly linked
in political discourses, from the 18th century onwards. As the French case presents particular
differences in comparison to other European receiving countries (it is treated here as an “old
immigration country”) an understanding of its history, and in particular the link with French
colonial policy, is particularly important. Slavery and colonialism have consequences for
contemporary migration and integration policy. Several contemporary research programs
influenced by postcolonial studies have focused on retention centers, camps, the
externalization of borders, the notion of “integration of immigrants”, and the criteria for
citizenship1. Several networks collaborate with civil society associations which seek to recall
these continuities and to refer to them in their political discourses (« Les indigenes de la
République”; Conseil des Associations Noires de France/CRAN; etc.).

The first wave of immigration from France’s neighbouring countries and later ones from its
colonies can only be understood within a broader economic and political perspective. We set
out below some of the key historical moments:

- Before 1851: immigration from France’s neighbouring countries
- Beginning of colonial policy in parts of West and North Africa and immigration from
  the colonies, 1860-1914
- Immigration in a context of war and colonial policy, 1914-1945
- Foundation of the « Office central de placement des chômeurs et des refugiés » in
  1914, attached to the Ministry of Interior Affairs since 1st June 1915. This institution
  has placed immigrant workers in the war industry.

Before 1851, immigration to France occurred mainly from neighbouring countries towards
regions that were close to its respective borders: Belgians came to Northern France, Germans

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1 For example, see the work of Michel Agier on camps; Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison (2005) on the relation
between France and Algeria; Emmanuelle Saada (2005, 2007) on citizenship; Gérard Noiriel (2007) on French
migration history; Patrick Weil and Stéphane Dufoix (2005) on colonisation, slavery and their consequences.
2 We will come back in detail to the consequences of these historical references in the chapter that deals with
contemporary immigration policy.
and Swiss immigrants to the Eastern regions, Italians to the South-East, Spanish to the Roussillon and the Basque country and British immigrants to the northern coastal regions. The only exceptions were Polish immigrants who, via the Marne, came up to the Charentes region (Le Moigne/Lebon 2002: 7).

After the conquest of Algeria, between 1830-1847, large extents of West and North Africa were colonised. The first important immigration from the colonies started in a context of economic growth and WWI, although soldiers from Algeria had already been drafted during the French-German war in 1870-71.

Since the 19th century until the beginning of the 21st century, French immigration policy has been guided by continuous utilitarianism (Lochak 2006). Economic needs of the labour market and demographic policy have oriented political efforts to attract immigrants, especially after WWI (Noiriel 2007). Although the administration has not always followed economic policy and employers’ demands, the regularisation of working migrants was more or less dependent on economic conjuncture. Demography has also played a key role in decision-making from the nineteenth century onward, and facilitated the settlement of families (Viet 1995). However, the migrants were treated distinctively by nationality, profession and qualification: immigrants with professions that did not threaten the French worker’s job opportunities were privileged by the Ministry of Employment, as well as nationalities that were considered as being easy to integrate (Spire 2005). The recent explicit discourse on “chosen immigration” in contemporary policy differs from the former which adopted a more implicit approach seeking to promote, at least in theory, equal opportunities for migrants, even though this is not what happened in practice.

1.1 Slave trade, forced migration, colonisation and impact on definition of citizenship

In the French context, we obviously cannot so easily ask the question “From emigration to immigration?” As noted in the Introduction, France has never been a classic emigration country. However, if we undertake a diachronic analysis starting with the slave trade period, we find periods of emigration and forced migration, accompanied by the first immigration processes that were less important before the 18th century. The notion of citizenship and the criteria for belonging to a national entity have changed over the last two centuries, but the underlying concept has been assimilation in most of the cases.

1.1.1 Definition and criteria of citizenship

According to Article 4 of the 1793 Constitution, “Any foreigner at the age of 21 who resides in France for at least one year and who lives thanks to his own work or who marries a French citizen or adopts a child or who nourishes an elder person, is admitted to have the rights of French citizens”³. According to Saint Just, citizenship was also linked to the approval of the ideas and values of the Republic. This concept has lead to assimilation as the central motor of the “machine of integration” in the eyes of French Interior politics (Benjamin Stora, 2007). The Code Napoléon of 1804 defined citizenship and marital rights. Concerning the French

³ « Tout étranger âgé de 21 ans accomplis qui, domicilié en France depuis une année y vit de son travail ou acquiert une propriété ou épouse une Française ou adopte un enfant ou nourrit un vieillard est admis à l’exercice de droits de citoyens Français ». (our translation)
colonies, citizenship was granted to those who could prove cultural assimilation to French values. As Emmanuelle Saada (2005:212) points out, the civil norms of the country mentioned by Pierre Dareste in 1916 has provided the basis for contemporary criteria for the acceptance of immigrants and for access to citizenship: in his writings about colonial doctrine, Dareste makes a distinction between the slave inhabitants on the Island of La Réunion and in the Antilles on the one hand, and those from Senegal and India on the other hand, in order to justify the cancellation of voting rights given to the latter. According to Dareste, these slaves have to submit to their law, customs and religion and have different traditions and mentalities. Here, difference is a clear criterion for justifying discrimination. When the slaves from the Antilles were given access to citizenship in 1848, the reason provided was their long lasting interaction with the French which had extended over two centuries. This experience, namely the “servitude towards the master,” led the rootless slaves who were far from their homeland to assimilate with the French, as Emmanuelle Saada explains (2005: 216). Today, language abilities and the adoption of “Republican values” have to be proven by foreigners who want to acquire French citizenship.

1.1.2 Slave trade and forced migration

France’s involvement in slave trade and colonialism has been recently remembered in the context of postcolonial theories that are being discovered by a broader public. History is being used by civil society organisations and policy makers to justify or to contest recent decisions in migration policy. For this reason, we provide a short historical synopsis of France’s involvement in the slave trade, which was an early form of forced migration.

1780 marked the peak of the Atlantic slave trade and France was well placed to profit from it having captured Gorée (the Senagalese island from which most slaves were being shipped) from the Dutch, in 1677. During this period, around 78,000 slaves were being brought to the Americas each year; one fifth of this ‘export’ was being conducted by the French. Such trade in humans was claimed to be simply a consequence of war, a natural occurrence, by the 18th century European slave traders. In fact, they further argued that they were actually doing a service to such captives by rescuing them from possible execution or of becoming human sacrifices; slavery under civilized Christian masters was preferable to slavery in primitive, pagan African society. This argument of French mission civilisatrice is still visible today; access to French citizenship is perceived as being more of an honour than a right. Slave trade and colonialism are crucial elements of the contemporary identity-building process of second or third generation immigrants in France who claim ancestry in the former colonies. As Reynaud-Paligot (2006) observes, colonialism is not an exception but the consequence of Republican ideology.

1.1.3 Colonisation and migrations

A possible future for those colonised by the French was acculturation or assimilation so that ultimately they could all become full French citizens, the colonies would be integrated with metropolitan France, and African citizens could share equally with the French-born in its institutions. These ideals were effectively shelved when it came to grappling with the problem of governing the enormously greater number of Africans without any real previous contact

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4 Loi relative à la maîtrise de l’immigration, à l’intégration et à l’asile, Assemblée Nationale, No. 57, Ch. 1, Art. L.411-8.
with European ways who were quickly brought under colonial rule in the years after 1879. Thus, on the French side, those born in the four major communes (Saint-Louis, Gorée, Rufisque and Dakar) of the old colony of Senegal continued to enjoy French citizenship that they had been granted prior to 1879, while other Africans became French subjects (possessing the obligations of citizens but not their rights), only qualifying for citizenship after stringent tests. By 1937, out of an estimated 15 million people under French rule in western Africa, only some 80,500 were citizens, and only 2,500 of these had acquired their citizenship by means other than the accident of birth in one of the four communes. This means that the theoretical access to citizenship was hardly put into practice because of the stringent criteria which could only be met by a tiny minority of applicants.

By 1960 all the former French colonies were *de jure* independent states. Today, the experiences of exclusion from political decisions are part of the collective memory of French citizens who claim their descendence from former slaves and colonised peoples. An increasing segment of public opinion is in agreement that the economic dependence of former colonies is a consequence of economic exploitation during the colonial period. Similarly, it is clear that a certain number of internal African migrations as well as migrations to Europe occur within a framework of unequal power relations established during the colonial period.

### 1.2 Emigration and immigration in the 19th and 20th century: some examples

In France, the main emigration period took place before 1860. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, emigration was not on the political agenda. However, the *Préfets*, representatives of the Minister of Interior Affairs, began to raise the question of how to deal with growing emigration demands, from 1820 onwards. The main reason was the recruitment activity of a certain Mr. Varaigne, an emigration agent who very efficiently headhunted qualified French workers in order to send them to Buenos Aires (Weil 2006: 123).

Of course, emigration from France started before that period, namely in the seventeenth century, to Louisiana and Québec, and from the eighteenth century to Saint Domingue (Haiti), but these movements were more discrete and were not subject to control by the authorities. French settlers in Saint Domingue (Haiti) imported slaves from Africa to work in their sugar cane plantations. In 1791, the slaves in Saint Domingue, led by Toussaint Louverture, rebelled against the French. After the victory of the slaves in 1803, the French settlers fled to Puerto Rico. So the French were not only concerned by slave trade as traders in Africa, they were also directly involved in buying slaves to work in their fields.

Between 1820 and 1830, when emigration appeared on the agenda, the political attitude that the authorities had towards the increasing demand of French emigrants was not clear. A high number of Préfets wrote to their Minister of tutelage in order to know how to balance the interest and the liberty of the individual on the one hand, and the interest of the French population for demographic and military reasons, on the other hand. Weil’s conclusion also shows continuity in the treatment of migration issues: concrete decisions depend on the individual agent who takes them, on the character of the Préfet, on the Minister of Interior Affairs, on the place, on the economic and political circumstances, and on the period within which the demand is submitted. All these factors influence the treatment of the demander.

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5 Weil (2006) gives numerous examples of letters reflecting the uncertainty of the *Préfets* facing this new situation.
From 1830 onwards, emigration policy changed significantly because of three key factors: the exponential increase of emigrants—their number was ten times higher in the 1830s in comparison to the 1820s, the French landing in Algeria in 1830 which put colonial policy on the agenda and the receding of a Malthusian view of demography which was replaced by a more populationist view.

1.2.1 Uruguay and Argentina as destination countries

The emigration from southeast France, namely from the department of Basses Pyrénées to Uruguay, became a highly debated public and political issue. In 1835, the French Ministry of Interior Affairs noticed emigration from Basses Pyrénées to Uruguay. Critical voices asserted that emigration weakened the country; those who had a positive view of emigration affirmed the opposite, arguing that the French economy could benefit from the emigrants and that demographic distribution was not threatened. In 1855, emigration was submitted to rules defined by law and by numerous decrees (1850, 1860, 1861, 1868, 1874), but in practice, immigration control and the protection of immigrants could signify very different actions according to the factors mentioned above. For example, in 1868 and in 1912, openly hostile attitudes towards emigration emerged. In 1912, Mayors received a confidential note and were asked to do everything within their means to avoid further emigration to Argentina. However, the citizens had learned how to deal with the written and unwritten administrative rules, and in practice, the administration had also learned how to cope with the phenomenon of emigration.

1.2.2 Emigration and immigration: Senegal

Senegal is particularly interesting because it was a hub of the slave trade—this history remains an important component of contemporary political relations between France and Senegal, and because of the Senegalese exception concerning citizenship and the right to vote of a small part of the population during the colonial period. We have to go back to the seventeenth century in order to understand this particular case in a broader diachronic and synchronic perspective marked by some key moments listed here and which we have discussed briefly in section 1.1.1:

- The slave trade began in the 17th century and affected particularly the coastal Senegambia region (which provided approx. 15 per cent of the total number of African slaves). One of the « humanistic » arguments for deporting slaves was to ‘rescue’ them from ‘pagan African’ practices.
- A contemporary discussion on the law concerning the ‘positive’ consequences of colonisation taking place in France and Senegal. The speech given by Nicolas Sarkozy in Dakar in July 2007 has reinforced the polemics and nourished a feeling of being downgraded among the immigrants of African origin in France.
- Contemporary afrocentric movements that are claiming reparations for crimes committed during the colonial period.

1.2.3 Emigration and immigration: Algeria

The conquest of Algeria by the French army started in 1830 and lasted until 1847. A colonisation of settlement was the main goal during this period. The settlement of French
colons (pieds noirs) who benefited from political privileges was undertaken. When Algeria became a part of France, the colons sent delegates to the French parliament. By the end of the French colonial rule, the French colons represented roughly 10 per cent of the total population.

Under the Second Empire, Faidherbe started the colonisation process in West Africa and the opposite of a colonisation of settlement dominated French policy. The descendants from the colonies are currently revisiting colonial history (‘Les indigènes de la République’; “Conseil National des Associations Noires de France”; etc.). Several historians and members of the above-cited civil society associations particularly contest the law promulgated on 23 February 2005 that asked history teachers in secondary schools to assume that French colonial policy has had globally positive effects. Firstly, the fact that the State asked teachers to include a moral judgement in their course was contested. Secondly, the consequences of colonialism was discussed publicly and led to the emergence of a large group of French youth whose members declared themselves as being the “indigenous people of the Republic”. The latter called the riots from November 2005 and November 2007 “anti-colonialist riots.”

**Given below are some key events of historical significance with reference to Algeria:**

- During World War I, 200,000 Algerians served in French army. At the end, 70,000 Algerian soldiers remained in France.
- In 1943, French citizenship was extended to certain categories of Muslims.
- In 1947, 1.5 million Europeans and 9 million Algerian Muslims lived in Algeria. Muslims were finally considered full French citizens with the right to keep their personal Qur’ānic status and were granted the right to work in France without further formalities. However, most of the reforms laid down by the new statute were never enforced. 350,000 Algerian workers established themselves in France and sent remittances back to Algeria.
- Between 1956 and 1958 French army commanders in Algeria tried to promote a new Franco-Muslim society in preparation for Algeria's total integration into France.
- At the beginning of the 5th Republic, President Charles de Gaulle declared that “Algerian Muslims could not be converted to a French identity”
- Contemporary experiences of exclusion confirmed by official “Testings”.
- Protest against the recent creation of a Ministry of “National Identity and Immigration”.

At the end of the 1920s, several decrees established criteria for belonging to the “French race”, especially for children born to a French citizen and a “French subject” (Saada 2007). In cases where the child was raised by the “French subject”, the authorities considered it insufficient French cultural influence and therefore disallowed French citizenship.

The Blum-Viollette proposal (named after the French premier and the former governor-general of Algeria7), was introduced during the Popular Front government in France (1936–37). It would have allowed a very small number of Algerians to obtain full French citizenship without forcing them to relinquish their right to be judged by Muslim law on matters of personal status (e.g., marriage, inheritance, divorce, and child custody). Settler opposition to the measure was so fierce, however, that the project was never even brought to a vote in the French Chamber of Deputies.

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6 See Editorial, No. 10 of the monthly magazine “Les indigènes de la République”. <indigenes-republique.org>
General Charles de Gaulle declared a year later that France was under an obligation to the Muslims of North Africa because of their loyalty. French citizenship was extended to certain categories of Muslims three months later, but this did not go far enough to satisfy Algerian opinion.

The statute voted into existence on September 20, 1947, created an Algerian assembly with two separate colleges of 60 members each, one representing some 1.5 million Europeans and the other Algeria's 9 million Muslims. Muslims were finally considered full French citizens with the right to keep their personal Qur'ānic status and were granted the right to work in France without further formalities.

However, the law was poorly implemented, and the subsequent elections were widely held to have been manipulated to favour the French. Most of the reforms laid down by the statute were never enforced. In spite of this, Algeria remained quiet. The principal change had been the fact that some 350,000 Algerian workers – five times as many as in the post-World War I period – were able to settle in France and send their remittances to Algeria.

Hundreds of thousands of rural Muslims were resettled under French military control, Algiers was successfully cleared of all guerrilla cells, French investments in Saharan petroleum grew, and, in a dramatic climax, a coalition of European settlers, colonial troops, and armed forces commanders in May 1958 refused further obedience to the Fourth Republic.

Charles de Gaulle, first president of the Fifth Republic, thought that the effort of fighting colonial wars had prevented France from developing nuclear weapons and also came to realize that “Algerian Muslims could not be converted to a French identity”. He began to negotiate with the rebels; the negotiations culminated in a plebiscite, French evacuation, and proclamation of the independence of Muslim Algeria (July 1962). De Gaulle then proceeded to develop a nuclear striking force as the new foundation of France's status as a great power. The Fifth Republic moved rapidly toward freeing the colonies of sub-Saharan Africa.

After the Algerian war and the gaining of independence in 1962, the Algerian immigrants living and working in France started facing increasing problems: they consistently remained at the bottom of the economic ladder and were subject to ethnic prejudice. Véronique de Rudder, François Vourc’h, Alain Morice and Patrick Simon have shown how difficult it is to measure inter-ethnic relations and discrimination because statistics do not include ethnic origin (French law disallows questions regarding ethnicity in the Census). However, an ongoing project lead by the INED (National Institute of Demographic Research), in which Patrick Simon and Veronique de Rudder participate, tries to provide figures about this important topic (Moers, Pailhé, Simon 2006).

Recent “testings” organised in 2007 by the Centre d’Analyse Stratégique, a research centre attached to the French Prime Minister, have shown the high impact of these prejudices when accessing the job market: there were substantial differences concerning the number of CV’s that a candidate had to send in order to get an interview or meeting (let alone a job!). The number varied according to the candidate’s nationality, family name, first name and place of residence as shown below

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A certain number of researchers have published their epistemological point of view in the context of the contemporary political environment, see Véronique de Rudder, François Vourc’h, 8.3.2007: “Quelles statistiques pour quelle lutte contre les discriminations”.

The results of this study are published in Horizons Stratégiques, no. 5, 2007.
Table 1: Prejudice Testings

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Nationality/Family Name</th>
<th>MMM</th>
<th>FMM</th>
<th>FMF</th>
<th>FFF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>/1st name</td>
<td>KHALI</td>
<td>CHARBIT</td>
<td>EL HADJ</td>
<td>MARTIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmedi</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Selim</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>François</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruno</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M=Moroccan ; F=French
The first letter indicates the nationality, the second the family name and the third the first name (which is perceived as being French or Moroccan).

The current government institution, the HALDE (Haute Autorité de Lutte contre la discrimination et l’exclusion) created and funded by the State, is supposed to receive complaints from victims of discrimination and to fight against different types of discrimination. It reflects measures against discrimination inspired by affirmative action programs.

2. THE FRENCH EXCEPTION: THE PROCESS OF TRANSFORMATION FROM NET EMIGRATION TO NET IMMIGRATION

From the mid nineteenth century, France has had a very different demographic situation than its European neighbours: a drastic reduction of birth rates compensated partly by significant foreign immigration. The 1851 census, as we noted in our introduction, calls attention to the presence of 381,000 foreigners --more than 1 per cent of the total population (see Table 5: Census of Foreigners in France 1851-1914). According to Jean-Claude Chesnais (2006), it is the statistical threshold of 1 per cent that, for European countries, marks the transition from secular emigration to contemporary immigration. We can thus consider France to be a century ahead of other European immigration countries because our Western European neighbours passed this threshold only in the second half of the twentieth century, i.e., between 1960 and 1980.

2.1 A weak birth rate compared to the other European countries since the mid-19th century

France had only a moderate rate of population growth over the course of the nineteenth century, an average of 0.5 per cent per annum for the period 1821 to 1866 and 0.2 per cent per annum for the period 1872 to 1911. This contrasts to 1.1 per cent per annum for Germany (1816-1910), 1.3 per cent per annum for England and Wales (1801 to 1911), and 1.1 per cent per annum for the Netherlands (1816 to 1909) (Haines, 2000).
Table 2: Population growth rate over the 19th century (in %)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>England/Wales</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
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<td>1821-1866</td>
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<td>1872-1911</td>
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<td>1816-1910</td>
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<td>1801-1911</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1816-1909</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Haines, 2000, Annales de la démographie historique n° 1

The reduction in mortality rates, a major phenomenon of the contemporary world that began in the 19th century, compensated for low birth rates, and prevented the nation from becoming aware of this demographic decline. The annual number of births, at least until 1890, always remained larger than that of deaths, even though the gap tended to be constantly reduced, becoming often nil in the decade preceding 1914 (deficit of births in 1890, 1892, 1895, 1900, 1907, 1911).

What was increasingly alarming for French political leaders was the growing difference between France and its German neighbour, whose army crushed the army of Napoleon III in 1870-1871 — although there was not yet at that time a marked difference in population size of the two countries — both with a population close to 40 million. Forty years later however, France, cut down by Alsace-Lorraine, had not reached this threshold of 40 million inhabitants (39,600,000 in 1911 within its borders at that time), whereas that of the German Empire exceeded 65 million (see Fig 1). The annual number of births in France has not stopped declining since 1907 and it was always below 800,000, twice even below 750,000 in 1911-1913, while in Germany the annual number of births came very close to 2 million a year (Garden, Le Bras and Dupâquier, 1988).

At the end of the 19th century, the French birth rate tended towards a value hitherto unknown: 20 pro mille. In Germany, the birth rate remained at a sharply superior level, of the order of 35 to 40 pro mille i.e., a woman giving birth to an average of five children. See Fig 1 below as well as Table A1 in the Annex.
France markedly contrasted with Great Britain as well with regard to birth rates (see Fig. 2 as well as Table A 2 in Annex). British fertility had reached a historic maximum by 1820, with an average of 6 children per woman, while the long-term tendency before the industrial revolution was between 4 and 4.5 only. This long wave of English fertility had three major consequences: its population multiplied fivefold in the period between 1750 and 1900, massive emigration, and the dispersion of the English language through colonisation.

Over 80 years (1800-1880), as Table 3 shows, the variation in fertility to the advantage of England with regard to France is about 1.5 to 1.8 children, on average, per woman. The combination of an exceptionally high English fertility rate (5 to 6 children per woman) and an abnormally low French fertility rate had significant consequences: the development of the Anglo-Saxon world and the relative decline of France and the French language. Britain’s demographic domination did not have very significant implications for Europe.
Thus, between 1850 and 1950, the French population increased by only 16 per cent (Chesnais, 2006), this in spite of the reduction in mortality, the relative youthfulness of the population pyramid and in spite of immigratory contributions which Alfred Sauvy (1945) estimated to be at five million people around 1940.

Consequently, the relative increase, within a century, two times less than during the period of almost 40 years which followed (1950-1988). All other great sets of the industrial world saw an opposite trend. Between 1850 and 1950, the other European countries (with the exception of Russia), taken as a whole, saw their global population growth exceeding 100 per cent while, between 1891 and 1946, France, as we have already indicated, saw a long stagnation in its population and workforce. Within its current borders, it had reached 40 million in 1891, its population in 1946 was still only 40 million.

2.1.1 A weak French emigration level since the 19th mid-century: the American case

France did not produce official statistics on this prior to 1853, but one can nevertheless glean much information from various official documents which have been archived. Though often incomplete and not very detailed, such documents can still be used as a basis for evaluations, that are otherwise very precise, or at least more plausible and closer to the reality than those for which we can try to establish for the previous period. Such documents include those which provide information regarding the number of passports which were issued to French citizens as well as provide information regarding population movements out of French ports showing the number of French citizens who were emigrating (Bunle, 1943). From 1892, the statistics of the emigration of French citizens to North America were established for seven ports: Boulogne-sur-Mer, Le Havre, Cherbourg, Saint-Nazaire, La Rochelle, Bordeaux, and Marseille.

Among the major European sending nations involved in massive movements of people between Europe and North America, in the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, France made the smallest contribution relative to its population. The emigration rate per 100,000 inhabitants never rose above 31, while a number of nations (e.g. England, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Italy) had rates above 500 and even over 1,000 at times (see Table A3 in the Annex). On the other hand, a large proportion of French emigrants, during this period, went to Latin America and North Africa (Ibid).

The Table A4 in the Annex shows the annual emigration average per 100,000 inhabitants per decade. It is be clear that the highest intensity of emigration to North America was from Italy, in 1913: 1,630 per 100,000 inhabitants. Next, for the same year, was Portugal with 1,296 passengers and Spain with 1,051 (of whom 757 were emigrants proper). The intensity was lowest for France, with 15 and Germany and the Netherlands not showing much emigration either with 40 each. If these figures for 1913 are compared with those for 1881-1890 and 1921-1924, considerable shifts can be observed – but French figures remain negligible.

2.1.2 French migrants to the United States compared with other European migrants

Table A4 in the Annex further indicates that the flow of French migrants to the United States was proportionately larger in the 1820s and 1830s -- 6.8 per cent of all recorded immigrants and about 9 per cent of all recorded migrants from Europe-- than in later decades. The 1840s and 1850s were a clear turning point in Europe: the period was marked by poor harvests, the catastrophic potato famine, political revolutions and unrest, including dislocations created by
industrial development and economic structural change. Even though the number of migrants from France reached a peak in 1840s (at about 77,000), the share of France among immigrants declined to only about 1-3 per cent for the remainder of the period covered by the table. By contrast, the majority of migrants were now from Ireland (781,000 in the 1840s and 914,000 in the 1850s) and Germany (435,000 in the 1840s and 952,000 in the 1850s). These figures confirm that the United States had ceased to be attractive to the French by the middle of the nineteenth century. As Hatton and Williamson (1998) note: “the observed low emigration rates from France and the high emigration rates from Ireland were not due to some deviant behaviour, but rather to differences in the economic and demographic environment dictating their emigration experience.”

The combination of slow population growth, declining birth rates, an agricultural sector with a high proportion of small individual proprietors, good levels of urban, industrial, and real per capita income growth combined to make overall French emigration relatively small in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. French cities were more attractive than American ones. Among the large countries of Europe, France had systematically the lowest overseas emigration rates in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

(See Table A5 in the Annex)

2.2 Immigrant France

From the end of the nineteenth century to the end of the 1930s, the demographic decline had significant consequences for the labour market and recruitment to the French army. At the end of the nineteenth century, neighbouring countries such as Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Great Britain, Switzerland and Germany contributed the bulk of emigration to France. These immigrants were mainly employed in the processing industries. Another migratory wave arose in the years preceding World War I with a large Polish emigration (Ponty, 1988). From June 1919, migration increased so extensively that by 1930 France had the highest rate of foreigners --515 for 100,000 inhabitants—which was not even matched by the United States which which had 492 for 100,000 inhabitants (Noiriel, 1988).

Between 1920 and 1930, official statistics reveal a surplus of 1,150,000 immigrant workers entering France (Bunle, 1943). These workers arrived under the aegis of international bilateral agreements signed by France with Italy in 1904 and 1906, Belgium in 1906, Poland and Italy in 1919, and finally with Czechoslovakia in 1920. They institutionalised a relationship between States of reception, States of origin and French companies, which indicates a strong convergence of economic interests.

2.2.1 Foreign presence from 1851 to 1914

The 1851 census revealed the presence of 381,000 foreigners on French territory, that is, an evaluation of 20,000, or approximately the annual immigration average for the previous ten-year period. For figures from later censuses, see Table 3 below.
Table 3: Foreigners in France, at various censuses, 1851-1914

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>In thousands</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>In thousands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>1886</td>
<td>1,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>1,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>1,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>1,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1,160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Recensement quinquennal de la population française

The foreign population in France grew non-stop from 1851 until 1891. This upward movement seemed to have been halted for the period 1891-1906. It was simply masked by the effects of the 1889-1893 laws on naturalization and the nationality. It grew again in greater intensity in 1906. However, we cannot measure the importance of net immigration in France only by the increase of the number of the foreigners, notably for the period 1886-1921, when naturalisation and the “becoming French” doctrine reached high values. But the number of foreigners in successive censuses constitute one of the elements of a rough evaluation of the net immigration in France of the time.

According to Henri Bunle (1943), the foreign population increased for the following reasons: surpluses of births over deaths, the net immigration (surpluses of arrivals as compared to foreigners' departures), loss of citizenship by French people (Frenchwomen marrying a foreigner, for example, according to the civil code of the time. One had to wait until the new nationality law of 1927, which enabled Frenchwomen who married a foreigner to keep their French nationality, as we will discuss in greater depth later on). At the same time, the foreign population also decreased due to naturalisations.

2.2.2 Labor immigration to France from mid nineteenth century to the eve of World War II

The immigration to France of foreign populations (inhabitants of the border zone or neighbours on the eve of World War I) was, on such a scale, a unique phenomenon in Europe. This demographic imbalance between France and Europe contributes to welcoming inhabitants of the neighbouring countries who thus do not have to travel across the Atlantic. “France is a country of immigration, as is the Republic of Argentina or Australia.... 40,000 to 50,000 foreigners settle in it each year” (Leroy-Beaulieu, 1886, own translation).

After 1914, the migratory flows to France grew and France ranked second among countries of immigration. Since the beginning of the First World War, the country had to admit diverse contingents of foreigners. At first this was to compensate for the shortage of men needed for
the army and for more general work related to the war industry. After the war, it was for rebuilding destroyed regions, replacing French people killed in the war, developing industries and fulfilling labour needs of the agricultural sector. The new immigration is different from the pre-war one: it is collective and organised, better known (enumeration of all those who declare their worker’s quality at the border), and France has recourse in greater numbers to ethnic groups hitherto little represented on French ground. Finally, from 1918 onwards, France becomes a place of asylum for the foreigners who do not want or cannot stay in their country of origin --Russians fleeing Bolshevism, the Armenians, the anti-fascist Italians, Jews fleeing persecution, the Spanish Republicans etc.

### 2.2.3 Foreigners in France according to national origin

French data is lacking for immigration numbers during the early part of the nineteenth century. However, we have information regarding Belgian and Italian immigration, since approximately 1880, and Dutch immigration since 1900 as all three of these countries have published more or less complete statistics, revealing the emigration of their nationals to France, during this period. Successive population censuses in France nonetheless provide information regarding the nationality of foreigners resident in the country during the latter half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. The numbers provided by the decennial censuses from 1851 till 1911 are shown in Table 4 below:

#### Table 4: Foreigners in France by nationality from 1851-1911 censuses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalities</th>
<th>1851</th>
<th>1861</th>
<th>1872</th>
<th>1881</th>
<th>1891</th>
<th>1901</th>
<th>1911</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>absolute (in thousands)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgians</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spaniards, Portuguese</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans, Austrian-Hungarians</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives of Luxembourg, Dutch</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>1130</td>
<td>1034</td>
<td>1160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per 1000</td>
<td>1851</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>1872</td>
<td>1881</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgians</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spaniards, Portuguese</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans, Austrian-Hungarians</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives of Luxembourg, Dutch</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Recensement décennal de la population française de 1851 to 1911 (Bunle, 1943)
The Belgium and the Italy regularly supplied more than half of the foreign immigrants to France, between 1851 and 1910. The proportion of these two nationalities, with regard to the total of the foreigners listed in France, indeed rose from 50 per cent in 1851, to 63 per cent in 1872, 67 per cent in 1881, 66 per cent in 1901 and 62 per cent in 1911.

The most numerous immigrants to France were thus nationals of neighbouring states who were considered “comparable” to the French and therefore expected to be “easily assimilated”. It is only by 1910 that immigration of North Africans begin. This was predominantly those who were called the "natives" ("indigènes") of Algeria. An Algerian government inquiry revealed the presence of 4,000 to 5,000 Algerian natives living in Marseille, in Paris, and in the Pas-de-Calais primarily employed in industrial and mining sectors (Beaugency, 1914). A small number of Moroccan dockers and miners were also resident in Marseille, in the Pas-de-Calais and in the Loire region (Ray, 1938).

In both seasonal and permanent immigration, the movement towards France was almost exclusively spontaneous and individual. The first organized, collective immigration began in 1908. when the Union of Agricultural Companies of the Northeast of France, with authorization from the Committee of Emigration and the diet of Galicie, introduced approximately 1,000 Polish farm workers. This mode of recruitment, pursued until 1914, brought into France up to 20,000 Polish workers, distributed across about one third of French territory (Raflin, on 1911).

Additionally, the Steelworks Committee of Meurthe-et-Moselle, following rather long negotiations, was able to recruit between 4,000 to 5,000 Italian workers during the years 1912-1913. These are the only cases of collective immigration organized for the period preceding World War I. Table A5 in the Annex provides an overview of foreign workforce activities in France from three censuses. A constant increase, extending over 20 years and marked by labour immigration to the processing industry, handling and transport is visible: 245,000 in 1891, 337,000 in 1906 and 382,000 in 1911. An increase of foreigners involved in commercial occupations, in the service industry and in liberal professions is also visible. They however decreased in agriculture and in the mining and quarrying industries.

2.2.4 Immigration in the context of war and colonial policy 1914-45

- Foundation of the “Office central de placement des chômeurs et des refugiés” in 1914, attached to the Ministry of Interior Affairs since 1 June 1915. This institution has placed workers in the war industry.
- Foundation of the “Commission interministérielle de la main d’oeuvre” 1915

The “Commission interministérielle de la main d’oeuvre” at the Ministry of Interior Affairs, was “coordinating actions of diverse administrations being in charge of unemployed, of refugees, war invalids on the one hand, and, the recruiting of local and foreign labour needed in industrial, commercial and agricultural sectors in particular those firms working for national defense, on the other. It was also responsible for the rational utilisation of labour and

11 History seems to repeat itself as shown in the example of seasonal Polish workers contracted by OMI (Office des Migrations Internationales). This seasonal work program, mainly dedicated to agriculture, allowed the introduction of migrant workers, at first for a duration of six months extendable up to eight months. Since 2000, OMI contracts have increased once again, as about 15,000 were signed in 2006. This growth is mostly due to the arrival of Polish workers which increase each year and constitute nearly half of the total in 2006). Today, only three countries are eligible for this procedure - Morocco and Tunisia since 1963 and Poland since 1992. See section 4 below.
its protection.”

The Ministry of the Colonies has been in charge of the employment of the industrial and agricultural workers within the entirety of French territory, including its properties, colonies, and the countries that are under the French protectorate as well as, from 23 March 1917, North Africa.

Migration in the 1920s was characterised by increasing migrations from Eastern Europe. They were recruited by special organisations like the “Société générale de l’immigration”, sponsored by the French State. The majority of these immigrants came as whole families from Poland (Noiriel 2002:12), and were settled in areas where agricultural workers and miners were needed, particularly in Ile de France (agriculture) and Northern France (miners), but also to some extent in south-western France around Carmaux (miners). Although usually the men got a work permit, the women who came with a family residence permit also started to work.

The different temptations to regulate immigration following the needs of the labour market, by inventing new certificates and rules (“carte d’identité et de circulation pour les travailleurs coloniaux et étrangers” of 18 April 1917 and the obligation to produce a signed work contract approved by inspection) were inspired by the illusionary concern of controlling migration flows (Viet 2006: 19).

2.2.5 The foreign presence from 1914-1920

In this section, we shall focus our attention on the immigration of workers. Over the period 1914-1920, immigration of agricultural and industrial workers recruited by the Ministry of Armament, the Ministry of Agricultural and the Ministry of Labour included natives from the French colonies, and the Chinese, on the one hand, and European immigrant workers, on the other. Indeed, between 1914 and 1920, German, Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian prisoners were recruited in large numbers. This temporary emigration exceeded four and a half million adult men, at the end of 1918 (Huber,1931).

Of the 220,000 workers who arrived during this period, 37,000 were Chinese. Of the 183,000 colonial arrivals, 120,000 came from Northern Africa, 48,000 from Indochina, and 5,000 from Madagascar (see Table 5). The total number of their entries oscillated between 60,000 and 83,000 from 1916 to 1918. The North Africans were all repatriated in December 1918 and by the end of January 1921, there were only 6,000 Chinese in France (Ibid).

Table 5: Immigrant workers from the French colonies and Asia (in thousands), 1915-1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colony</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indochina</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>219.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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12 *Bulletin des usines de guerre*, no. 9, 26 juin 1916, pp. 68-69.
It is clear that the Department of Foreign Labour (at first attached to the Ministries of Agriculture and Armament, then to the Ministries of Agriculture and Labour) made efforts to introduce immigrant workers of “white race.” From July 1916, it recruited Italians, Poles, Dutch and Scandinavians, and in particular, Portuguese, Greeks and Spaniards. The latter appeared spontaneously at the Spanish border and entered France to work in agriculture and industry.

Maurice Huber estimates that up to 330,000 persons comprised the net immigration of foreigners in France (see Table 6 below). These were almost totally, Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese and Belgians. These nationalities contributed approximately 100,000 persons towards the repopulation of France.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality of origin</th>
<th>In thousands</th>
<th>In %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovaks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgians</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spaniards and Portuguese</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All nationalities</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A comparison of the censuses of 1911 and 1921 reveals that deaths exceeded births as well as a visible surplus of net immigration (difference between the net immigration of the foreigners and the net emigration of the French people).

### 2.2.6 Immigration from 1921 to 1939

In 1921, the population in France (French and foreign) turned out to be numerically insufficient for the needs of the reconstruction of the country (destroyed regions, agriculture, industry, communication routes). These could be satisfied only by massively introducing foreigners.

The data for this period is more numerous and more precise than for the previous periods, in particular French official statistics concerning:

- The entry and exit of immigrant workers
- Arrival and departure of Algerian “natives” (“indigènes”)

Official statistics from various sending countries such as Italy, Belgium, Poland and Czechoslovakia also provide ample information on those emigrating to France and also returning from France. The enumerations of the French censuses of 1921, 1926, 1931, 1936 also helps us in making further estimations.
2.2.7 Context and legal framework on the eve of World War II

French rules relating to the admission, stay, establishment and circulation of foreigners was always basic.

The Law of 16 July, 1912 modifying the previous Law of 8 August, 1893 required that all foreigners living in France register their place of residence at City Hall which had established a register and issued certificates of registration; any person employing a foreigner without a certificate of registration was liable to be fined.

The decree of 2 April, 1917 created a special identity card for all foreigners over the age of 15 staying in France for more than a fortnight. This card was to be presented to the mayor or the police captain at the arrival to or the departure from each locality. This decree was modified several times in 1917, 1922, 1924, 1925, and 1926 then by the laws of 30 November, 19 December, 1926 and of March, 1927, and finally by the decree of July 1929. One has to recall that in the 1920s, the United States of America had stopped immigration and France had welcomed many of those who were unable to emigrate to America.

The immigration of foreigners to France was made more difficult by the decrees of 20 April1932, 19 October 1932 and by the law of 12 August 1932 all of which sought to protect the national labour force. The decree of 6 February1935 clarified the conditions under which identity cards should be issued to foreigners.

Three types of working permits were issued:

- A permit allowing the exercise of a specified profession only in one or several French “departments”
- A permit allowing the exercise of a specified profession in all the departments
- An Identity Card allowing the exercise of all the occupations in the entire territory of France

The exercise by the foreigners of craft and commercial professions was subjected to similar rules --payment of a full tax for the delivery or the renewal of the card used as permit of stay and work permit, and to indicate a change of residence. It was also forbidden to employ a foreigner not provided with the card, to use him in a occupation or a sector other than those specified in the card and to employ a foreigner before the expiration of the contract of employment by virtue of which he entered France. Company managers had to declare the number of foreign workers they employed and to register them in a special register.

Until the middle of 1932, foreign immigration to France took place freely as immigrants could enter without any difficulty if they did not disclose their intention to take up paid employment. They could regularise their status afterwards by presenting a work contract.

2.2.8 The main migratory movements

From 1921 until 1930, the net immigration of foreigners to France can be estimated at being between 1,900,000 and 2 million persons (see Table 7). A caveat is necessary here however, because these figures differ from the net immigration figures supplied by foreign data on labour as well as Polish, Belgian and Italian statistics.
Table 7: Main migratory movements. Net immigration by nationalities of origin, 1921-1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalities of origin</th>
<th>Probable net immigration (in thousands)</th>
<th>In %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgians</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spaniards</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakians</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African subjects or protected French</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 950</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Recensement de 1921 et de 1931 et données des statistiques belges, italiennes et polonaises, in M. Huber, 1931, *La population de la France pendant la guerre*. Paris: PUF

2.2.9 Foreigners and naturalised individuals listed in France from 1921 till 1936

The intense immigration which occurred from 1929 onwards made it necessary to soften the conditions imposed for naturalisation by the law of 1889.

---

Law of 26 June 1889 “On nationality”

Art. 8. “Are French: […]
3° Any individual born in France of a foreigner who was born himself there;
4° Any individual born in France of a foreigner and who, at the time of his majority, has taken up residence in France, unless in the year which follows his majority, such as it is regulated by the French law, he did not decline the quality of French [… ];
5° The naturalized foreigners. Can be naturalized:
1° The foreigners who obtained the authorization to fix their place of residence in France, after 3 years of place of residence […]
2° The foreigners who can prove a residence not interrupted for 10 years […]
3° The foreigners allowed to fix their place of residence in France, after 1 year, if they rendered services important to France […]
4° The foreigner who married a Frenchwoman, also after one year of authorized place of residence.

It is ruled by decree at request of naturalisation, after an investigation of the morality of the foreigner.”

Art. 9 “every individual born in France of a foreigner and who has not taken up residence at the time of his majority there, can, up to the age of 22, make his wish to fix in France his place of residence and […] to claim the quality of French […].”

Art. 12. “The foreigner who will have married a Frenchman will follow the condition of her husband. The woman married to a foreigner who is naturalised as French and the major children of the naturalised foreigner will be able, if they ask for it, to obtain the quality of French without the condition of taking a training course.”

---

A decisive step in the history of the law on French nationality is reached because – for the first time – the word "nationality" appears in the title of a law which will govern access to French nationality, until 1927. Decided after long debates (the deposit of the law dates to 1882), this law is more important for demographic reasons (decline of the birth-rate mainly) than because of the obligatory military service from which the foreigners escape. By this extensive revision, the State introduces new measures which aims to facilitate access to French nationality, by foreigners. For example, the State automatically attributes French nationality to those born in France to foreign parents, when they reach adulthood (Art 8.4 ). This law also widens the possibility of access to French nationality for the 2nd generation thanks to the “statement” by the father of minors born in France (Art. 9). On the other hand, given that this civil code assigns women only the status of minors, those who marry a foreigner lose their quality of French citizen.

Law of 10 August, 1927 “On Nationality”

Art. 2. “Are French, except the faculty to reject this quality in the year which will follow their majority, such as it is regulated by the French law:

1° Every legitimate child born in France of a foreign mother who was born herself there;
2° Every natural child born in France of foreign parents, when the one by which he did not have to follow the nationality […] is born himself in France. […] the faculty of renouncement stops : a. If during the minority of the child the surviving father or the mother of the legitimate child […] were naturalised or restored […]”

Art. 3. “Can, up to the age of 21 accomplished years, become French any individual born in France of a foreigner and domiciled in France, which will declare to demand the quality of French […]”

Art. 4. “Every individual born in France of a foreigner becomes French, at the age of 21, unless, in the year which follows his majority, he declined the quality of French […]”

Art. 6. “Acquire the French nationality the naturalized foreigners: naturalization is granted by decree returned after an inquiry into the foreigner.

Can be naturalised […]

1° The past 18-year-old foreigners, who can prove a residence not interrupted for 3 years in France. […]
2° The past 18-year-old foreigners, after 1 year of continuous residence in France, they rendered services important to France […]”

Art. 7 “Can obtain the naturalisation, without condition, of training courses the major or minor woman, married to a foreigner who acquires after marriage the French nationality, and the major children of this foreigner. Become French, the legitimate or legitimised unmarried minors, of a surviving father or mother who is naturalised French or acquires the French nationality by application of articles 3 and 4 […]The married minors have the power to request French naturalisation without condition of a training course, after the age of 18 years.”

Art. 8. “The foreign woman who marries a Frenchman acquires the quality of Frenchwoman only at her express demand […]. The French woman, who marries a foreigner, keeps the French nationality unless she expressly demands to want to acquire […] the nationality of this last one.”

---

15 From 1927 to 1974, there was still unequal treatment of men and women. The foreign woman who married a Frenchman automatically became French while the foreign man who married a French woman could not become French.
This new law on nationality brings several innovations regarding the previous one, notably the reduction of the time of stay which is reduced from 10 to 3 years (Art. 6). Additionally, the French woman acquires the possibility of not following any more the condition of her husband in case of marrying a foreigner (Art. 8).

Finally, it is necessary to note the absolute link between the naturalisation of the parents and the nationality of the minors (Art. 2). Also, the principle established by the law of 1889 according to which a foreign child born in France can acquire French nationality by issuing a simple statement is maintained (Art. 3). If as previously these measures answer concerns of demographic order, they nevertheless present a favourable sign to the foreigners who wish to obtain French nationality for themselves or for their descendants.

The statistics regarding foreign immigration highlight the considerable increase of foreign immigration to France from 1921 until 1931 and its decrease between 1931 and 1936 (see Table 8 below). It confirms the results relative to the present population listed for those same dates. The number of foreigners increased by 1,530,000 in 1921, it was 2,715,000 in 1931 to fall again to 2,198,000 in 1936. The total increase of 1,185,000 foreigners in the first ten years is 77 per cent faster for the first period, 1921-1926, than for the next five year period, when the spaces opened up after the war were partially filled and labour needs less imperative.

From 1931 until 1936, the number of foreigners decreased by 517,000, i.e., 23 per cent, as a result of departures, naturalisations and instances of “becoming French”. On the contrary, the number of naturalisations was stable and close to 250,000 between 1921 and 1926, amounted to 361,000 in 1931 and then to 517,000 in 1936. In fifteen years, it thus increased by 237,000, that is, 104 per cent, compared to the numbers in 1921.

Table 8: Foreigners and naturalised immigrants in France, 1921-1936

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Foreigners in thousands</th>
<th>Foreigners per 10,000 inhabitants</th>
<th>Naturalised in thousands</th>
<th>Naturalised per 10,000 inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>2,409</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>2,715(A)</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>361(B)</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>2,198(C)</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>517(D)</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(A) including 1,656,000 men and 1,059,000 women  
(B) including 154,000 men and 207,000 women  
(C) including 1,273,000 men and 925,000 women  
(D) including 228,000 men and 289 women

Sources: Recensement de 1926 (Etrangers et naturalisés), Recensement de 1931 and de 1936 (population totale étrangers et naturalisés)

In 1921, out of 10,000 inhabitants, there were 395 foreigners and 66 naturalised individuals. Ten years later, the corresponding figures were 658 for foreigners and 88 for naturalised individuals, per 10,000 inhabitant. In 1936, we see no more than 534 foreigners for 10,000 inhabitants but the proportion of naturalised individuals amounted to 126 per 10,000 persons.
From 1914-1918 and up to 1920, foreign immigrants residing in France considerably differed from their predecessors before 1911. Polish immigrants formed the most numerous group; the immigration of French colons from Africa, Czechoslovakians, Yugoslavs, Romanians and Armenians (more than 62,000 refugees in the spring of 1939) increased considerably. In contrast, movements of Belgian, Swiss and German immigrants slowed down while Italian immigration remained about the same until it decreased rapidly at the beginning of the thirties.

The assimilation of each new group proved difficult. However, the multiplicity countries from which immigrants were arriving decreased the risk of France having to rely primarily on a small number of neighbouring countries for its workforce (Bunle, 1943).

3. THE BIRTH OF IMMIGRATION POLICY AND MIGRATIONS AFTER 1945

France has an immigration policy, produced by its history, which is not always obvious or evident. “It has a policy, which means that it was equipped with precise rules as regards the entry, the stay and possibly of the return of the immigrants” (Weil, 2004). It is not until the second half of the 19th century that the immigration appeared as a “problem”.

It must be noted that the first attempts of collective immigration already began in 1908 and extended until 1914. Between 1924 and 1930, the general Company of immigration (S.G.I – Société Générale d’immigration), a special private organization, introduced 406,950 foreigners, that is, only 35 per cent of the totality of the issued titles. In 1928, there were 21,620 regularizations, 43,928 in 1929 and more than 60,000 in 1930.

Gradually from the thirties on, the main questions raised included:

- Is it necessary to distinguish between political refugees and economic immigrants?
- Is it necessary to select the immigrants based on ethnic criteria, or, on the contrary, to refuse, in the name of the principle of equality, entry to specific nationals?
- Is it necessary to keep immigrants in a legal limbo which inevitably confers a provisionality of presence, or to stabilize them in order to integrate them or to integrate them to stabilize them? (Ibid.)

In the general context of crisis surrounding the approach of World War II, the new government crafted a number of measures which led to increasing police surveillance of foreigners, in 1938. Daladier “laws-decrees” was a policy introduced in the name of national defence and sought to neutralise the fear foreigners inspired in numerous French people. Besides their repressive aspect, these “laws-decrees” mark the first attempt to regulate all aspects of the entry and settlement of foreigners in France.

3.1 French policies and immigrant businesses

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17 This activity, as Jean-Charles Bonnet underlines it, is very lucrative as shown through the earnings of the S.G.I. which shifted from 2 - 3 million francs in 1924-1925, to 20 million in 1930. The sums to be distributed between the shareholders being, 1,678,299 francs in 1925, 4,280,473 francs in 1926, 1,475,645 francs in 1927, 3,341,123 francs in 1928, 11,193,883 francs in 1929, and 7,404,091 francs in 1930 (see Bonnet, 1976, quoted in Weil, 2004).
The discriminatory laws of the 1930s towards foreigners allowed the government to fix limits on the proportion of immigrant workers who could be employed in industrial or commercial companies and in liberal professions, following the request of the labour and employers' unions.

To this day, many sectors of economic activity remain closed to immigrants, but nationals from EU member countries retain a privileged position because they are entitled to practice the profession of their choice on the territory of any member state. Thus, these restrictions apply mainly to nationals from non-EU states: in France, this means African and Asian immigrants.

People who do not hold French citizenship are barred from working as health care professionals such as physicians, dental surgeons, midwives, pharmacists and veterinarians (CERC, 1999). The Armbruster Law of 1933 limited the exercise of medicine only to the French and nationals of countries placed under the protectorate of France, provided that their doctorate of medicine was acquired in France. Licensed architects were subject to the same requirements, as were surveyors, certified public accountants and those in the legal profession. As a result, not only did notary publics, bailiffs, and licensed auctioneers have to have French nationality, but also court-appointed administrators, estate brokers and attorneys. Foreign lawyers could not practice in France unless their country was a signatory to a reciprocity convention. The severity of this rule however was attenuated by the existence of a fairly large number of such agreements which enabled immigrants from former colonies to practice. Due to legislative barriers, it is understandable why the number of professionals was so low among foreigners: just over 3,000, representing about 1 percent of the total number of licensed professionals in France (Ibid.).

As for the large companies, they were animated by their own interests and were urging the government to act differently. Agriculture was thus not concerned by the law of 1932 and as for industry, the administration applied the quota rules in a rather lax fashion until 1934. By that time, the decision not to grant any more workers' cards to new migrants was taken, which in a sense, was equivalent to stopping the immigration of salaried workers.

3.2 The laisser-faire attitude: 1945 - 1962

The years after World War II were marked by a long period of economic growth in the industrialized countries of Europe and was commonly called in France “the thirty glorious [years]” (“Trente glorieuses”).

Several characteristics of this period can be identified:

- Increased exploitation of labour due to the use of more advanced machinery and more efficient work practices
- The use of a large variety of raw materials and energy resources brought over from the colonies and other ‘poor’ countries (Cordeiro, 1987)
- North-American investments attracted by favourable conditions (less expensive labour force, infrastructures, purchasing power widened by an increase in wages) Labour force available in abundance in the rural areas of Mediterranean countries which softened the jolts of the economic crisis, for employers.
It is at this time too that the management of the immigrant labour force entered a new phase: with the ordinance of 2 November 1945, the State took charge of formulating migratory policy with reference to prospecting operations, grouping of job offers, the “professional” and “medical” selection as well as the recruitment of immigrant workers.

This ordinance, “relative to the conditions of entry and stay in France of the foreigners and to the creation of the National Office of the Immigration,” was inspired in a less repressive sense by the pre-war rule. The will of the State at the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century was thus to control immigration through coherent legislation instead of abandoning it to the fluctuations of the market. However, it soon became clear that the State’s attempt to control the entry of foreign labour was a failure. The National Office of Immigration (“Office National de l’Immigration” - l’ONI ), supposed to have a monopoly on the recruitment and in introduction of foreign workers to French territories, could not meet the demand for labour. In fact, the demand for labour was so great that, until the end of the 1960s, immigrant workers entering France without work permits could easily find jobs which then allowed them to regularise their situation afterwards (admission au travail).

Thus, the majority of worker entries took place independently of existing legal procedures of entry. Migratory policy consisted primarily of facilitating such entries by relaxing border controls and encouraging immigration to meet the increasing demands for labour within the industrial sector. Tables 9 and 10 below provide a useful breakdown of different nationalities who immigrated to France from 1946 to 1999 (see also Table A6 in the Annex).

Table 9: Foreigners according to nationality, at various censuses, 1946-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>24,947</td>
<td>53,760</td>
<td>46,606</td>
<td>43,724</td>
<td>42,955</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>52,723</td>
<td>76,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgians</td>
<td>153,299</td>
<td>106,828</td>
<td>79,069</td>
<td>65,224</td>
<td>55,945</td>
<td>52,636</td>
<td>56,129</td>
<td>66,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spaniards</td>
<td>302,201</td>
<td>288,923</td>
<td>441,658</td>
<td>607,184</td>
<td>497,480</td>
<td>327,156</td>
<td>216,047</td>
<td>160,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians</td>
<td>450,764</td>
<td>507,602</td>
<td>628,956</td>
<td>571,684</td>
<td>462,940</td>
<td>340,308</td>
<td>252,759</td>
<td>200,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>22,261</td>
<td>20,085</td>
<td>50,010</td>
<td>296,448</td>
<td>758,925</td>
<td>767,304</td>
<td>649,714</td>
<td>555,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>423,470</td>
<td>269,269</td>
<td>177,181</td>
<td>131,668</td>
<td>93,655</td>
<td>64,804</td>
<td>47,127</td>
<td>33,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavs *</td>
<td>20,858</td>
<td>17,159</td>
<td>21,314</td>
<td>47,544</td>
<td>70,280</td>
<td>62,472</td>
<td>52,453</td>
<td>50,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerians</td>
<td>22,114</td>
<td>21,167</td>
<td>350,484</td>
<td>473,812</td>
<td>710,690</td>
<td>805,116</td>
<td>614,207</td>
<td>475,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>16,458</td>
<td>10,734</td>
<td>33,320</td>
<td>84,236</td>
<td>260,025</td>
<td>441,308</td>
<td>572,652</td>
<td>506,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisians</td>
<td>1,916</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>26,569</td>
<td>61,028</td>
<td>139,735</td>
<td>190,800</td>
<td>206,336</td>
<td>153,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>7,770</td>
<td>5,273</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7,628</td>
<td>50,860</td>
<td>122,260</td>
<td>197,712</td>
<td>205,589</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Recensement de la population (INSEE, 1999)

*Yugoslavs, in 1999 including former Yugoslavs

Table 10: Foreigners according to nationality, at various censuses, 1946-1999 (%)
Foreign European Economic Community nationals escaped the control of the ONI (Office National d’Immigration). As for the Algerians, their freedom of circulation was recognised by the agreements of Evian. Consequently, the system of “regularisation” was adopted. This means that the entry and recruitment of workers arriving without passing by the ONI were hired outside the gates of the factories. Thus from 1945 until 1955, the number of Algerian workers in France increased by 240,000 (Cordeiro, 1987). This almost unlimited supply of workers who spontaneously appeared outside factory gates and construction sites enabled small and medium-sized firms to save on the expense of prospecting and recruiting labour (Rager, 1956). Considering the temporary character of this migration (predominantly men generally emigrating for a few years while leaving families at home), the actual arrival figures (before deduction of departures) could be about 400,000, that is roughly 50,000 a year (Cordeiro, 1987).

### 3.3 From 1962 to the 1974 crisis: the beginning of social policy

From the beginning of the 1960s, the immigrant workforce entering France became much more diversified due to many Algerians fleeing the French-Algerian conflict for independence. The French State also negotiated and signed bi-lateral labour agreements with Morocco, Tunisia and Portugal in 1963, and Yugoslavia and Turkey in 1965. This opened up other markets of recruitment but no measures to organise immigration globally were taken (Costa-Lascoux and Weil, 1992). At the same time, the rate of regularisation of the first migrants to arrive without an employment contract (61 per cent in 1963, 69 per cent in 1964, 79 per cent in 1965) indicating that the State encouraged employers to use the procedure of regularisation for non-contracted newcomers (Cordeiro, 1987).

This period also marked the beginning of a more coherent social policy towards migrant workers and their families, by playing a direct part in the maintenance and renewal of labour. Several key developments can be identified during this period:
• The SONACOTRAL, created in 1956, whose role was to construct homes for single or “isolated” workers as well as provide housing for immigrant Algerian families, transforms into SONACOTRA, in 1963, and extends its sphere of activity to all the migrants.

• The Social Action Fund for Muslim workers of Algeria and their families, created in 1958, in metropolitan France, transforms into the Social Action Fund for Migrant Workers (Fond d’action sociale-FAS), in 1964. Its jurisdiction is extended to all migrants (except for the French Overseas departments and Territories migrants, “DOM-TOM”) and then to other social groups “raising problems of adaptation comparable to those of the migrant workers.” Over the course of almost 10 years, its action is mainly focused on the accommodation of “isolated” or single workers. Then the financing of accommodation is relegated to a position of secondary importance. In 2001, it becomes the “FASILD” --Action and Support for Integration and Fight against Discriminations Fund (Law 16 November 2001), replaced by the “ACSE” -- Social Cohesion and Equality for opportunity Agency, in October 2006.

3.3.1 First attempts at a migratory control policy

In February 1969, the Economic and Social Council (integrating the Calvez Report) recommended the "increased control of migratory flows." The Calvez Report made a distinction between immigration intended to become integrated into the French population and specifically economic immigration without “vocation of assimilation”, on the basis of temporary stays which clearly targeted Arabs and black Africans (Cordeiro, 1981).

It meant an immigration inflow which “cannot be assimilated” (“non-assimilables”) which would supply the resources necessary for the integration of those who “can be assimilated” (“assimilables”). This had to cover not only economic but also demographic needs, and were intended to be profitable for “social policy”. It is also at this time that the Laroque Report provided arguments for a family immigration policy.

The Fontanet-Marcellin decree (February 1972) provided the occasion for the government to question ONI’s monopoly on the recruitment of immigrants. The policy of migratory flows control between 1968 and 1974 aimed at perfecting the traditional regulation from the point of view of nationalities (quota systems, advantages differentiated in social-security benefits and in training, etc.).

The permissive conditions for isolated workers and families were made more difficult through increased and selective control (under the pretext of “improving the reception”), focusing on the permanent crisis of their living conditions (Cordeiro, 1987). In spite of unemployment rates rising, after 1968, the entry of new migrants reached historic record levels -- about 200,000 a year during 1969, 1970 and 1971.

3.3.2 The biggest wave of family immigration: 1965 - 1973

Between 1961 and 1964, family immigration reached annual averages of about 45,000 units, peaking to about 55,000 units during the mid 1960s. Between 1970 and 1973, entries
sometimes exceeded 80,000, with an annual average of about 77,500. Family migration comprised, for the most part, female spouses and non-adult children. But with the constant increase of women admitted as workers and many of them being married (Morokvasic 1975), family immigration underwent an important transformation (Tapinos 1975). It clearly became an important channel to the labour market especially after the 1974 recruitment stop. For the 1965-1973 period, about 600,000 persons entered within the family reunification framework (Cordeiro, 1987). It was the biggest wave of family immigration into France with women and children coming to join Portuguese and Algerian workers. This trend continues even today among these two nationalities, and even persisted during the years of economic crisis. We have also noticed a rise in Moroccan and Turkish family immigration, though these numbers are not as high as among the former two nationalities.

In the years that followed, these families accounted for hundreds of thousands of births --there were 732,064 births of which one of the parents at least was foreign, for the period 1966-1974. Such a high rate was due to young couples arriving in France during this period (see Table 11 for arrivals disaggregated according to sex). Perceptible differences between Portuguese and Algerian immigrant families could also be identified (Cordeiro, 1987):

- Among the Portuguese, there was an increase in the number of newly-weds and young parents. Many women had their first child in France. They often took up house cleaning in order to bring in a second salary.
- Among the Algerians, many of whom had been resident in France for a long time, the number of children born in France was higher than in the case of Portuguese families, not only reflecting a higher fertility rate but also a longer marital life.

### Table 11: Foreigners according to sex in thousands, at various censuses, 1946-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>1083000</td>
<td>1292000</td>
<td>1606300</td>
<td>1841280</td>
<td>2186830</td>
<td>2178816</td>
<td>2168271</td>
<td>2166318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>902871</td>
<td>1001000</td>
<td>1254980</td>
<td>1439780</td>
<td>1700630</td>
<td>1858220</td>
<td>1997681</td>
<td>2139776</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Recensement de la population, INSEE, 1999

According to the Eurostat data there has been a feminization trend in Europe. In France the proportion of women in foreign population rose to 51.4 per cent in 2004 against 50.9 per cent in 1994.

---

18 The arrival of a spouse active in the labour force and subsequent double salary in the family was seen as an opportunity for migrants to realise their migratory project faster and return to the home country.
3.3.3 The job market in France: a particular economic situation

There also appeared two new elements which had an impact on the job market:

- At the beginning of the 1950s, there was an inflow of young newcomers to the job market after extension of their schooling
- A behavioural change occurred among the younger generations of French women who started working as well as continued working after they had their first or second child. The employment rate of married women shifted from 33.7 per cent in 1968 to 40 per cent in 1975. In 1962, 46 per cent of the women between the ages of 25 and 29, married or single, was employed. This figure increased to 63 per cent in 1975. In 1962, only one woman out of four who had two children was employed; in 1975, almost one in two was employed.\(^\text{19}\)

Over the period 1968-1975, 28.7 per cent of those employed were immigrants rather than young people or women who had joined the workforce. Immigrant men contributed 60.7 per cent of the industrial workforce. For example, the immigrant workforce employed at the Renault car company increased from 9,800 to 22,000, from 1967 to 1970.

Table 12: Working population and working foreign population in different socio-professional groups in 1999 (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Experts, skilled workers, apprentices</th>
<th>Semi-skilled workers</th>
<th>Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>46.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>77.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: Recensement de la population, INSEE, 1999

Source: Recensement de la population, INSEE, 1999

Table 13: Working population and working foreign population in economic sectors in 1999 (in %)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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Source: Recensement de la population, INSEE, 1999
3.4 The labour migration halt of 1974 and gradual implementation of integration policies

During the first oil crisis of 1974, the French government followed other major destination countries by stopping immigration of workers and imposing rigorous controls on migratory flows. Basically, the objective was not only to stop immigration but also to reduce the foreign population residing in France. Initiatives to encourage the return of immigrants to their countries of origin were taken, but they had only very limited effects and only a few thousand persons left France.

At the same time, family reunification measures were implemented to favour the arrival of spouses and children. Family reunification was regulated by the decree of 29 April, 1976, signed by Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. It aimed at regulating the practice – then common – of on-the-spot regularisation. The spouse and children of an immigrant could then obtain a residence permit if the head of the family was regularly settled for one year, had "stable, sufficient" resources, and adequate accommodation. The length of stay in France and family links became stronger assets than work, for immigrants who wanted to obtain residence permits.

Immigration has continued at the rate of several tens of thousand persons a year until today but it is no longer an immigration of labour. Between 1975 and 1998, immigrant arrivals averaged around 73,000 per year, with variations ranging from 55,000 in 1985 to 118,000 in 1998. The total number of immigrants during this period of "migration halt" was 1,760,000 while from 1950 till 1974, the period when immigration was encouraged, it was only 1,330,000. In 1999, 4,310,000 immigrants were counted in France by the INSEE that is 7.4 per cent of the total metropolitan population (see Table 14).

3.5 The 1980’s: the stabilization of the immigrant population

The law of 10 January, 1980 (the so called “Bonnet law”) directly attacked illegal immigrants by modifying for the first time the ordinance of 1945. From then on, illegal entry or irregular stay could be reasons for deportation as well as considered a threat to public order. The new political discourse in 1981 and the socialists in power broke with the previous period and foreigners were no longer regarded as a pool of labour but massive regularisation campaign was carried out in 1981/82 regularizing some 130,000 of 150,000 immigrants who filed requests). The economic sectors concerned were primarily construction (Garson and Mouhoub 1987) and garment manufacturing (Morokvasic 1987). The law of 17 July 1984 gave concrete expression to residence in France: it also combined the right of stay with the right to gain employment. From then on two categories of residence permits were issued: the

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20 For INSEE, those counted as immigrants were people who were foreign or French by acquisition, i.e., born outside French national territory. A French person by birth - albeit born in another country – was not recorded as an immigrant. This criteria was also applied for persons of foreign nationality, or someone who was French by acquisition, if he or she was born on French territory.

The definition of INSEE thus combines a criterion of nationality (nationality for a foreigner, or the nationality of origin for someone who is French by acquisition) with a geographical criterion (country of birth).

21 From 1935 to 1984, foreigners who wished to engage in trade had to apply for a special license as ‘foreign merchants’. These licenses were only granted in very limited numbers by local administrations.
automatically renewable ten year residence card introduced in 1984, enabling access to the labour market in any sector and anywhere in France, and the temporary residence permit valid one year.

It was at the same time that a progressive implementation of an urban policy was carried out in the urban areas marked by social problems (eg., unemployment, housing, criminality, juvenile delinquency). This policy did not specifically target immigrants but rather “families with problems” who were nevertheless linked with immigrant populations. In December 1989, the High Council of Integration (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration - a follow-up of the previous Conseil National des populations immigrées) was established with the mission to make propositions in favour of integration.

Table 14: Total population and foreigners in France at various censuses, 1946-1999

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>absolute</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39,848,182</td>
<td>46,458,956</td>
<td>52,599,430</td>
<td>54,295,612</td>
<td>56,651,955</td>
<td>58,513,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>1,743,619</td>
<td>2,169,665</td>
<td>3,442,415</td>
<td>3,714,200</td>
<td>3,596,602</td>
<td>3,258,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in %</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
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In 1977, job-seekers who wanted to create or to take over companies (‘L’Aide aux Chômeurs Créateurs ou Repreneurs d'Entreprise’ - ACCRE) benefited from a grant equivalent to a capitalization of their unemployment benefits. This measure enabled job-seekers to create their own firms and thus create their own avenues of employment. After a period of experiment (until 1979), this measure to combat unemployment was legalized, although it was always managed and financed by the social partners (‘Union nationale interprofessionnelle pour l'emploi dans l'industrie et le commerce’ - Unédic) until 1984.

The State took over the responsibility for managing this measure, with the transformation of the insurance unemployment scheme which created two regimes: the conventional regime (Unédic) and the solidarity regime (public). In the Law of 3 January, 1985, the ACCRE supported citizens’ rights and extended to all categories of paid unemployed persons, in conformity with the conventional regime or with the regime of solidarity. Its success and the budgetary incidences that went with it, in addition to widening the field of recipients to the public, encouraged the authorities to modify the measure.

The decree of 1987 put a halt to automatic financial aid to the jobless; the ACCRE remained an entitlement by right, but in addition to administrative conditions of eligibility concerning the person, its attribution from then on was subjected to the appreciation related to the economic feasibility of the project: the request for help had to be accompanied by a file which allowed the administration to appreciate the reality and the economic consistency of the projects.

The local Authority (Prefect) made his decision after having taken the opinion of a departmental committee (collegial authority made up of members of the administration and qualified personalities: networks, consular chambers, etc). This capacity of appreciation left to the administration gave this measure a certain discretionary character.
In the nineties, a better awareness of racial discrimination marked an important re-orientation of the integration policy. At the public action level, it resulted in the creation of the GELD.\textsuperscript{22} The Group to Study and Fight against Discrimination (GELD) is an organization financed by the government with the mission to identify and analyze the different forms of discrimination which take place in the job market and in housing and to propose and carry out measures aimed to fight them.

3.5.1 The 1990’s: the hardening of immigration policy

In 1993, "the Pasqua laws" marked a turning point in immigration policy but they were in fact the implementation of plans prepared by the preceding government. If there was any transformation, it had already been started by the political community, of the left-hand side as right-hand side, for several years\textsuperscript{23}. There has thus been a continuity in the main trends of French migratory policy of the last twenty years, whatever the ideological position of the respective governments (Ma Mung, 2003). These laws were not only the result of an internal evolution in France but also a translation of the recommendations of the European authorities within the framework of the agreements of Schengen and the Treaty of Maastricht (Costa-Lascoux, 1993). They marked the beginning of the end of the specificity of French policy on migration directed at an immigration of settlement.

These measures represent a hardening of French policy on migration. The objective was to limit foreign presence. They were also aimed at fighting against illegal immigration that had been tolerated and even encouraged during the years of economic expansion where the majority of the workers entered France without following the legal procedures of entry. Moreover, the question of the integration of foreigners, which was always posed like compensation of the restrictive policies, did not produce additional measures intended to support integration. With the turning point being the 1990s, expulsion from France – considered, until then, as an extreme measure – became a key element of migratory policy (Marie, 2002).

The Pasqua laws related to three fields: the code of nationality, the control of migratory flows (conditions of entry, reception and settlement) and identity checks.

- The reform of the code of nationality was the measure which caused the most arguments because it broke with the tradition of automatic attribution of French nationality on the people who filled certain requirements. Thus the children of foreigners born in France who could by the \textit{jus soli} obtain without formality French nationality would have to from now on express their will to become French, the naturalisation process acquired a voluntary dimension. As we have already underlined, integration in France was originally conceived as incorporation into the nation. This reform which limits – in the spirit more than in the facts – access to French nationality broke with the French tradition of integration since foreigners no longer had an

\textsuperscript{22} Groupe d’Études et de Lutte contre les Discriminations / Group to Study and Fight against Discrimination.

\textsuperscript{23} In 1990, Michel Rocard, Prime Minister for the socialist government declared: “France cannot accomodate all the misery of the world”. Even if it were not the objective of the Prime Minister, this declaration was regarded as a mark of hardening with regard to immigration.
automatic vocation to become French. However, the obligation to express the will to become French disappeared in 1998.

- The control of migratory flows also gave rise to many arguments. They concerned the rules of entry of foreigners, the conditions of delivery of the residence permits, family reunification, the right to asylum and more severe identity checks. The rules of entry from abroad remained basically the same, it was their execution that was the subject of a more severe and strict application.

They resulted in a reinforcement of the control of entries starting from an already existing legislative device. On the other hand, the arrangements relating to the stay introduced more modifications and aimed at limiting the conditions of delivery of a residence permit – both the temporary and the ten-year, permanent one. The residence permits became increasingly difficult to obtain. In addition, it was from then on possible to withdraw the permanent residence permit to a polygamous foreigner who would not have declared his situation at the time of delivery of this title. This measure provoked many contradictory debates on polygamy.

The conditions under which family reunification could take place became more restrictive and had dissuasive impact. To the already existing requirements --sufficient resources to support the family, housing adapted to accommodate them all-- some new ones were added : the requirement that approval from the mayor of the commune of residence opened the possibility of arbitrary decisions (extreme right wing officials used such requirements to the maximum), duration of residence before such claims could be extended and, in the case of a polygamous family, reunification was allowed only with one wife and the children of this wife.

As Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux (1993) underlines, it was in the measures concerning family reunification that the essence of the restrictive policy of the “Pasqua laws” resided. Twinned with arrangements for the right to asylum, this dissuasive effect was reinforced.

The 1990s also mark a turning point with regard to political asylum. Political asylum was aligned with immigration and the right to asylum limited. The applicants requesting asylum were suspected to be economic migrants using this procedure to circumvent the closing of borders to economic immigration. Political asylum applicants were now required to bring very precise evidence of individual persecutions. A person fleeing his or her country due to feeling threatened for his/her political, religious or ethnic convictions but not actually been imprisoned or abused for holding such views, could be refused admission and expected to leave French territory within one month. Indeed, the rejection of asylum requests increased considerably in the 1990s and reached 83 percent in 2001.

Policies with regard to political asylum in France evolved through a restrictive interpretation of the Geneva Convention – for example, persecutions carried out by non-state agents were not included in the scope of the Convention thus enabling France to refuse refugee status to Algerian intellectuals who had fled their country because they were threatened by Islamic terrorists. In France, as in the other European countries, one passed from the “right to leave” to the “right to remain in his country” enabling countries in which many sought asylum to place a limit on the arrival of asylum applicants (Legoux, 2002). This situation gave rise to phenomena such as the camp at Sangatte where nearly 40,000 applicants seeking asylum in the United Kingdom were kept. The way in which the problematic situation of the camp at
Sangatte\textsuperscript{24} was solved illustrates how the question of political refugees and asylum applicants was treated as a migratory problem rather than being an issue about providing political protection.

3.6 Migrations from West Africa to Europe and the United States

In the last two centuries, forced migration within African regions was due to several factors: slave trade, colonial and postcolonial wars and conflicts, climate changes and, to a lesser extent, demographic growth in Africa. From 1950 to 2000, the migration from rural areas to cities rose from 20 to 410 million people (Guillon 2005: 167). Emigration to Northern European countries also often started from urban areas. The first migration flows to France began during the colonial period with soldiers recruited in the French army, during the two World Wars, and a smaller number of students and intellectuals coming to study in France. Migrants seeking work followed later.

Certain regions in Africa became particularly well known for the number of soldiers who enlisted from those areas e.g. the Soninké region around Senegal River, from which most of the \textit{tirailleurs sénégalais} came. Between the two World Wars, a large number of them worked as dockers in Le Havre and Marseille. The migration paths created during that period still exist and Soninké are known as \textit{marchands de sommeil}, as renters of rooms to new migrants arriving in Marseille today.

After African colonies achieved independence, migration flows were facilitated and intensified by free circulation agreements. Paris and its surroundings offered the most amount of opportunities in low-skilled jobs. Migrant networks operate certain job sectors such as cleaning, especially street cleaning, due to sub-contracting from industrial cleaning firms, in the late 1960s. Many of these networks were sustained through links of kinship and geography and thus enabled chain migrations with older, more experienced migrants established in France helping younger, more recent migrants from Africa. For example, an older inhabitant of a Senegalese or Malian village who was established in France, took care of a younger man, paid his journey and often offered his place to live, sometimes even his job. The official immigration halt, proclaimed in 1974, affected this well-rooted system, although the factors leading to emigration remained. From 1975 onwards, young unmarried workers who used to circulate through different European countries, stopped this practice and remained in France fearing they may not get a new visa if they sought to re-enter France.

| Table 15: Africans and naturalised French from Sub-Saharan Africa, France 1982-1999 |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                                  | 1982            | 1990            | 1999            |
|                                  | A. N. Fr. Total | A. N. Fr. Total | A. N. Fr. Total |
| 148,931                          | 28,940          | 177,871         | 239,947         | 67,955          | 307,902         | 282,902         | 164,785         | 447,521         |

A = Africans  
N. Fr. = Naturalised French from Sub-Saharan Africa  
Source: INSEE

\textsuperscript{24}See the documentary “Sangatte Seaside Resort” (Sangatte – station balnéaire), 2002, by Naïma Bouferkas, Benjamin Durand, Nicolas Potin, Wassila Zahzouma. Focusing on everyday life at this refugee centre run by the Red Cross, the film directors explore notions of “humanitarianism”, “refugeeness” and “right of asylum.”
The statistics provided in Table 15 indicate a growing number of immigrants from 1982 to 1999 despite the official “end” of immigration policy as well as a growing number of naturalisations.

At each period, migration policy had different aims, used different strategies and had different consequences for France as well as for the sending countries. The different temptations to regulate immigration following the needs of the labour market did not allow for the controlling of migration flows (Viet 2006: 19). Concerning West African migrants, the experience of exclusion and the feeling of being downgraded led an increasing number of highly skilled migrants to leave Europe and France for the United States (Salzbrunn 2004). European governments began to realise the consequences of their interior policy on individual migrants, and tried from then on to attract highly-skilled immigrants ("Plein droit, no.73). In France, the new legislation of 2007 created a special residence permit entitled “skill and talent” to enable the entry of highly-skilled migrants.

4. CONTEMPORARY DIMENSIONS OF MIGRATION POLICIES

4.1 The impact of history on contemporary debates

There was a tension/contradiction for one century and a half between a migratory phenomenon which became massive but necessary for the French economy, in particular large companies, and the processes of social construction of the French nation, which was based on the distinction between the national and the foreigner²⁵.

The integration of foreigners has been and is still conceived as integration in the nation of future French citizens rather than as integration in a society of people keeping their foreign identities. The French pattern of integration in the nation is based on the integration of individuals and not of religious, regional or ethnic groups (Schnapper, 1994).

Thus, we can say that immigration has always been thought of, implicitly, as a definitive settlement of people who were supposed to /expected to become French. As a result, a code of nationality was drawn up during the nineteenth century which made the acquisition of French nationality much easier (Law of 26 June 1889 “On nationality” which is discussed in Section 2.2.9).

As Emmanuel Ma Mung (2003) notes, this conception of immigration encourages immigrant workers to become French. This makes the category of “foreigner” rather ambivalent --it is positive when the “foreigner” is thought of as an individual who is going to become a national and thus ready to lose his/her foreignness, and negative when the “foreigner” chooses not to become French. The “foreigner” is tolerated on the sole condition that he disappears -- not physically but semantically. This national concern with coupling immigration with integration has thus had a major effect on national migration policy. Immigration in France thus always had and continues to have two dimensions: an economic dimension which resorts to a foreign workforce and a demographic dimension which is interested in “populating” France.

²⁵ See Gérard Noiriel, 1988. le Creuset français, le Seuil, p. 78-80. The words “immigration” and “immigrants” first appeared during the Industrial Revolution, a period in which mass migrations of people took place.
4.2 Migration policy: A return to circular migration and multi-entry visa?

Different social practices of migration have consequences for public policy. This is an area which requires much further research and analysis. However, it is our assumption that mobility and circulation is increasing today. The processes of settlement are also changing, particularly because of the modification of juridical and economic frameworks (e.g., several migrants tend to settle and to become “undocumented” after the expiration of their residence permits because they are afraid of not getting a new visa to return to Europe, although they were previously used to circular practices).

In contemporary migration policy, a growing cooperation between EU states and African states can be observed. Sociological and anthropological case studies have shown that circulation is an ancient practice of migrants in Europe. This practice however, was only recently realised by policy makers who until then had no idea that the closing of borders can have unintended consequences such as migrants stopping their circulation and settling in one country because they are afraid of not being able to come back to Europe. Therefore, the introduction of multi-entry visas which would take into consideration circular migration practices is under discussion in France – but only for certain categories of immigrants such as those who are highly-skilled.

4.3 Recent French political treatment of immigration

Concentrating on what are termed in France the “Sarkozy laws” of 2003 and 2006, along with recent international agreements, this section focuses on recent changes brought on by this legislation.

Immigration in France is a long-standing phenomenon that has significantly evolved since the seventies, under the influence of the construction of Europe, the globalising economy and, as a consequence, a new political attitude towards migratory issues. Today, while fervently opposing long-term immigration, French politicians are attempting to meet the needs of employers by selectively promoting temporary labour migrations. The recourse to a foreign workforce, managed through temporary contracts, posted workers, international subcontracting agreements or even undocumented workers, appears to have succeeded in assuring the survival of weak economic sectors within a competitive international market. As a consequence, after having considered immigration since 1974 to be a marginal phenomenon centred on “family reunification” [regroupement familial], France is now returning to policies that favour labour immigration.

Although the government announced an official objective of forging a new era of migration in France, and although the reports of the United Nations and numerous experts maintain the necessity of a substantial and continual flow of immigration to compensate for the demographic decline (United Nations, 2000), French politicians assume the national population to be unprepared for news of an influx of settler migrations. Politicians thus

27 Nicolas Sarkozy was Minister of the Interior in the French right-wing government from May 2002 to March 2004 and from June 2005 to April 2007. During the last five years, immigration has been one of his key issues and he supervised two new laws on this topic.
28 After labour immigration in France was suspended by the decree [décret] of 5 and 9 July 1974, immigration concerned only students, seasonal workers and the relatives of workers legally settled in France.
frequently opt to anticipate the public’s rejection of such a migration policy by asserting that the results would be unbearable for France. In political discourses, the return to an era of immigration is therefore counterbalanced by the idea that this new trend will differ from previous ones and will not add to existing social problems related to settler migrations.

On the one hand, there is a will to restrict long-term immigration because former immigrants supposedly demonstrated a “lack of integration” which led to social problems. On the other hand, modern capitalism and the global economy require a cheap, reliable and flexible foreign workforce. The French right-wing government has consequently attempted, over the last five years and through several laws and official communications on the matter, to re-introduce immigration as an acceptable practice by focusing on the pragmatic aspects and simultaneously down-playing the human and social aspects. In this vein, the new laws are advertised as modifying French policy so as “to go from an endured immigration to a chosen immigration.”

Giving credence to the idea that immigration is a source of many of the social problems in France, the 2003 and 2006 laws on immigration claim to support the social integration of foreigners who are either already present in France or whose entry cannot be refused, while limiting entry for new “undesired” immigrants.

The first of these two laws is: Law n°2003-1119 of 26 November 2003, entitled “Related to the control of immigration, to the stay of foreigners in France and to nationality” [Relative à la maîtrise de l’immigration, au séjour des étrangers en France et à la nationalité], or MIFESEN. This law introduces a modification to the ordinance of 2 November 1945 concerning the “Requirements of entry and stay of foreigners in France” [Conditions d’entrée et de séjour des étrangers en France]. This edict of 1945, modified dozens of times since its creation, has since 2004 been transformed into a new edict entitled “Code of entry and stay of foreigners and of rights to asylum” [Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit d’asile], or CESEDA. The second Sarkozy law, of 24 July 2006, “Related to immigration and integration” [Relative à l’immigration et à l’intégration], completes its statutory part. Our goal is not to examine every aspect of this Code but to present its main modifications which attest to a change in immigration policy.

4.3.1 Limiting “endured immigration”

- Hindering access to all residence permits

The Minister of the Interior defends the idea that France receives too many “undesired” foreigners due to permissive legal procedures that grant residence permits too easily. One aspect of the new laws has thus been to limit the possibilities of obtaining any kind of resident permit and to hinder progression from short-term permits to longer ones. The main point introduced to limit any form of long-term immigration has been to submit the delivery of any permit of this kind to a condition of integration.

30 Ordinance n°45-2658 of 2 November 1945.
32 Law n° 2006-911 relative to immigration and integration.
This “integration requirement” has been subject to much controversy, as the governmental administration is now responsible for estimating the integration of a foreigner, in particular the latter’s “sufficient knowledge of the French language and the principles of the French Republic.” NGOs working on issues of immigration argue that the assessment of such criteria is problematic and subjective, and thus likely to differ from one government official to another. Some have also asserted that integration is impossible prior to a long settlement in the country, which only the ten-year resident permit allows for. Beyond criticizing the concept of integration, NGOs denounce the arbitrary selection of immigrant candidates based on obscure factors. Yet for the Minister defending this measure, the requirement of integration is a means of carrying out the political belief that residence in France should be subject to feeling affection for this country and its values.

- Limiting the right to settle in France for family reasons

A major objective of the new laws entails abating the rights attached to family reunification, which is presented by the Minister of the Interior as archetypical of “endured” immigration. Family reunification concerns the possibility, for any foreigner possessing a residence permit in France, to be reunited with his/her spouse and children in order to live as a family. This form of migration has been the principal gateway to settlement in France since long-term working immigration was officially ended in 1974 (see introduction to this report). Both the 2003 and the 2006 laws contain measures that aim to limit immigration brought about by family reunification.

In the same vein, another aspect targeted by these laws is the facilitation for the spouses of French citizens to live in France and acquire French nationality. Considering this a gateway for abuses, the 2003 and 2006 laws tried to hinder this path. Consequently, NGOs argued that these new procedures made foreign spouses dependent on their husbands/wives as they must remain married for at least four years in order to avoid losing their residence permit in France.

The new laws therefore complicate these settlement procedures in order to maximally hinder access to the resident permit and, in doing so, to limit long-term settlement in France. A substantial portion of civil society has since protested the resulting lack of respect for the basic human rights of immigrants and their families.

- Fight against illegal immigration

The Minister’s speeches have depicted illegal immigration as a core element of “endured” immigration. Reinforcing the fight against the former has thus become a priority of the government. Yet since this policy has not been pursued parallel with the development of worker immigration, the pursuit of illegality has frequently led to the deportation of fully employed foreign workers.

Illegality in working immigration has two facets: one concerns the absence of any residence permit. In this case, the foreigner is not allowed to settle in France and consequently has no right to work there. Another case concerns an individual possessing a residence permit which does not allow him/her to work. This circumstance resembles that of French nationals who work while receiving unemployment aid, although the sanctions are different both for the employers and for the workers (Marie 1999).
The most controversial measure taken against undocumented foreigners is the elimination, with the 2006 law, of automatic regularisation after ten years of continuous stay in France. Before 1993, any foreigner who could prove s/he had been living in France for 15 years could obtain a ten-year resident permit. This possibility disappeared in 1993 but was reintroduced in 1997 under a less advantageous form, in that long-term illegal residents could obtain a one-year temporary resident permit if able to prove they had lived continuously in France for ten years (fifteen years if they had been a student during the period). This measure has been replaced since the 2006 law by much less advantageous procedures.

In addition to these principal legal modifications, both laws facilitate the deportation process and the option for police to interrogate and retain migrants in closed centres.

In analysing these main modifications, it is quite clear that the objectives of the law are not only to limit immigration, but chiefly to leave room for the administration to refuse immigration applications based on undisclosed or subjective criteria. Both laws eliminate any automatic procedures of granting long-term residence, replacing these with the issuance of one-year residence permits, subject to the yearly administrative reconsideration of the applicant’s personal situation. In this framework, “republican integration,” “insertion into French society” or “respect of French Republican principles” are all the more meaningful in that their meanings are not clearly established. These requirements can consequently be interpreted differently from one administrative service or locality to another, but also from one government to another, depending on its conception of “French society” and what might be considered a proper – or improper – attitude toward French republican principles.

4.3.2 “Chosen” immigration: a European preference?

In presenting these new laws created under his aegis, the Minister of the Interior has insisted on their two-fold objectives: to end “undesired” immigration and to allow for tightly controlled labour immigration.

Analysis of both laws, however, reveals that they hardly reintroduce labour immigration. Although the 2006 law clarifies and restructures the work permits for foreigners, it does not profoundly change French policy towards labour immigration. Other legal measures, particularly those connected to European directives and international agreements, are in fact more influential on this matter and have already led to a more permissive attitude concerning labour immigration to France. Remarkably, whereas the “Sarkozy laws” have been publicly announced, defended by the government and debated in civil society, international measures such as the European Directive CE96 or the GATT agreements on free trade in services, which have been influential in terms of labour immigration to France, have entered French legislation in a much more concealed manner.

Political asylum and migratory issues have been a prime issue at the EU level since 1999, though each member State has maintained significant latitude in managing this issue on its own territory. In France, this leverage is utilized to merge from a post-colonial setting into the new European situation, with all the internal cross-border flows and new international exchanges that this context entails.

33 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) discussed at the World Trade Organization (WTO).
34 General Agreement on Trade in Services – GATS.
The measures concerning posted workers and the recruitment trends in numerous sectors clearly establish European citizens as the preferred migrants. This trend may indeed be in accordance with the construction of the European Union, it is also in accordance with an increasing ethnic preference. As racism in France generally targets people from Africa and North Africa, immigration is perceived as frightening when these countries are concerned. Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians are not only the principal actors of the latest immigration trends in France, but are also the targets of xenophobic attitudes (De Rudder, Poiret, and Vourc'h, 2000). When French politicians insist on the “integration difficulties of immigrants,” they implicitly point fingers at the supposed gap between “their” culture and “ours.”

These kinds of representations do not exist towards European citizens. Although migrations from Eastern Europe are sometimes feared, the reasons lie in the apprehension of the elevated number of entries and the fact that these immigrants may compete with French workers due to their willingness to work for lower wages. Eastern European workers however, do not appear in the public imagination as threatening French national identity. Ideal immigration from a French political standpoint might thus be that concerning European migrants whose stay in France does not surpass the duration requested by their employers.

4.4 Changes in Interior policy: Measuring Discrimination?

There are current changes taking place in Interior policy which are linked to immigration. Different studies aimed at measuring discrimination based on phenotype or “race” have been undertaken, such as the recent ‘testing’ organised by the Centre d’Analyse Stratégique, a public research and policy-making institution under the auspices of the French Prime Minister. The way these results could lead to affirmative action measures is under discussion.

Several anti-racist movements in France like the CRAN (Conseil Représentatif des Associations Noires) have reacted to the testing organised by the Centre d’Analyse Stratégique under the auspices of the French Prime Minister, or have themselves organised such testings previously.

The question whether certain categories of population are able to be assimilated is still present within public discourse and shows continuities in French migration policy.

Messages of exclusion and contempt are perceived by third-generation Arab and African immigrants, whereas third-generation Italians or Portuguese are perceived as French. The recent naturalisation criteria, symbolised by the new Ministry for Immigration, National Identity and Co-Development, show a clear continuity: assimilation is still a criterion for naturalisations, which means that the Ministry has not yet integrated the diverse cultural, geographical and religious references of its immigrants (Saada 2005, 2007; de Rudder et al, 2000). The latest immigration Law\textsuperscript{35} in its Art. 1, paragraph 2, includes an evaluation of the candidate seeking citizenship, based on “a degree of knowledge of the language and the

values of the Republic”, in order to “allow him to prepare his republican integration in the French society”.

4.5 Co-Development: Improvement of local living conditions in West Africa

In the 1980s, co-development meant “cooperation for development”. It was based on the idea of “valuing the contribution migrants can make to the development of their countries of origin and of involving civil society in this process” (Magoni 2004:6). Although French policy evolved from the objective of sending migrants home, in the 1980s, towards measures for stabilizing potential migrants in their countries of origin, the Sami Naïr’s report36 was based on the idea that migrants are important actors and that their contribution to development should be encouraged and valued. The governmental return projects have never been successful and were considered failures by the French government as well as by the Senegalese government.37 As stressed in previous sections of this report, France’s immigration policy was influenced by demographic evolution and by the needs of the labour market. These two aspects also currently dominate debates on co-development: on the one hand, co-development is supposed to discourage potential immigrants with the improvement of the local living conditions – a hypothesis which is contested in the long term. On the other hand, the current needs of the French labour market for skilled labour lead to the invention of “partnerships” between France and potential sending countries. The “fear of increased competition from migrant workers” (Magoni 2004: 14) has a lower impact on public policies than the obvious need for 100,000 qualified immigrants.38

A recent tendency is noted in the French government choosing to attract highly-skilled migrants via a special residence permit. The principle of chosen migration is not new because highly-skilled migrants have always benefited from preferential treatment, even during the officially declared period of “zero migration” (discussed at length in previous sections). The new dimension in this policy is that such preference is now openly declared. This is also coupled with attempts to restrict family migration and the discouragement of potential asylum seekers by making the procedure more difficult and complicated.39

4.6 New migration phenomena

4.6.1 Trans-European migrations

Since the Iron Curtain came down, the European continent has become, as it used to be, a vast space of exchange in which human migrations take diverse forms, from more or less permanent emigration to a variety of short-term movements, such as study programs or

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37 See the declaration made by Abdoul Malal Diop, the Senegalese Minister for Senegalese residing outside the country, in an interview with the newspaper “Soleil”, www.soleil.sn (14/08/2007).
38 Report published in 2002 by the OFCE (Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Economiques), a governmental study group.
39 Lettre de mission du Président Sarkozy à Brice Hortefeux, 2007 ; see Projet de Loi relatif à la maîtrise de l’immigration, à l’intégration et à l’asile, enregistré à la Présidence de l’Assemblée Nationale le 4 juillet 2007. For a critical reading of these documents, see the analysis of Serge Slama on www.upolin.fr.
seasonal jobs (Okolski, 2001). This kind of migration consists of a constant mobility, between the native country and several places abroad where migrants work on a temporary basis. These practices were introduced at the beginning of the nineties and show how middle-class people from eastern European countries have played a role, without waiting for international agreements, in the construction of Europe as a large transnational space.

In the context of a more or less difficult transition, depending on the countries concerned, the option of working temporarily abroad has become a solution for coping with the difficulties encountered at home. The wealth gap between eastern and western countries allows migrants to make the most of their earnings by working in the West while spending in the East (Potot, 2007). Thus, for most of them, migration does not mean permanent emigration; they actually ‘settle in mobility’, their life being divided between several places while their ‘home’ remains their original country (Morokvasic-Müller, 2003). At the beginning of the nineties, as possibilities of travelling to the West were very few, informal (i.e., not legally organized) movements took place involving mainly young males just reaching adulthood and in search of adventure as well as prosperity. They went to Germany, France or other countries with tourist visas using the new options of free circulation (lasting from 1992 for Polish, Hungarians and Slovenians) and found jobs there, mostly in construction or tourism, where undeclared jobs are numerous. Others became petty traders, selling eastern products in the West and vice versa (Morokvasic, 1999). After a few months, they would come back to their homeland with their savings.

These early experiences encouraged others to leave and, eventually, with the numbers increasing, migrations have become easier and been particularly enabled by numerous informal networks now in place which sell visas when needed, provide information, and offer opportunities to work abroad. Meanwhile, migrants have also tightened networks of sociability throughout Europe which facilitate the migration of newcomers. As a result, the people concerned now include many categories of the middle-class, such as older people (some retired) and women, who are today nearly as numerous as men to migrate temporarily while managing transnational families.

Being ‘cross-European’ gives these migrants a special position both in the West and in their homeland. Through transnational networks, migrants participate simultaneously in two different economic processes: one in Western Europe and the other in their homeland (Göckel, Morokvasic and Münst 2008). In the West, their role as underpaid workers contributes to organising new forms of global capitalism (Rea, 2002) while, in their own country, these migrants are directly involved in the so-called transition process which aims to put eastern societies into the spectrum of the industrialised countries.

4.6.2 The example of Eastern European workers in French agriculture

The increase in international agricultural competition, the expansion of the European Union and new forms of product distribution have all led to deep modifications of wage-earning labour in Western European agriculture.

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40 This part comes from preliminary results of an ongoing research conducted by the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Migragri project: http://www.unice.fr/urmis/spip.php?article200
This sector is unique as it needs a large number of workers for very variable periods, for hard and low-paid jobs. By nature, the activity does not permit them to delocalize, but international competition, mainly with Spain and Morocco who benefit from better weather conditions and cheaper workers, weakens this economic sector (FCE, 2002). For years, farmers have recruited foreign workers; from the end of the sixties until the nineties most of them, Tunisians and Moroccans, were employed under OMI contracts managed by the French Office des Migrations Internationales (a follow-up of ONI – Office National de l’immigration), created to introduce temporary workers for six to eight months. Since 1992, these contracts have been modified, first to extend it to Polish workers and then to reduce their duration up to four months, to better suit the employer’s demand of flexibility (this has been discussed in previous sections as well).

Meanwhile, another kind of recruitment has been developed: sub-contracted workers “posted” by Polish and Romanian firms. The position of these workers regarding French law is quite ambiguous, torn between special French dispositions and foreign national laws (Math and Spire, 2004). On the ground, international controls are very rare and thus these situations are open to much abuse (Morice, 2004).

Other types of agricultural workers include undocumented ones: being illegal, they remain outside of any juridical protection and are entirely devoted to their employers; they can be employed and dismissed according to the variations of farming activity (Berlan, 1997).

This diversification can be explained by the fact that their extensive experience as long term migrants allows old OMI workers to be more demanding of their rights and better collectively organized than newly arrived migrants. This works in favour of a replacement of the working forces, given the liability placed on migrants to be employed (Potot, 2008).

Therefore, the traditional way of contracting, inherited from the colonial period, is nowadays overdetermined by new migrant networks, often Europeans who are more ‘settled in mobility’ than are their predecessors (Morokvasic, 1999). New links are developed between French areas and foreign places of recruitment. In the Polish case, some ancient immigrants, settled in rural regions of France since the communist period, have become central pillars of new recruitment networks. Official organisations being nearly nonexistent, farmers turn to Poles in their area when seeking to establish links with Polish manpower. The latter mobilize their existing relationships to offer their compatriots temporary jobs in France. In this way, they satisfy both the employers in search of cheap and reliable manpower and the workers who are willing to spend a few months in France, earning the wages of a year’s worth of work in Poland. Most of the time, these hiring are conducted very informally and are based on personal arrangements between the various actors. Surprisingly, employers are generally not charged for this service; only workers have to pay to get those jobs.

It is worth noting that these networks open the gate to both legal and illegal economic migration. It is quite common to find migrants who work alternatively with and without a legal permit. Even though Poland is now part of the EU, France has chosen to maintain a specific regime for its workers: they can be employed in sectors in which manpower is lacking but they still need to follow official procedure concerning the introduction of foreign workers. In agriculture, they need to be processed through the OMI contracts. For farmers, it is more secure to employ them legally but the procedure is quite complex and long, so they often bypass it. For example, it appears that they apply for the introduction of Polish workers but, as they do not receive an answer soon enough, they employ them illegally during harvest time. Other times, they do not receive the official authorisation because the quotas are already filled. In this case, employers do not renounce, they just do it illegally. Often, Polish workers
enter France as tourists but go straight away to the field. They usually live where they work, renting a room from their employer. In big farms, these workers can number over a hundred, working under hard conditions for low wages which are still higher than those available in their homeland.

In addition to this predictable need for manpower, farmers often need very short-term workers, for compensating harvest irregularity. If the weather becomes warmer, if supermarkets ask for bigger amounts of produce or for any other reason, it becomes necessary to employ more workers for a few days. In those cases they cannot wait for foreigners to come so they turn to another source of manpower: local illegal workers. In these rural areas, there are always a large number of undocumented workers willing to do any kind of work. They can be long-term undocumented migrants who have difficulties finding any job in France, old legal workers who have lost their permits, OMI workers who must wait for several months before being authorized to sign a new contract or people in transit, going elsewhere and seeking to earn some money. This population is mostly made up of North African migrants, living in very poor conditions in caravans or shantytowns. They cannot afford to send any money to their homeland and barely manage to survive from day to day. Because their migration is a failure, they do not dare going back, but they cannot expect any improvement in their situation either. Until 2006, undocumented workers could hope for a long-term permit after ten years of residence in France, but this procedure having been withdrawn, they are now stuck in limbo.

Nonetheless, these undocumented workers provide a crucial role within the agriculture sector. All farmers are in agreement that they need this very flexible manpower, recruited on a daily basis, to deal with the fluctuations of their activity. It helps them resist the competition with Spain, Israel or Morocco where labour laws and wages are much less favourable to the workers. Local French manpower as well as documented foreigners refuse these hard and very low-paid jobs. Actually, undocumented and hopeless foreigners are the only ones who accept this work, as their illegal status prevents them from searching for jobs in other sectors. This explains why farmers are not in favour of a general regularisation of undocumented migrants. If they can accept having a part of their workers legally employed, the tolerance toward undocumented living on the place is crucial for their manpower management. Indeed, while most of the industries are regularly patrolled by state agents in search of illegal workers, this is very rarely done for farms, even when illegalities surface, they are nearly never pursued. Thus, even if not officially acknowledged, there is a kind of tolerance specific to this sector of employment. In fact, farmers’ unions have managed to obtain special treatment from politicians by stressing the specific difficulties they encounter in their sector.

4.7 Gendered effects of gender-neutral policies

Though the new legislative measures mentioned above (section 4.3) are assumed to be gender neutral, it is clear that they target immigrant women and men differently. Women are more likely to be among the reuniting spouses and to have their status tied to those of their husbands. The waiting periods and the separation target women differently when they have to wait or go back to their home country before being allowed to join their spouses. Besides increasing the likelihood of immigrants resorting to illegal entry in order to reunite with their spouse in France, the legislation, by increasing the number of years of marital life as a condition for obtaining a residence card or for obtaining French citizenship,
increases the spouse’s, i.e., primarily women’s dependent status in the couple. Separation and/or divorce then become highly risky and unlikely steps.\footnote{This section draws on joint research, the findings of which are published in Morokvasic and Catarino (2006).}

The CSO “Women’s rights, residence rights, against double violence” denounces the extension of the period of cohabitation necessary for a reuniting family member, in most cases a woman, to obtain residency. This increases the vulnerability of women when they are subjected to domestic abuse. The very meaning of cohabitation as applied by the prefectures is questionable: it is an outdated conception of family and marital ties, out of touch with social realities. It denies family reunification outside marriage, does not recognize homosexual couples for the same purpose, conditions which are no longer applicable to many French couples.

Women demanding asylum on the grounds of sexual violence seldom obtain refugee status because the specific forms of persecution against women are not considered to be of a political nature. They are granted \textit{subsidiary protection} which entitles them to temporary residence permits, subject to conditional renewal, and limits their access to some social benefits.

The acquisition of French nationality has been equal for men and women since 1973 until recently. Men and women marrying French citizens could equally request French nationality through a simple declaration, within one year after marriage, without residency conditions. Thirty years later, inter-marriage has become a target of restrictive legislation with the 2003 Law, based on the suspicion that many of these are “marriages of convenience.” Statistically, women have a greater propensity than men to become French (getting naturalised). Men are more likely to be suspected of contracting marriages of convenience than women. This is also the case when they immigrate as spouses.

There is also legislation which does not explicitly target immigrants or foreigners, but in practice, it primarily targets them or has a perverse and discriminatory effect on certain categories of people where immigrants tend to be disproportionately present. In the examples below the first laws are controversial and have stirred much debate. They directly concern mostly immigrant/foreign women and girls. The third example draws on public policies related to the labour market which are meant to remedy unemployment.

The Law on Internal Security of March 2003 under the cover of “curbing the spread of crime” introduced the notion of passive solicitation and sanctions on women and men who practice street prostitution, obliging them to move to remote areas where they are increasingly vulnerable to being abused by clients and pimps. This criminalisation of prostitution has an additional effect on foreign prostitutes whose residence permits can be confiscated any time leading them to risk being expelled.

In 2003, France had its third “headscarf affair” and in March 2004 the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols was outlawed in all public educational establishments with the exception of universities. Although not specifically targeting the headscarves and Muslim symbols, the media coverage, debates and the Commission Stasi that formulated the arguments to support the Law, focused primarily on Islam and the wearing of headscarves by schoolgirls as a symbol of the oppression of women. The law divided feminists and intellectuals. Those who were for the law, argued in the name of the universalistic principles of the French Republic that needed to be reaffirmed; those against the banning by law pointed to “political hysteria” about an issue which in itself was minor in scope: there were no more than twelve hundred cases in the whole country, with only a
couple of dozens genuinely regarded as problems leading to four exclusions. It is argued that the headscarf is used by girls who wear it as a test of the universal principles and openness of the Republic. The violent reaction of the state with the law which excludes school girls from state schools is but a sign of its own incapacity to deal with differences and with sexism and ethnic discriminations in the society as a whole (Nordmann 2004).

In the context of persistent high unemployment in France, immigrants’ unemployment rates have been higher than the rates of the total population (double as far as immigrant women are concerned). In recent trends in welfare-to-work policies, the series of schemes are unlikely to target immigrants favourably. The payment of the back to work allowance requires conditions which immigrant women may find difficult to meet. It is equally increasingly difficult to qualify for unemployment compensation, and foreign national job seekers are more likely to receive welfare because they are more often working part-time and do not have enough hours to qualify. The rate of part-time employment or under-employment is particularly high for cleaning jobs --maids and house-keepers-- which are over-represented by immigrant women. Immigrant women are also over-represented in the segment of population receiving the lowest wages, so even when they receive compensation, it is bound to be low.

CONCLUSION

France has been a major immigration country in Europe since the 19th century. The foreign presence has contributed to shaping French population and identity – one quarter of French citizens has at least one foreign born parent or grandparent. Neither the economic crises nor the tightening of immigration policies have managed to halt the continuous trend of immigration which even accelerated recently.

In the overview presented here we focused on the key moments of the French immigration experience and stressed the importance of taking into account historical developments in assessing contemporary flows and their origin as well as migratory policies. Rather than reiterating main points of our present contribution to the conventional wisdom about immigrant France, we would like to draw attention to the limits of the available data and to some challenges and questions for further research.

Migration realities stretch beyond immigration only. First, even in such an old immigration country as France, emigration is important. Second, migration flows, increasingly feminized in composition, are complex and diversified involving various forms of mobility, short term migrations and circulation. Third, emigration and immigration concern both foreigners and French citizens. However research as well as public debate and policies focus on immigration. The evidence about other dimensions, when it exists, is based on small surveys only. The French official statistics are incomplete, as some French demographers pointed out recently. Not a single new tool for the observation of international migrations has been developed in France since 1993 and only foreign immigration is measured, the statistics on emigration and on the movement of the French are inexistent observes Xavier Thierry (2008). For Hervé Le Bras too, it is “as if immigration/emigration concerned only foreigners”. He equally underscores the statistical knowledge gap about emigration, especially of the French, who have increasingly been taking residence in various European countries in the past decade (to the extent that net migration was close to zero) (Le Bras, 2008). It seems that in an old established
immigration country as France the political relevance dictates the observation tools, topics and, accordingly, policies. Taking on emigration into consideration as a part of French migration reality is difficult in the context in which political as well as scientific focus remains on immigration.

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*Plein Droit, La revue du Gisti*, no. 73, juillet 2007: Let tri des étrangers.


ANNEX: TABLES

Table A.1: Births in France and in Germany (per 1000 inhabitants), 1841-1900

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1841-1850</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851-1860</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861-1870</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871-1880</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881-1890</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891-1900</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table A.2: Total fertility rate (average number of children per woman) in France and England, 1760-1900

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Divergence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1760-1769</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1770-1779</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1780-1789</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1790-1799</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>-0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800-1809</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>5.76</td>
<td>-1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1810-1819</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>6.07</td>
<td>-1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820-1829</td>
<td>4.18</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>-1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830-1839</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>-1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840-1849</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>-1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851-1860</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>-1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861-1870</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>-1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871-1880</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>4.91</td>
<td>-1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881-1890</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891-1900</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.3: Intercontinental Emigration rates (per 100,000 average population), Europe, 1851-1924

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1851-1860</th>
<th>1861-1870</th>
<th>1871-1880</th>
<th>1881-1890</th>
<th>1891-1900</th>
<th>1901-1910</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1921-1924</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria-Hungary</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Isles (1)</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>1 035</td>
<td>607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>178</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland (2)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>1 417</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>357</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>211</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>210</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>1 077</td>
<td>1 630</td>
<td>433</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>1 296</td>
<td>321</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain (1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>1 051</td>
<td>461</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(1) Passengers
(2) For the period 1921-1924, Irish Free State for 1921-1923
Source: Ferenczi and Wilcox, 1929: 200-201
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total Europe</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>France % of Europe</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>Ireland (2)</th>
<th>Scandinavia (3)</th>
<th>Other North Western (4)</th>
<th>Germany (5)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1821-30</td>
<td>98,817</td>
<td>8,497</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>25,079</td>
<td>50,724</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>4,331</td>
<td>6,761</td>
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<tr>
<td>1831-40</td>
<td>495,688</td>
<td>45,575</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>75,810</td>
<td>207,381</td>
<td>2,264</td>
<td>6,255</td>
<td>152,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841-50</td>
<td>1,597,501</td>
<td>77,262</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>267,044</td>
<td>780,719</td>
<td>14,442</td>
<td>17,969</td>
<td>434,626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851-60</td>
<td>2,452,660</td>
<td>76,358</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>423,974</td>
<td>914,119</td>
<td>24,680</td>
<td>40,538</td>
<td>951,667</td>
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<tr>
<td>1861-70</td>
<td>2,065,270</td>
<td>35,986</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>606,896</td>
<td>435,778</td>
<td>126,392</td>
<td>39,122</td>
<td>787,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871-80</td>
<td>2,272,262</td>
<td>72,206</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>548,043</td>
<td>436,871</td>
<td>243,016</td>
<td>52,055</td>
<td>718,182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881-90</td>
<td>4,737,046</td>
<td>50,464</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>807,357</td>
<td>655,482</td>
<td>656,494</td>
<td>155,866</td>
<td>1,452,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891-00</td>
<td>3,558,978</td>
<td>30,770</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>271,538</td>
<td>388,416</td>
<td>371,512</td>
<td>76,104</td>
<td>505,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-10</td>
<td>8,136,016</td>
<td>73,379</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>525,950</td>
<td>339,065</td>
<td>505,324</td>
<td>124,819</td>
<td>341,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-20</td>
<td>4,376,564</td>
<td>61,897</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>341,408</td>
<td>146,181</td>
<td>203,452</td>
<td>100,555</td>
<td>143,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-30</td>
<td>2,477,853</td>
<td>49,610</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>330,213</td>
<td>220,591</td>
<td>198,210</td>
<td>73,197</td>
<td>412,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-40</td>
<td>348,289</td>
<td>12,623</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>29,378</td>
<td>13,167</td>
<td>11,286</td>
<td>18,044</td>
<td>114,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-50</td>
<td>621,704</td>
<td>38,809</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>131,592</td>
<td>27,503</td>
<td>26,901</td>
<td>38,416</td>
<td>226,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-60</td>
<td>1,328,293</td>
<td>51,121</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>191,614</td>
<td>57,332</td>
<td>57,101</td>
<td>89,211</td>
<td>477,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-70</td>
<td>1,129,670</td>
<td>45,226</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>206,353</td>
<td>40,435</td>
<td>43,458</td>
<td>58,818</td>
<td>190,796</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(1\) For years ending June 30, except: 1820-1831 and 1844-1849, years ending Sept.30; 1833-42 and 1851-1867, years ending Dec.31; 1832 covers 15 months ending Dec.31; 1843, 9 months ending Sept.30; 1850, 15 months ending Dec.31; 1868, 6 months ending June 30. For 1820-1867 excludes returning citizens.

\(2\) Comprises Eire and Northern Ireland after 1921

\(3\) Comprises Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland

\(4\) Comprises Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland

\(5\) Includes Austria, 1938 to 1945
Table A.5: Foreigners active in the labour force according to the occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-professional groups</th>
<th>1891</th>
<th>1906</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1891</th>
<th>1906</th>
<th>1911</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in thousands</td>
<td>per 1,000 active population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forests</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines and quarries</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing industries</td>
<td>229.2</td>
<td>290.5</td>
<td>276.3</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport (A) including fishing (B) the handling</td>
<td>(A)15.4</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>(B)105.8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial occupations</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servants</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal professions</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public services</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All categories</td>
<td>533.4</td>
<td>617.1</td>
<td>680.2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Recensement de 1891 fait dans chaque préfecture, Recensement de 1906 et de 1911 par la “Statistique Générale de la France” (SGF) pour tout le territoire (Bunle 1943)*.

* The census methods are different and in 1906 the active foreigners were classified according to the nature of the collective industry exerted in the establishment where they worked while in 1911, one distributed them according to their individual profession. The data collected in the three censuses are not thus comparable but give however the tendency for considered periods.
Table A.6: Immigrants according to the year of arrival (Europe, Africa, Asia, America and Oceania)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of arrival</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Year of arrival</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>12,712</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>84,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>14,687</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>88,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>23,862</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>72,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>26,853</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>64,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>23,490</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>69,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>18,998</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>58,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>14,706</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>63,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>17,967</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>73,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>13,655</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>94,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>17,949</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>76,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>20,186</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>75,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>38,416</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>68,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>48,753</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>59,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>43,774</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>55,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>35,086</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>56,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>47,537</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>57,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>43,855</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>66,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>74,687</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>96,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>59,802</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>97,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>64,731</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>81,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>62,201</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>90,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>61,479</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>69,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>58,929</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>66,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>63,280</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>62,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>85,382</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>64,248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>109,530</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>76,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>81,661</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>117,587</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Recensement de la population, INSEE, 1999